Commentary

Volume Sixty-seven, Number Three, March 1979

LIONEL TRILLING, A JEW AT COLUMBIA
Diana Trilling

WHY THE SHAH FELL
Walter Laqueur

WELFARE REFORM AND THE LIBERALS
Leslie Lenkowsky

WHAT WOMEN WANT
Brigitte Berger

THE PROPHETS IN MODERN IDIOM
Chaim Raphael

YESTERDAY'S NEW MUSIC
Samuel Lipman

Books in Review:
Bernard Lewis
Michael Vannoy Adams
Peter H. Schuck
James Atlas
Arch Puddington

How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East

Theodore Draper

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE / $2.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.

Who's a leader at fueling America to keep it running strong?

Amoco is...

with over a million barrels of its petroleum products used by Americans every day.

Our independent dealers' and jobbers' service stations sell the fine family of Amoco • gasolines—leaded regular, and two grades of lead-free. Plus, a full line of Amoco • motor oils. All are identified by our familiar red, white and blue Torch and Oval trademark.

Amoco markets directly or through jobbers, to homes, industry, farms. We offer railroad fuels and jet fuels, lubricants, heating oils, LP-gas, fertilizers and pesticides. We also market to municipalities and governments.

What all our activity adds up to is this: every one of these millions of barrels of Amoco petroleum products used annually helps keep America running strong.

AMOCO®

You expect more from a leader.

Amoco Oil Company

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

VOLUME 67 NUMBER 3 *MARCH 1979*

Articles	23	How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East *Theodore Draper*
	40	Lionel Trilling, A Jew at Columbia *Diana Trilling*
	47	Why the Shah Fell *Walter Laqueur*
	56	Welfare Reform and the Liberals *Leslie Lenkowsky*
Observations	62	What Women Want *Brigitte Berger*
	67	The Prophets in Modern Idiom *Chaim Raphael*
Music	72	Yesterday's New Music *Samuel Lipman*
Letters	4	from *S. Clark Woodroe, Michael Kerper, James T. Farrell, John F. Dolan, Midge Decter, Michael Lewis, James A. Nuechterlein, Alfred D. Low, Jack P. Greene, Kenneth S. Lynn, Jonas Brachfeld, Roger Kaplan,* and others
Books in Review	82	A Dangerous Place, by Daniel Patrick Moynihan with Suzanne Weaver *Bernard Lewis*
	84	The History of Sexuality: Volume I, by Michel Foucault *Michael Vannoy Adams*
	87	Watergate and the Constitution, by Philip B. Kurland *Peter H. Schuck*
	90	A Revolution in Taste, by Louis Simpson *James Atlas*
	92	The Guns of Lattimer, by Michael Novak *Arch Puddington*

Editor: Norman Podhoretz
Executive Editor: Neal Kozodoy
Managing Editor: Marion Magid
Associate Editor: Brenda Brown
Contributing Editors: Robert Alter, Milton Himmelfarb, Walter Laqueur
Comptroller: Philip Shamis
Production Manager: Bruce Lodi
Circulation Manager: Helene Hansen
Cover: The Drawing Board, Inc.

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $2.50, $24 a year; 3 years $64; 5 years $96—Add $4.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1979 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions—Indexed in *Readers' Guide, Book Review Digest, Public Affairs Information Service, Index to Jewish Periodicals, ABC Pol Sci, Historical Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life*—Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Publication Number ISSN 0010-2601
EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO JINZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Richard Maass, *President*

The Commentary Publication Committee

Edward E. Elson, *Chairman*

Norman Alexander
Donald M. Blinken
Charles D. Breitel
Naomi W. Cohen
Theodore Ellenoff
Richard C. Ernst
Edith U. Fierst
Maurice Glinert
Robert H. Haines
Lewis J. Laventhol
Bess Myerson
Ned Pines
Frederick P. Rose
David Sher
John Slawson
Harry Steiner
Alan M. Stroock*
Laurence A. Tisch
Ben Touster
Gerard Weinstock

**Honorary Member*

Letters from Readers

Kennedyism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As a Harvard graduate, . . . I wish to thank Midge Decter and COMMENTARY for the article "Kennedyism Again" [December 1978] which analyzes the ethic of aggrandizing oneself to the utmost while seeking an appearance of somehow benefiting society. This approach has hurt integrity and morals at an institution I love.

I wonder what punishment will be in store for Miss Decter if Edward Kennedy enters the White House in 1981.

S. CLARK WOODROE
Charlestown, West Virginia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Midge Decter's "Kennedyism Again" is a fascinating . . . attempt by an able representative of one political elite to discredit a rival elite by appealing to, of all things, anti-elitism and "the political wisdom of ordinary citizens." Miss Decter's approach, of course, is hardly novel. The New Deal liberals used it against hapless Republicans; Eisenhower against Stevenson; Nixonian Democrats against McGovern; George Wallace against everyone; and, perhaps to a much lesser extent, Carter against Ford. . . .

Miss Decter makes some interesting points, but in her eagerness to persuade she succumbs to a dangerous temptation—she martyrs poor Edward Kennedy by rummaging through the Hyannis Port laundry hamper, indiscriminately tossing out every piece of soiled linen within her reach. To weaken her case further, she snidely—and, I think, ineffectually—denigrates the real achievements and stature of John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. But all the while she misses the really substantive question of "Kennedyism": why has the so-called Kennedy elite remained so durable and so attractive while other political elites, say the old Johnson-Humphrey-Jackson elite or the newly-emerging Moynihan elite, have evoked yawns or outright moans from the electorate (I have in mind the 1976 Jackson campaign)? And why has Kennedy retained his strength among the major non-elite groups of America, namely, the labor movement and the minority community? . . .

Part of the answer, I believe, lies in the fact that the so-called Kennedy elite operates on two political levels: "high" politics and "street" politics, if you will. By contrast, the sophisticated Kennedy opponents, like Miss Decter and other intelligent critics around neoconservative Democratic circles, rarely leave the "high" politics of Chevy Chase and the Upper West Side. The issues that engage Kennedy's highbrow critics—issues like international human rights, the perils of the New Class, deregulation, the problem of capital formation, Soviet advances in Africa—have no relevance whatsoever to the clubhouse patrons of Queens, the Bricklayers' Union in Brooklyn, or the paraprofessionals residing in Harlem. I do not mean to suggest that these issues are unimportant. Instead, I am saying that, by and large, they are issues that concern a relatively small, relatively insular intellectual elite.

Kennedyites, unlike their Right opposition, have a much broader, much more realistic vision of politics. They fully understand that one picture of Kennedy in the Baltimore *Afro-American* or the Local 400 *Union Reporter* is worth a thousand pages of type in COMMENTARY or the *Public Interest*. Moreover, in selecting and carefully framing their issues, they display a good deal of foresight, political savvy, and "street" wisdom. Thus, while someone like Senator Moynihan talks arcanely about SALT II and the terrible effects of regulation, Kennedy makes the rounds for tax reform and national health insurance, both popular proposals.

But Kennedy does much more than simply talk a good show. He produces for his constituencies, he joyfully presses the flesh. And he does all this at a time when virtually every other leading Democrat has retreated from the fray, frightened by the new hordes of deregulators and tax revolutionists. It is because Kennedy produces, and produces rather prodigiously, that trade unionists (including many who find his foreign policy and intra-party allies simply horrendous) and "putatively oppressed minorities" turn to him as something of a savior. These non-elite groups embrace Kennedy because he is reliable, acces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Twenty million years ago, the site of Marsha's discovery was a seashore. Now it's 40 miles from the sea, and half a mile down.

Marsha Green took a closer look at a 20-million-year-old seashore and found this new gas field.

For geologist Marsha Green, it was a case of reviewing the evidence just one more time and coming up a winner. After only two years with Gulf Oil, Marsha discovered a new and untapped gas field.

Spotted a trend

Her find was near Victoria, Texas, which 20 million years ago was a seashore, rich in the marine life that creates natural gas.

There were plenty of producing wells in this general area. The drilling record of each one tells a geologist something new about the earth's structure.

Marsha pored over these records. And she began to spot a trend.

Textbook curve

Marsha persuaded Gulf management to drill five exploratory wells. Four were dry. But on one, the instrument that detects natural gas went right off the scale. "A real textbook curve," Marsha says.

Marsha persuaded Gulf management to drill a series of exploratory wells.

Such moments are rare. But Marsha is a dedicated professional. "I like to try to figure out what happened millions of years ago," she says, "and put the whole picture together."

Marsha Green. One of 52,000 Gulf people, meeting the challenge.

Gulf

Gulf people: meeting the challenge.

Gulf Oil Corporation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sible, and sensitive to their needs. They do not support him because of what Miss Decter calls his "inalienable right to the Presidency" that somehow resides "not in his accomplishments, or his views, but in his essence." Such an understanding of the Kennedy appeal is, quite frankly, almost naive. Furthermore, to suggest that Kennedy's chief supporters find him attractive for mystical or nostalgic reasons seems to indicate that Miss Decter thinks the non-elite Kennedyites are indeed rather stupid.

Kennedy and his supporters understand and act upon one of the key truths of American politics. That basic truth was aptly expounded by Senator George Washington Plunkitt (Tammany Hall, 1842-1924) when he said: "What tells in holdin' your grip in your district is to go right down among the poor families and help them . . . and, let me tell you, they have more friends in their neighborhoods than the rich in theirs."

In short, then, one should not forget that in almost every respect the Kennedyites are superior politicians when compared with the neoconservatives and old elite Democrats. They are willing to get their hands dirty with the important issues that concern ordinary citizens. They are willing to spend some time away from the elite salons. And because of this they will out-hustle and, in all probability, continue to out-poll the Decter elite.

MICHAEL KERPER
Flushing, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Because I respect Midge Decter as a serious journalist, I would like to make one comment about her article on Arthur Schlesinger's book, *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, in which she says that it is "the product of great haste."

At my seventieth birthday party (and I will be seventy-five on February 27, 1979), Arthur Schlesinger spoke to me about the book. He had, at that time, already started doing some extensive research for the book. In fact, he mentioned having spent more than two years on it.

I feel sure that Miss Decter would want to know this fact, since truth is what all of us who write search for.

JAMES T. FARRELL
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

If Edward Kennedy decides to go in 1980, a few million copies of Midge Decter's article circulated throughout the country could be his most effective campaign literature. This, he could say, is what the "best and brightest" of my critics have to say about me and my brothers. I rest my case.

Because Miss Decter is ordinarily such a sane and sensible writer, one can hope that both she and COMMENTARY will, on reflection, come to realize that malevolence is not a sufficient basis on which to construct a critique of public men and public affairs. It is effective only with the already convinced; on others it produces anything from mild discomfort to active revulsion, depending on how sensitive one is to considerations of elementary fairness in political discussion.

ALLEN TAYLOR
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Midge Decter, in her article, "Kennedyism Again," begins with the rationally unassailable assertion that Edward Kennedy fails to satisfy minimal standards for leading the nation's government. From there her essay deteriorates, passing from irrelevancies (the Senator hails from "the less than politically impeccable state of Massachusetts") to something less than biting satire ("After all, . . . the Adamses . . . had been patient enough to hand the torch from generation to generation").

But it is not Miss Decter's shortcomings as a political essayist that prompt this letter; it is a more serious matter.

In the course of her article Miss Decter observes:

> First there was Jack, who might have appeared, and indeed for a time was, the roughhouse son of a roughhouse and politically unappetizing Irish millionaire father.

It is apt criticism of a political leader that he was "roughhouse" as a young man; and, though mostly irrelevant, it is only harmless gossip to refer to the similar trait of the former President's father. That trait and the whiffs of scandal that go with it are news to no one, thanks to the tabloids. It is also probably irrelevant, yet journalistically clever, to refer to the financial success of the late ambassador. Many people resent the child of a millionaire who enjoys, by the happenstance of birth, advantages denied the rest of us. One can fairly conclude from the tone of Miss Decter's article that she is not above fostering resentment toward "Teddy" and his brothers "Jack" and "Bobby," as she refers to them.

Yet what purpose does the ethnic reference in Miss Decter's sentence serve? Why in a truculent and vituperative article about the Kennedy family, an article which refers to Edward Kennedy's "criminal cowardice," to Robert Kennedy's fist fights, and to John Kennedy's, if not Joseph's, adultery, does Miss Decter juxtapose the word "Irish" with the double use of the term "roughhouse" and directly following the words "politically unappetizing"?

There are persons who think that Irish people are roughhouse, politically unappetizing, or otherwise undesirable. To those persons, Miss Decter's use of the term "Irish" as an epithet reinforces the thesis of her essay. That reinforcement notwithstanding, what Miss Decter has done is to play on the bigotry of those persons. In short, she has uttered publicly an ethnic slur in the evident confidence that her readers will at best get the message and at least accept the usage.

Assume for a moment that Miss Decter were writing an ungenerous article about a Jewish politician and that her article made no attempt to veil her hostility toward the subject whom she characterized as "the roughhouse son of a roughhouse and politically unappetizing Jewish millionaire father."

I would find such a statement offensive. I find Miss Decter's use of the term "Irish" offensive. At best, her comment reflects ignorance and insensitivity, at worst ethnic prejudice. In either event, Miss Decter and her editors owe me and many others an apology.

JOHN F. DOLAN
Grosse Pointe, Michigan

MIDGE DECTER writes:

Michael Kerper accuses me of being an elitist, concerned only with the sorts of issues that do not move ordinary voters and thus unable to appreciate the appeal of Edward Kennedy as a politician. According to Mr. Kerper, Kennedy's appetite for pressing the flesh and making promises that gladden the hearts of labor leaders is quite beyond the ken of those who, like

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The diamond solitaire.



A rare gift.

A 1⅛ carat diamond. Set simply and elegantly.
To sparkle on its own. Of lasting value,
because diamonds of about 1 carat and up are rare.
(The one shown here is worth about $5,950.)
The diamond solitaire.
It is the gift that makes a rare and beautiful
moment last a lifetime.

A diamond is forever.

The 1¼ carat diamond shown is enlarged for detail.
Prices may change substantially due to differences in diamond quality and market conditions. DeBeers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

myself, display a snobbish, not to say on the whole tiresome and boring, preoccupation with such higher abstractions as foreign policy and—God help us—"deregulation." For the sake of avoiding the vertigo that would follow, I will not take up in any detail the amazing list of issues Mr. Kerper claims now agitate that strange and wonderful kingdom called the Upper West Side, such as "the perils of the New Class"—the Upper West Side, Mr. Kerper, insofar as I understand the concept, *is* the "New Class." But I do want to say that it is precisely the needs and wishes and interests of the grass roots which have been in contention within the Democratic party since 1968. The old clubhouse pols seem to be out of touch with them, the New Politics pols have for the most part trampled on them, and the evidence of Kennedyite triumph in this area is, to put it mildly, far from conclusive. The voters cannot have been behaving as the Kennedyites would wish, unless Mr. Kerper thinks that Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter are in some sense embodiments of the Kennedyite dream. In any case, the question I asked in my piece was not whether Kennedy would or would not be elected but what are the qualities of the particular political community whose Crown Prince he is. If Mr. Kerper is a representative of that community, and if he can seriously characterize Henry Jackson and Daniel P. Moynihan as elitists and Kennedy at the same time as a true man of the people, then surely one of those qualities is a certain degree of confusion.

A far more serious question, because it has been raised in a number of places outside this magazine, and above all because it has been raised here by someone for whom I have an abiding admiration, James T. Farrell, is the question of my concern for truth and decency in having characterized Arthur Schlesinger's book as hurried, especially in view of the fact that he has been known to be working on it for years. My characterization of Schlesinger's book as hasty was based not on any kind of idea as to when it had actually been commenced, or when research on it had first been undertaken, but on its quality as a piece of writing. The book's great length, I said, was not the kind that results from comprehensiveness or scholarly thoroughness, but on the contrary from a lack of careful distillation. This, I repeat, was a *literary* judgment, or if you will, a literary-intellectual judgment. In the case of Arthur Schlesinger, who is normally a writer of grace and style and spirit, the shapelessness of *Robert Kennedy and His Times* seems all the more glaringly obvious; if the hastiness of which I spoke is spiritual rather than temporal, it makes little difference. Furthermore, to imply a connection between Schlesinger's book and the career of Edward Kennedy may be considered, as it is by Allen Taylor, a nasty thing to do, but to take the book at face value, as the true and disinterestedly presented story of Robert Kennedy, would, I am afraid, be no act of kindness either, to the author or to the memory of his subject.

Finally, with respect to my having identified Joseph P. Kennedy not simply as a roughhouse millionaire but as an Irishman of that category, I must assure John F. Dolan that I did so not out of bigotry but, on the contrary, in order to be quite dispassionately descriptive. Ethnicity has provided fairly specific kinds of coloration to American political life, especially, as everybody knows, in the Democratic party. The Irishness of Kennedy seemed to me relevant as signaling the particular political tradition from whence he stemmed. I would just as easily identify someone as Jewish. As it happens, there is an identifiable political style—indeed, it is the one that dominates the area of Manhattan in which I live—associated with Jews; its besetting sin is not roughhousery but sanctimoniousness. If anything, Mr. Dolan would find me more sympathetic to the former.

Equality

To the Editor of Commentary:

In his review of my book, *The Culture of Inequality* [Books in Review, November 1978], James A. Nuechterlein unwittingly reveals more about the muddled and often ethically suspect character of neoconservative thought than he does about the substance of my work. While the review itself—with its vituperative tone and its substitution of caricature for analysis—is difficult to take seriously, some of the premises that appear to have informed it do, I believe, warrant critical assessment.

Mr. Nuechterlein, in the manner typical of neoconservatives, would like to draw a distinction between a social system which emphasizes equal opportunity and a social system which emphasizes equality of condition. He believes, as do his ideological bedfellows, that the American predisposition for the former can be well served without serious attempts to make the latter a reality. As a historian, Mr. Nuechterlein should know better. Equal opportunity—the equity or fairness he claims to champion as a moral imperative of the greatest significance—has not been achieved in American society precisely because the need to equalize condition has, for the most part, been neglected. A competent historian should not have to be reminded that the American presumption of equal opportunity has characteristically been undermined by accident of birth. The children of poor parents, the children of modestly endowed parents, and the children of wealthy parents all have had different and unequal opportunities because of the inequalities in condition that they have inherited.

Having created a false distinction between equality of condition and equality of opportunity, Mr. Nuechterlein voices a specious worry which seems to trouble many who share his premises. He is concerned because "any drive for equality of condition will have to assume a conflict rather than a congruence with equality of opportunity." If we strive to equalize conditions of existence, he seems to be implying, we can only do so at cost to the fairness which is the hallmark of equal opportunity. Not so! If, on the contrary, Mr. Nuechterlein and his fellow neoconservatives were really interested in fairness above all else, they would have to be ardent supporters of policies intended to redistribute those inordinately advantaging resources, which more often than not are possessed by those who have not produced them.

Inequalities in condition, characteristically inherited and undeserved, are unfair so long as their existence renders equality of opportunity nonexistent in fact, and that too is unfair. The choice before us is not, as Mr. Nuechterlein would have it, between two conflicting versions of equality, because the two versions are not functionally separable. The choice is indeed between a system which max-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imizes equality of condition and therefore equality of opportunity, and a system which minimizes equality of condition and consequently equality of opportunity. That Mr. Nuechterlein and those who share his view refuse to see this raises grave doubts about their asserted commitment to equity. Their commitment, it seems, is to the continuation of unearned privilege, and that hardly seems synonymous with fairness.

Those who think as Mr. Nuechterlein does frequently invoke the "complexities" and "ambiguities" of social life ("complexities" and "ambiguities" which they rarely specify) in their defense of the inequitable status quo. Because almost nothing in the human social experience is fully determined (apparently as a result of these "complexities" and "ambiguities"), we are ultimately, each of us, presumed to be the captains of our singular fates, and consequently even thinking about a reorganization of society in the service of maximized human serviceability is a foolish waste of effort. *Que será, será*—and what will be is ultimately the responsibility of the autonomous individual.

It is difficult to imagine any contemporary student of human social experience denying the potent dedetermining reality of culture and social structure; but this is precisely what Mr. Nuechterlein does. That individual autonomy and free will—although undeniably human characteristics—find expression within limits imposed by cultural meaning and structural alignment is perhaps one of the few social-science generalizations which is not arguable. That Mr. Nuechterlein believes the study of the cultural and structural bases for persistent inequality and inequity trivial, surely cannot be a function of his historian's appreciation of the way Americans have exercised their limited autonomy in negotiating extra-individual sociocultural imposition. Rather, it would appear that he is driven to such a demonstrably ludicrous position by his ideologically inspired need to defend the legitimacy of what is in fact undeserved privilege. It is one thing to argue that individuals bear some responsibility for their behaviors and another to deny the significance of culture and social structure in shaping the behaviors for which they can be held accountable. No sensitive observer of the human drama could fail to embrace the first sentiment, but only those driven by ideological urgency would, in the face of all the historical evidence to the contrary, espouse the second sentiment.

On the issue of our characteristic responses to those problems associated with the persistence of poverty, Mr. Nuechterlein seems determined to out-Pangloss Dr. Pangloss. This is indeed the best of all possible worlds in which our interventions are the best of all possible interventions. Anything we do or have done about poverty—no matter how ineffective—ought to be appreciated and, if Mr. Nuechter-

80 PROOF IMPORTED BY THE JOSEPH GARNEAU CO., NEW YORK, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Haggadah That Will Become an Heirloom



Chaim Raphael's *Passover Haggadah*

Clear, easy to use, freshly and lucidly translated by Chaim Raphael, the well-known historian of Judaica and veteran contributor to *Commentary*, this Haggadah is packed with information and hints to make your family festival a memorable event. It is also an art treasure, one of the most beautiful editions of the Haggadah ever published.

In this carefully and exquisitely illustrated new presentation, the high points of the Seder ceremony are made crystal clear. The traditional Hebrew text, printed here in full, acquires a fresh dimension through Chaim Raphael's English version, full of respect for the original but at the same time direct and lively, striking right to present in words that speak to our own generation. The festive mood of the Haggadah is beautifully enhanced by the 29 full-color pages of art objects associated with the Passover holiday from all over the world and through the centuries.

Chaim Raphael's *Passover Haggadah* will be used, cherished, and passed down over the generations. If you are conducting [illegible] you could not ask for a more beautiful and if this is your first Seder, you need look no further for the ideal gift to [illegible]

[illegible] $2.50 each
[illegible] $2.85 each

[illegible] New York, N.Y. 10022

[illegible] pays all packing and shipping charges.)

lein were to have his way, rendered immune from criticism. What does it matter if public assistance rarely moves recipients out of poverty (see, for example, "A.F.D.C.: Symptom and Potential" by Winifred Bell in *Jubilee for Our Times,* edited by H.L. Schorr, Columbia University Press, 1977); if the War on Poverty was poorly conceived and funded at such an inadequate level that it never served more than 15 per cent of the poverty population (see, for example, "Poverty and Power" by Ben B. Seligman in *Aspects of Poverty,* edited by Ben B. Seligman, Crowell, 1968)? What do these misguided critics want? Effectiveness? Evidence that our interventions are other than symbolic gestures which do no more than insure the persistence of an inequitable status quo, even as they allow us to believe we are really trying to change things? How dare they assert that our record of ineffectiveness in responding to such problems, when juxtaposed against our record of successful inventiveness in other areas, indicates that—rhetoric aside—their solution is not a high-priority matter! How unthinkable for such critics to suggest that all of this may very well imply the necessity of poverty in American life, that given the nature of our culture and the structure of our society many of us may have an investment in the maintenance of others of us in impoverished circumstances! Unfortunately for Mr. Nuechterlein, such Panglossian indignation will not wash. The record speaks for itself, and it is certainly not a record deserving celebration. Need it be said that all interventions are not equally effective? Would Mr. Nuechterlein counsel uncritical acceptance of an approach to poverty reduction which emphasized extensive income redistribution? Given his fears about the "unfairness" presumably inherent in steps taken to equalize condition, I think not. Mr. Nuechterlein's very effective imitation of Dr. Pangloss has, I fear, been stimulated by an acute attack of ideological hysteria brought on by criticisms of programs which serve many of us well precisely because they poorly serve the disinherited.

Like so many neoconservatives, Mr. Nuechterlein is possessed of a one-dimensional view of individual differences. Mr. Nuechterlein believes that people can express their distinctiveness only in the competi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive exercise of personal ambition and in the initiatives they employ in its service, simply because in American society they characteristically do so. A society in which contributions to the common good are highly valued can only mean the demise of individuality in this view. If we strive for community based upon some concept of collective welfare we must, he implies, be ready to give up our personal distinctiveness. In this, Mr. Nuechterlein has confused *individualism* and individuality. The former represents a set of beliefs about individuals quite common in the American cultural experience (see *The Culture of Inequality*); but it is just that, a *set of beliefs* which should not be taken for granted as describing a true and unalterable state of affairs. The fact that most Americans—because of their cultural history—find it necessary to conceive of individual differences in terms of competitive individualism does not mean that the two must in fact be synonymous. Mr. Nuechterlein mistakes what is, given a set of historically specific conditions, for what must always be. Individuality can be expressed in a society which emphasizes contributions to the common good instead of maximum realization of narrow self-interest. Pride in the quality of one's efforts in behalf of others, whatever the tasks one is called upon to perform—a sense of personal distinctiveness free of invidious competitiveness—is possible in a society where equality of condition is realized to a considerable degree, in a society where, therefore, differential consumption is not a measure of differences in personal worth. That Mr. Nuechterlein and those who think as he does cannot conceive of such a situation only demonstrates the force of the individualistic culture of inequality—that same culture whose existence he is at pains to deny.

There is, I believe, one final point worth noting. Mr. Nuechterlein says he favors dispassionate and balanced consideration of those issues which the equality-inequality debate must inevitably focus upon. I certainly would not take issue with that sentiment. I would, however, caution him to heed his own advice. In tone and substance, his review of *The Culture of Inequality* is *not* dispassionate and balanced. I would also remind him that a commitment to dispassionate analysis does not and

Don't just choose a cruise. Choose an Italian Festival.

Every Costa cruise is an Italian Festival, with more gourmet food, exciting ports of call, parties, and fun. And more Continental service from our attentive Italian crew.

There's a Costa cruise every week of the year on ten magnificent Costa ships that give you the best of the Bahamas, Caribbean, South America, Mediterranean and Around-the-World. And Costa has special money-saving fly/cruises that jet you from your home to your Costa ship.

Choose an Italian Festival on Costa. 3 to 76 days. $170 to $25,000. See your travel agent or mail the coupon below.


Bahamas from Miami 3-day to Nassau; 4-day to Nassau & Freeport; 8-day fly/cruise/land tour with Disney World option. Cruises from $170-$435.
Caribbean/West Indies 7-day intineraries from San Juan include Caracas, St.Thomas, Martinique, Curacao, Barbados, Grenada and more. $460-$995.
Caribbean/South America 10 and 11-day itineraries from Miami include Jamaica, Venezuela, Aruba, Panama, Mexico, Colombia and more. $740-1430.
Costa Line, Inc., C379
P.O. Box 941, Woodside, N.Y. 11377.
Brochures: ☐ Bahamas ☐ Mediterranean
☐ Caribbean/South ☐ Caribbean/West Indies
☐ Around-the-World
Name
Address
City State Zip
My travel agent is
Address

COSTA CRUISES
It's an Italian Festival

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should not exclude a passion for social justice. Given the thinly veiled defense of privilege implied in his views, I must unfortunately surmise that Mr. Nuechterlein lacks just such a passion.

MICHAEL LEWIS
Department of Sociology
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN writes:

Michael Lewis employs a curious method of intellectual debate. While presumably defending his book against my critical review, he ignores what he wrote and I criticized (he can only make undocumented references to the review's "vituperative tone" and "substitution of caricature for analysis") and instead launches a diversionary counterattack which obscures the real differences between us in a cloud of puzzling social analysis and fanciful attribution. He imputes to me a number of absurd views which I do not hold and which are, in any case, irrelevant to the very specific criticisms I made of his book. It really will not do for him to defend his work by changing the subject. I cannot here entirely recapitulate the argument of his book and of my review; nevertheless, let me briefly respond in order to the major points he now raises.

1. Any useful discussion of the relationship in America between equality of opportunity and equality of condition must begin in specific historical and social analysis and be placed in a comparative framework. Because it exists outside such a context, Mr. Lewis's flat statement that "equal opportunity . . . has not been achieved in American society" is meaningless. How does Mr. Lewis measure America's failure? In absolute terms? In comparison with other societies? In comparison with its own past? Or simply in comparison with some wholly theoretical standard of perfection that he has chosen to establish? Only in the last case, it seems clear, could he seriously argue that equality of opportunity is "nonexistent in fact" in America. Of course "accident of birth" renders perfectly equal opportunity impossible. I cannot imagine a society based on the family in which that would not be the case. Even if income in America were somehow totally equalized at a given moment in time (and how equalization might be accomplished without irreparable damage to society Mr. Lewis nowhere suggests), the inequalities which parents transmit to their children would persist: inequalities of ability, of character training, of psychological stability, of the desire to achieve. Given such inequalities (which would appear to be non-redistributable), America or any open society would quickly reproduce inequalities of economic condition, even if the social and educational opportunity structure remained absolutely equal. It remains my contention that in any society which allows for individual differences, inequality of condition is the natural product of equality of opportunity. Specifically, I do not share Mr. Lewis's assumption that because American society contains significant inequalities, it is by that token necessarily inequitable. It is demonstrable that success in America is not simply, as Mr. Lewis suggests, a function of "unearned privilege"; people do, after all, differ in ability and effort, regardless of their social origins. That there are nonetheless under current American conditions many specific injustices and many specific steps that can be taken to improve equality both of opportunity and of condition I would not for a moment deny, and nothing in my review suggested such a denial. Finally on this point, if Mr. Lewis actually believes that there can be no conflict on grounds of fairness between equality of opportunity and equality of condition, I would refer him, without further comment, to the subject of affirmative-action quotas.

2. In his book, Mr. Lewis disposed of the problem of social determinism vs. individual responsibility by asserting that success and failure are simply products of culture and social structure. He now partially retreats from that absolutist position (individuals do, it seems, "bear some responsibility" for their behavior), but covers his retreat by ascribing to me the opposite pole of the argument. I would never be so foolish as to deny the significance of "culture and social structure" in shaping individual action. That would be, as he says, a "demonstrably ludicrous position," which is why, his irresponsible accusation to the contrary notwithstanding, I did not take it. Similarly, I do *not* find "the study of the cultural and structural bases for persistent inequality and inequity" to be trivial. It is Mr. Lewis's particular study I found to be simplistic and therefore trivial.

3. On the question of poverty, my review neither stated nor implied that this is "the best of all possible worlds in which our interventions are the best of all possible interventions" and should therefore be "immune from criticism." I *did* attack Mr. Lewis's incredible argument (which he here repeats, though in notably muted terms) that the failure of those interventions to achieve all their ends proves that Americans do not really want to solve their problems. It would be helpful if Mr. Lewis could point out for us some other modern industrial society that has solved all its major problems—in his book he specifies poverty, crime, racial conflict, and educational failure—and so demonstrate to us feckless Americans how easily it can be achieved if only we find the desire. As to my own views on poverty: no, I would not "counsel uncritical acceptance of an approach . . . which emphasized extensive income redistribution" (I cannot imagine counseling "uncritical acceptance" of anything); I would, however, as I suggested in my review, counsel a guaranteed minimum income. It may serve Mr. Lewis's polemical needs to imagine all "neoconservatives" as being mean-spirited as well as "ethically suspect" in their thought, but as on other subjects, his views do not necessarily accord with reality. He might, all things considered, reflect again on who it is that is guilty of "ideological hysteria."

4. On the issue of collective welfare vs. individual ambition, Mr. Lewis again takes an untenable position and then, for his own rhetorical purposes, falsely attributes to me an opposite and equally unreasonable stance. I do not believe that concern for the common good and for one's own advancement are mutually exclusive. Such mixed motivations in fact characterize the behavior of most of us. Mr. Lewis apparently assumes as an act of faith that if only we equalize our economic conditions, we can establish a society rooted essentially in altruism, in "efforts in behalf of others, whatever the tasks one is called upon to perform." I do not. We can and do act partly and occasionally for others, but not exclusively or always so. Mr. Lewis and I obviously differ in our conceptions of human nature. He is of course

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

free to imagine any sort of human possibility he chooses to, but I would be curious to learn from him the historical or empirical evidence on which he bases his vision of the future. In the meantime, I find his view of contemporary America partial and distorted. American society embodies in its present condition a broader range of values than "competitive individualism" and "maximum realization of narrow self-interest," and its social culture consists in far more than the monolithic capitalist monster that Mr. Lewis's book conjures up.

5. Mr. Lewis did not find my review "dispassionate and balanced." I would simply plead the occasion: he wrote not a piece of careful social analysis but an ill-considered polemical tract, and I responded accordingly. Other readers of *The Culture of Inequality* will have to make their own judgments as to the accuracy and appropriateness of my comments. As for that "passion for social justice" that Mr. Lewis is sure is lacking in me, I would remind him that the concept of social justice is one on which equally honorable and humane observers can legitimately disagree, and that it involves—in a phrase he obviously dislikes but which I must insist on—"complexities and ambiguities." In other words, Mr. Lewis should try to understand that not everyone who disagrees with him is a scoundrel.

Sadat & Nasser

To the Editor of Commentary:

I do not wish to take issue with Barry Rubin's perceptive review of Anwar Sadat's autobiography, *In Search of Identity* [Books in Review, December 1978], but rather to supplement his observations, especially in one rather important area, Nasser's leadership in Egypt between 1952 and 1970. What struck me, and is likely to strike many a reader, is that Sadat's book represents, surprisingly, a massive attack on Nasser's reputation, ruthlessly dissecting his "cult of personality." Sadat's criticism of Nasser closely approximates Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. Sadat makes it rather clear that it was only his own political moves which belatedly restored the 1952 revolution to its deserved glory. Throughout the book, he tries to cut Nasser down to size and to contrast Egypt's domestic and foreign policy under

You'll never guess where Lufthansa German Airlines flies to.

Germany you say? Naturally. But guess again. And again. About 100 times. Because that's how many different places you can reach all around the world on Lufthansa. 72 countries. On six continents. Just about anywhere people want to go! From Australia to Zaïre. And wherever Lufthansa flies, you have our famous service and efficiency going for you.

And most certainly, we can fly you to Tel Aviv. And we serve delicious kosher meals on your way to Israel or wherever you go. But please be sure to tell us in advance.

Ask your travel agent about us.

Lufthansa German Airlines
680 Fifth Avenue, One World Trade Center (Lobby),
New York, N.Y. Tel. (212) 357-8400

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Announcing a Historic Lithograph that Conveys in Glowing Colors the Beauty and Warmth of Passover

A Soviet Jewish masterpiece from the collection of the Jewish Museum in New York. Matted for framing, $30.

Among lovers of fine art, the appearance in the West of any work that comes out of the twilight world of Soviet Jewry is cause for special excitement. That excitement is doubled and redoubled when the artist is an acknowledged master, and when the work itself is steeped in Jewish tradition. In "The Cat and the Kid," Anatoly Kaplan, famed Soviet lithographer, has joined modern artistic techniques to ancient folk themes to create an authentic and enchanting evocation of the *Had Gadya*, the best-loved song of the Passover holiday.

Passover, the "Had Gadya," and the Jewish people.

The *Had Gadya*, a popular Aramaic song chanted at the end of the *seder*, narrates the fortunes of an "only kid" bought by a father for two coins. According to scholars, the song is of late medieval origin, and is based on German and French folk sources. It appears for the first time in a Haggadah printed in Prague in 1590, and like the other concluding songs of the *seder*, was incorporated into the Haggadah for the amusement of the children.

In the folk song, a series of tribulations besets the little kid, ending finally in the joyful triumph of the Holy One, Blessed be He, over the forces of darkness and death. Traditional commentators have considered the *Had Gadya* a symbolic parable of Jewish history, with long centuries of oppression and persecution at the hands of other nations culminating in messianic redemption at the end of time. The *Had Gadya* is thus an especially poignant and evocative theme for a Jewish artist to explore in the Soviet Union of today.

A sophisticated work of radiant beauty.

Anatoly Kaplan's lithograph depicts the first scene in the *Had Gadya:* the "only kid" is being set upon by a cat preparing to devour it. The legend—in Russian above, in Yiddish below—reads: "And along came a cat and ate up the little kid." The print exhibits the brilliant virtuosity for which Kaplan has been celebrated: dynamic movement and great sophistication of technique are placed at the service of simplicity, humor, and the poetic mood of the source upon which he draws. As in many of Kaplan's works on Jewish folk themes, the emphasis on decorative elements, on warm earth colors and bold forms, imbues "The Cat and the Kid" with the charmed air of a fairy tale.

A valuable and exciting acquisition.

For this special offering, the editors of Commentary, together with the staff of the Jewish Museum of New York, have created a meticulously supervised and superbly executed edition of "The Cat and the Kid." The result is a work to be owned with pride and displayed with prominence, a work that will occupy a position of significant honor in home, school, or synagogue, and that will attract the admiration of anyone who appreciates fine art.

"The Cat and the Kid" makes an especially apt gift for Passover and many other occasions of the year. *To assure delivery in time for Passover 1979, orders should be postmarked no later than March 26.*

Commentary, 165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Please send_____impressions of Anatoly Kaplan's "The Cat and the Kid" @ $30 each to:

Name_____

Address _____

City _____ State_____ Zip_____

☐ Payment of $_____ is enclosed

☐ Please charge my credit card as follows:

☐ Master Charge ☐ Visa ☐ American Express

Account Number_____ Expiration Date_____

Signature _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Cat and the Kid by Anatoly Kaplan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORDER NOW FOR PASSOVER



SPECIALLY DESIGNED MATZO PLATE





Be the first to own or give a beautiful lucite matzo holder, 8"x8", for Passover.Choice of originally designed hand screened,Old City of Jerusalem or multi colored floral, signed by the artists.Perfect for gifts for the holiday. Can be used for fruit,cake, cheese,etc.Limited Supply-Order Early. **$12.00 each** plus $1.25 postage. Mail check or money order to: **Judijak, Inc. 132 Lafayette St. New York,N.Y. 10013,Dept.C-1.**

FREE Send **STAMPED** self-addressed envelope for your 25 free personalized return address labels with Old City of Jerusalem picture in background Offer expires April 30, 1979.**Judijak Inc. 132 Lafayette St.,New York,N.Y.10013.**

ONE OF THE MOST BEAUTIFUL RESORTS ANYWHERE SALUTES THE GLORIOUS CELEBRATION OF THE HOLIDAY OF LIBERATION.

PASSOVER

Wed. April 11–Thurs. April 19

CANTOR IRVING ROGOFF

AND THE NEVELE SYMPHONY CHOIR CONDUCTED BY CLIFFORD NADEL

SERVICES • SEDARIM

NEVELE

ELLENVILLE, NEW YORK 12428
DIRECT WIRE, N.Y. 244-0800
HOTEL TEL.: 914-647-6000

his own leadership with the intolerable conditions which existed under his predecessor.

Though the 1952 revolution overthrew the monarchy and eliminated political parties and corruption, Sadat reveals its terrible shortcomings and failures. The "ugliest feature" of the new order built by Nasser, he maintains, was "the mountain of hate which accumulated in the course of the attempt to build a power-based community"; it was based upon a complete lack of human values. "The frustration, the sense of loss [felt by] young people in Egypt today," says Sadat, "is definitely to be related to that experience." This crescendo of criticism is obviously designed to destroy any sentimental yearning for Nasser that might perhaps still exist in Egypt, and, by contrast, to boost Sadat's own image.

According to Sadat, to the day of his death, Nasser, always surrounding himself with an "aura of glory," never understood the importance of personal freedom, imagining that people were happy and satisfied with his method of government. With the beginning of the Yemeni civil war (1962), there took place in Egypt further widespread "suppression of freedoms" and "any sense of democracy" was lacking. Having a "pathological view of personal security," Nasser interpreted any criticism of his policies as a counterrevolutionary reaction that had to be "ruthlessly crushed." He allegedly confided to Sadat that he knew the country was ruled by "a gang of thieves," that liberty was suppressed, and that Egypt was "heading for disaster." The officers who engineered the 1952 revolution were patriots, but they were not driven by the desire to establish a democratic government. Although they did not object to Egypt's being ruled by a "benevolent tyrant," they, like Sadat himself, had not anticipated a government which would flagrantly violate human rights. Sadat concludes that the last years of Nasser's life became "a period of intense suffering, unprecedented, I believe, in the entire stretch of Egyptian history." . . .

Sadat's criticism of Nasser extends also to his policies leading to the Six-Day War. To establish Nasser's guilt, Sadat virtually acquits Israel of the accusation that it launched an aggressive war, a charge that has been a carefully nurtured Arab thesis. According to Sadat, after concentrating Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai, Nasser considered that the chances of a war with Israel were about fifty-fifty, but he expected war as a "100 per-cent certainty" if he closed the Straits of Tiran, Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea. Nasser's decision to close the Straits, in Sadat's view, was based upon his desire to maintain his great prestige within the Arab world.*

Sadat's own foreign policy differs, of course, from that of Nasser because he repudiated Soviet totalitarianism; he considers Communism an expansionist ideology, the establishment of which in the neighboring Sudan he promptly rejected. "With crass stupidity," Sadat charges, Nasserite Egypt had copied the Soviet pattern of socialism, although the country lacked the necessary resources, technical capabilities, and the required capital. When, after Nasser's death, . . . Egyptian "agents" of the Soviets attempted to "finish off" Sadat, he struck first, having them arrested. What disturbed Sadat especially in his relationship with Moscow was Soviet arrogance and high-handed behavior; . . . Egypt's dependence in weaponry; and, most importantly, the initiation of the new policy of détente between East and West! The policy of détente was a "violent shock to us," Sadat writes revealingly, because it signaled Soviet unwillingness to increase the flow of weapons to Arab countries. The expulsion of Soviet military experts in 1972, prior to the October war, had been widely interpreted not only as a sign of Egyptian independence vis-à-vis the USSR, but also, erroneously, as a sign that Sadat's policy was turning to more peaceful pursuits. But, according to Sadat, one of the reasons behind his decision to expel the Soviet military experts, aside from "the Soviet attitude to me," was "that within the strategy I had laid down, no war could be fought while Soviet experts worked in Egypt." Thus the expulsion of these experts was a *conditio sine qua non* of Egypt's resuming the battle! He shrewdly anticipated that the expulsion of the Soviets would be falsely interpreted by Israel and the West and thus

* For a further discussion of Sadat's version of these events, see Theodore Draper's article, "How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East," beginning on p. 23—Ed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

help him to prepare a surprise blow against the former.

While Sadat received praise in the West for his seeming independence from Moscow, he reveals that on the eve of the 1973 war, the Cairo government "went so far as to ask the Soviet Union to appoint a Soviet commander for the Egyptian air-defense system and another for the Egyptian air force." It is well to keep in mind Sadat's tactical flexibility, the "gambler's" talent for surprises and for a zig-zag course, before abandoning oneself to wishful thinking that his diplomatic break with the USSR is irreversible. Sadat's agility as well as his ability to make friends in the West make him a more dangerous opponent than Nasser ever was. It is to be hoped that his giving apparent priority to Egyptian national interests over all-Arab endeavors, to which Mr. Rubin points, may still push him toward the road to peace.

ALFRED D. LOW
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Jefferson

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In trying to evaluate the debate between my two colleagues over whence Jefferson derived his ideas for the Declaration of Independence, whether primarily, as Garry Wills asserts in *Inventing America*, from the "communitarian" thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment or, as Kenneth S. Lynn suggests in reaffirming a more traditional interpretation in his article on the Wills book ["Falsifying Jefferson," October 1978], from John Locke, readers may want to consider still another, perhaps more direct, source for one of the most famous clauses in the Declaration.

Having been elected to represent his home county of Albemarle the previous December at the relatively young age of twenty-six, Jefferson first took his seat in the august Virginia House of Burgesses in Williamsburg on Monday, May 8, 1769. The occasion was especially auspicious—not because it marked Jefferson's debut as a legislator, but because it was the first formal and official encounter between the Virginia legislature and the colony's popular new governor, the Right Honorable Norborne Berkeley, Baron de Botetourt (pronounced Botatot), the first full governor to preside over the colony in sixty-three years and the first actually to have met with the legislature in more than seven decades! Since 1704, the Virginia governorship had been a sinecure. Incumbents had remained in Britain, leaving the administration of the colony in the hands of a series of lieutenant governors in an arrangement peculiar to Virginia and long complained of by Virginians. At last to have the governor-in-chief residing among them was a cause for jubilation for most Virginians. For him to be, as the *Virginia Gazette* (October 27, 1768) put it, "a nobleman of such distinguished merit and abilities" only enhanced their joy. Through his charm, benevolence, and moderation, Botetourt had skillfully exploited these feelings since his arrival in Virginia the previous October, and what gave his initial meeting with Jefferson and his fellow legislators such pointed significance was his formal announcement in the governor's traditional speech at the opening of the legislature that "for the future" the Crown intended each of its "Chief Governors of Virginia" to reside in the colony. . . .

Vastly more important for any consideration of the sources of Jefferson's ideas is a further—and perhaps insufficiently noticed—remark in Botetourt's speech. "The frequent Experience his Majesty [George III] has had of your Zeal and Wisdom," Botetourt informed the burgesses as he stood before them in a resplendent pale red coat, "leaves no Room in the Royal Breast, to doubt that you will give me all such Advice and Assistance as may enable me to promote and render the *Happiness* of Virginia; a steady *Pursuit of* which is the first and great Command of my Royal Master" (emphasis added). Could George III—in one of the more delicious ironies in a revolution filled with ironies—have been, through Botetourt, *the* actual source of the pursuit-of-happiness phrase in the Declaration of Independence? Could Botetourt's words have been so indelibly engraved upon the mind of the impressionable young Jefferson during this dramatic and singularly crucial moment in his passage from private citizen to public servant that they later came rushing to the forefront of his consciousness while he was composing the Declaration that would mark another and infinitely more important transition—that of the thirteen colonies from dependence to independence? The linguis-



THE CONCORD
INVITES YOU AND
YOUR FAMILY TO SHARE
THE TRADITION OF
PASSOVER
Wed. April 11–Thurs. April 19
Cantor HERMAN MALAMOOD
Assisted by the
Concord Symphony Choir
directed by Jonathan Weiss.
will officiate for the
Services & Sedarim.
JAN PEERCE
In Concert.
Sat. April 14,
Rabbi Simon Cohen &
Rabbi Solomon Saphier
Supervise scrupulous
dietary observance.
Plus a Program of Lectures & Seminars.
Special Holiday Entertainment
The Concord Hotel
Kiamesha Lake, New York 12751
Hotel 914-794-4000
Direct Line NY 212-244-3500
Counselor-Supervised Day Camp. Baby
Sitters Available. Nite Patrol.
Teen Activities.
Special Children's Rates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tic and situational parallels are striking but, like all such parallels, hardly conclusive. Still, the mere possibility that Botetourt's words did have some influence on Jefferson's later use of the pursuit of happiness stands as a pointed reminder of the folly of trying to trace the complex ideas of a revolutionary instrument such as the Declaration to any single source or particular group of sources.

JACK P. GREENE
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

KENNETH S. LYNN writes:

Jack P. Greene's deliciously witty letter makes a serious historical point. My only objection is that he cuts into the Wills-Lynn dispute with a double-edged axe, rather than with a hatchet aimed exclusively at Wills. For while Wills baldly asserts that the Declaration of Independence derives from "a particular group of sources," i.e., the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, I most definitely do not say that the document derives from "a single source," i.e., John Locke. Repeatedly, I refer with approval to Jefferson's own statement that the Declaration was "an expression of the American mind," and that that collective mentality was composed of a whole host of "harmonizing sentiments of the day," which had been expressed in "conversation, letters, printed essays, or the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc." I also scorn Wills for talking about Jefferson's mind "as if it were a blob of hot sealing wax . . . passively submitting to the imprint of European ideas"—and I go on from there to reiterate Carl Becker's judgment that "Generally speaking, men are influenced by books which clarify their own thought, which express their own notions well, or which suggest to them ideas which their minds are already predisposed to accept."

I therefore am fascinated by the ironic possibility that in the House of Burgesses in Williamsburg on May 8, 1769, Jefferson heard a phrase of George III's which the young Virginian's mind was predisposed to accept, and which was eventually immortalized in the Declaration of Independence.

South Africa

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I read Carl Gershman's "The World According to Andrew Young" [August 1978] with great pleasure. It was exceedingly refreshing to see such an informed and politically well-educated critique of the simplistic and wrong-headed approach to world affairs of which Andrew Young has, in recent times, been such an important exponent.

I write as a member of a group

¡Speak Spanish like a diplomat!

What sort of people need to learn a foreign language as quickly and effectively as possible? *Foreign service personnel*, that's who. Members of America's diplomatic corps are assigned to U.S. embassies abroad, where they must be able to converse fluently in every situation.

Now, *you* can learn to speak Spanish just like these diplomatic personnel do—with the Foreign Service Institute's Programmatic Spanish Course.

The U.S. Department of State has spent tens of thousands of dollars developing this course. It's by far *the most effective way* to learn Spanish *immediately*.

The Programmatic Spanish Course consists of a series of tape cassettes and an accompanying textbook. You simply follow the spoken and written instructions, listening and repeating. The course begins entirely in English. But by its end, you'll find yourself learning and speaking entirely in Spanish!

This course turns your cassette player into a "teaching machine." With its unique "programmatic" learning method, you set your own pace—testing yourself, correcting errors, reinforcing accurate responses.

AUDIO-FORUM®

The FSI's Programmatic Spanish Course comes in two volumes. You may order one or both courses:

- Volume I, Basic. Tapes 901-910 (10 cassettes, 16 hours), instructor's manual and 464-page text, $115
- Volume II, Advanced. Tapes 911-918 (8 cassettes, 11½ hours), instructor's manual and 614-page text, $98

(New York State residents add appropriate sales tax)

Your cassettes are shipped to you in handsome library binders.

TO ORDER, JUST CLIP THIS AD and mail it with your name and address, and a check or money order. Or, charge to your credit card (American Express, Visa, Master Charge, Diners Club) by enclosing card number, expiration date, and your signature.



The Foreign Service Institute's Spanish course is *unconditionally guaranteed.* Try it for three weeks. If you're not convinced it's *the fastest, easiest, most painless way to learn Spanish,* return it and we'll refund every penny you paid! Order today!

SA100

145 East 49th St., New York, N.Y. 10017 / (212) 753-1783

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(whose existence is mostly ignored by the Western world) which has experienced the ministrations of Andrew Young all too strongly in recent times. I am referring to the bloc of South African opinion, not only white, but also of other ethnic groups, which perforce occupies an uncomfortable middle position between extreme Afrikaner nationalism on the one hand and even more extreme African nationalism on the other. The latter trend undoubtedly encompasses elements disposed toward an ethnocentric approach or an economically dangerous form of doctrinaire Marxism, or both. Africa has already got too many such types of government for anyone's good. The imposition of such forms on South Africa, with its extremely sophisticated economy and great ethnic diversity, could only be a recipe for disaster. To recognize such a truism, moreover, is not to condone existing forms of racism, which must in the end be exorcised in the interests of South Africa's whites perhaps more than anyone else. This last proposition is one which is attaining wider recognition with every day that passes, even among many adherents of the present government.

In this context, one can only hope that Mr. Gershman's views gain in influence within America, so that American influence in Southern Africa can be exercised in a balanced and constructive way—in a word, toward necessary reform rather than totally destructive revolution. This approach is as much in the interests of South Africa's blacks as of any other ethnic group, since their wellbeing also depends on the maintenance of South Africa's modern economic infrastructure. This viewpoint, incidentally, is very clearly recognized by a black leader with such impeccable credentials as Gatsha Butelezi.

R. J. FRIEDLAND
Johannesburg, South Africa

The "New Philosophers"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am a devoted reader of COMMENTARY and have always felt your reviews and articles to be reliable guides to new intellectual developments. I would, therefore, like to convey my disappointment with the article by Roger Kaplan, "France's 'New Philosophers'"

The Empire Holiday:

KOSHER FOR PASSOVER

Plump, juicy, tender Empire poultry . . . so appropriate for festive occasions. Choose from America's biggest variety of cleaned, fresh or frozen, ready-to cook or pre-cooked Turkey, Chicken, Duckling . . . for every menu, every size of gathering, every style of preparation. Enjoy . . . eat in good health!

The Most Trusted Name in Kosher Poultry

KOSHER Empire POULTRY

At better Kosher butcher shops, food stores and dellys in most cities coast-to-coast.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ELINOR ROSS
"One of the most thrilling soprano voices you will hear in your lifetime . . ."

CONGREGATION RODOPH SHOLOM
of
Tampa, Florida
presents a
gala musical evening
with
Metropolitan Opera Star

ELINOR ROSS
in concert

the great arias of opera
the best melodies of Broadway
the nostalgic songs of the Yiddish Theater
Israeli hits and Cantorial gems
accompanied by William Gunther, renowned Israeli Piano Virtuoso

March 18, 1979
at the Synagogue
2713 Bayshore Boulevard
Tampa, Florida.

[February 1978]. I went to considerable trouble to obtain from Europe the works that Mr. Kaplan praised, particularly *The Master Thinkers* by André Glucksmann. Although French is my native tongue, and my reading comprehension would seem to be average or above, I found the book totally unintelligible. Nothing led me to expect the disjointed paragraphs, the use of hints and allusions as a substitute for exposition, and the delight in obscure references. . . .

There is latitude, of course, for readers to hold opposite opinions regarding the meaning and value of a publication. However, when an essayist in your columns does not prepare his readers for the difficulties and obscurity that will confront him, it is disillusioning indeed. . . .

JONAS BRACHFELD
Willingboro, New Jersey

ROGER KAPLAN writes:

Jonas Brachfeld is not alone in finding French philosophical writers hard to follow. One of the characteristics of some contemporary French writing is its corruption of the beautiful and lucid French language for the sake of smart-alecky one-upmanship. Some French intellectuals seem to be constantly outdoing one another's opacity, on the theory that they will fool people into thinking they are smart. The sad truth is that they have very little to say. Unfortunately, they live in an environment partly shaped by a tyrannous intellectual establishment shot through with stinking orthodoxies considered holy because considered subversive. Many French intellectuals want to be subversive. And this leads them to produce a great deal of cant.

The so-called "new philosophers" learned to think and write in this unhappy school. To the degree that they represent it, I have no praise for them. However, I applaud their attempts to break out of it. I believe I did not belittle the distance they have yet to travel before they can truly claim to have something new to offer, though I think it is no exaggeration to say that in some of their writings, particularly André Glucksmann's, they have already made interesting contributions to our understanding of the intellectual traditions to which they are the self-conscious and often bitter heirs. As for the manner in which Glucksmann writes, I am hardly to blame. Writing on the "new-philosopher" phenomenon, I did not sense the need to dwell on the formal problems of *The Master Thinkers*. But I would have thought anyone familiar with contemporary French writing would be prepared for a certain amount of unintelligibility, not to mention straight crap.

Or, to put it another way:

En effet, les soi-disants nouveaux philosophes ne sont pas au niveau de Racine ou de Montaigne en ce qui concerne le style, et j'avoue que les lire peut présenter des difficultés pour la matière grise. Pourtant, ce n'est pas pour lire des bandes illustrées qu'il nous a donné la matière grise, le Bon Dieu.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Job Discrimination... It Still Exists.

Paul Robertson is not a member of a persecuted minority. But he has experienced blatant discrimination all the same because he has chosen not to join a union.

Paul Robertson is a working man, a skilled licensed electrician with more than 20 years experience. He found out the hard way how a big company and a big union can discriminate on the job.



Paul was hired by the Bechtel Power Corporation to work on their Jim Bridger Power Plant project in the Rock Springs, Wyoming area. Only three months later, he was fired, supposedly because of a reduction in force.

But during the week preceding his discharge, Bechtel hired at least 19 union electricians referred by the local union and retained at least 65 unlicensed electricians.

A determined Paul Robertson filed unfair labor practice charges against the company and the union.

An administrative law judge ruled and was upheld by the full National Labor Relations Board that the union and the employer had indeed discriminated. The judge ordered that Robertson and seven other electricians be given the back pay they would have earned if they had been treated fairly.

The NLRB later reversed part of its decision, but Paul Robertson did not give up. With the help of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, he appealed the Board's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals, arguing that hiring hall favoritism is discriminatory and unlawful.

Paul Robertson was fortunate. He found experienced legal help—all important because the case dragged on for nearly four years in the courts and the union still refuses to obey the NLRB's backpay order.

The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation is helping everyone it can—currently in more than 75 cases involving academic and political freedom, protection from union violence, and other fundamental rights. But it would like to do even more.

If you'd like to help workers like Paul Robertson write:

The National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation
8316 Arlington Boulevard
Suite 500
Fairfax, Virginia 22038

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He committed himself to science, peace

and the atom bomb.

He was the high priest of modern science. A genius who was both mythologized and misunderstood. NOVA explores the conflicts, ironies and historical forces that shaped the life and thought of Albert Einstein... and changed the destiny of the world. Watch NOVA's *Einstein.*



From Einstein to the Amazon

In the weeks ahead, NOVA looks at a new breed of athlete that's using science to improve performance... India's radical approach to economic development... a revolutionary treatment for pain, depression and schizophrenia... a reclusive billionaire's 3½ million acre Amazon jungle.

NOVA takes you to worlds you've never seen.

Series of Surprises

Exciting journeys to unusual places. Rare encounters with fascinating people. Meetings with remarkable ideas.

Take NOVA to a new world every week.

NOVA

Thursday March 15 at 8:00*

*Check Local Listings PBS

A COMPANY CALLED **TRW**

NOVA is made possible in part by a grant from TRW.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East

Theodore Draper

WHY did the negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel break down? Why has the breakdown been so difficult to overcome? The search for an explanation cannot be limited to the negotiations themselves; it can even be hindered by sticking too closely to the day-by-day "peace process." The issues that led to the breakdown of the negotiations did not arise at Camp David and could not be settled by the negotiations at Camp David.

To get our bearings, we need to step back and view the negotiations from a greater distance. It is necessary to step at least as far back as 1967. For the Six-Day War in June of that year produced the hard territorial problems which the negotiations sought to resolve. What to do with the Sinai? The West Bank? The Gaza Strip? The Golan Heights? The Israeli settlements? These and other questions did not exist before June 1967. How they came to be is the starting point of any serious effort to find answers for them.

Mustafa Amin, a leading Egyptian commentator and confidant of President Sadat, recently provided an additional reason for going back to the 1967 war. The New York *Times* of December 24, 1978, reported him as having written: "This may be the first instance in history where a thief claims compensation for his own crime."

Mustafa Amin's allusion to the Israeli occupation of Arab territory after the 1967 war was not novel or original. It was typical of the steady journalistic diet fed Arab readers for the past decade. If all that had happened were no more than simple thievery and the criminal were so clearly identified, there would be very little more to say about it.

But the matter is hardly so simple. In fact, we now have it on the highest Egyptian authority how unsimple and how double-edged is the charge that a "crime" was committed in 1967.

The Egyptian authority is Anwar el-Sadat. His autobiography, *In Search of Identity*, appeared in English and other languages last year. In it he tells of the events leading up to the 1967 war. Although he leaves out a good deal, what he includes is enough.

Sadat relates that his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, knew that war with Israel was inevitable if the Straits of Tiran, leading to the Israeli port of Eilat in the south, were closed. The United Nations Emergency Force had been stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh in 1957 for the precise purpose of keeping the Straits open. In May 1967, according to Sadat, Nasser convened a meeting of his top leaders, including Sadat, at which he declared: "Now with our concentrations in Sinai, the chances of war are fifty-fifty. But if we close the Straits, the war will be a 100 per-cent certainty." Nasser then turned to his Minister of War, Abdel Hakim Amer, and asked whether the Egyptian armed forces were ready. Amer assured him that everything was "in tiptop shape."

With the Straits closed, Sadat writes, "war became a certainty." Nasser also knew that the Israelis were going to aim their first blow at the Egyptian air force; he deliberately took that risk because he was assured by the Air Force Commander, General Sidqi Mahmoud, that the Egyptian losses would come to no more than 10 per cent of the air force. Nasser even correctly guessed the exact timing of the Israeli attack. He expected it to come at latest by June 5. He was right.

We have long known all this and more from other sources.* Yet it is reassuring to have Sadat himself confirm how Egypt decided with calculated premeditation to set up a situation which could only lead to war.

If ever a war was deliberately instigated, it was instigated by Egypt in June 1967. Of this there cannot be the shadow of a doubt—except on the part of the present ranking Middle East expert on the National Security Council.†

THEODORE DRAPER is the author of *Israel and World Politics, Abuse of Power, American Communism and Soviet Russia*, and other works on international affairs.

* I dealt with these sources in detail in my article, "From 1967 to 1973: The Arab-Israeli Wars," COMMENTARY, December 1973, pp. 33-35.

† In his book, *Decade of Decisions* (University of California Press, 1977), William B. Quandt criticizes American policy-makers in 1967 for having been "ultimately insensitive to the danger that war might break out at Israel's instigation" (p. 39). The book was completed just before Quandt was chosen by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Middle East post on the National Security Council.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BUT Sadat hardly told the whole story, or even the most important part of it. What he does not mention in his memoirs is the war aim that Nasser repeatedly and unequivocally announced to the world before the outbreak of hostilities.

On May 26, 1967, Nasser said: "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel." On May 28, 1967, he said: "Israel's existence in itself is an aggression." On June 1, 1967, Ahmad Shukairy, then head of the PLO, at that time subsidized and controlled by Egypt, was asked what would happen to native-born Israelis if the Arab armies were successful. "Those who survive will remain in Palestine," he replied. "I estimate that none of them will survive."

It may be contended that Nasser's words should not have been taken seriously. Nasser's threats, however, were more restrained than popular Arab propaganda. We will never know whether Nasser would have gone as far as his henchman, Shukairy, but he fired up his armed forces for the battle with the language of the *jihad*—the holy war of Muslims against non-Muslims, which must end in death, conversion, or submission to Islam. The least that Nasser promised his followers was that the state of Israel would cease to exist in the event of an Egyptian victory.

The war, of course, ended with Israel in possession of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. That is how Israel became a "thief" and committed the "crime" to which Mustafa Amin referred.

WE ALSO know from the highest Jordanian authority, King Hussein, how Israel happened to occupy the West Bank. Two books, neither of which has been published in the United States, contain his version of how he got into the 1967 war. The story, told largely in Hussein's own words, is this:

Hussein decided that war was inevitable as soon as Nasser announced the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba on May 22, 1967. It took him only two more days to decide to get into it. Hussein flew to Cairo on May 30 for a reconciliation with Nasser as the prerequisite for joint Egyptian-Jordanian action. Nasser assured Hussein that his forces were superior to the Israelis.' Hussein's own words are: "Nasser never appealed to us. We were the ones who appealed to him."*

On the eve of the outbreak, Israel promised Jordan immunity from the war if it would stay out. One such message was transmitted through then Under Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow to the Jordanian Ambassador in Washington. But Hussein was tempted by the jackal's share of the easy victory held out by Nasser. After joining in the attack and getting punished for it, Hussein justified his poor showing on the battlefield by leading Nasser to believe that Jordanian forces had been attacked by hundreds of American war planes.†

And that is how Israel became the "thief" of the West Bank.

AS FOR Syria, its leaders claimed to be in the vanguard of the struggle to destroy Israel. Hafez al-Assad, then Syrian Defense Minister and now President, was particularly outspoken. He anticipated Nasser by saying early in 1967: "The mere existence of Zionism in Palestine constitutes an aggression, and aggression and peace cannot coexist in the same territory." In the same speech made to army units, he declared: 'The people's revolution has decreed that the enemy shall be humiliated until zero hour strikes, after which no enemy will remain in Palestine." The Syrians actually attacked Israel on the morning of the first day of the Six-Day War and were, in fact, the only Arab force to stage an abortive raid into Israeli territory during the entire war. The bulk of the Syrian army was stationed on the Golan Heights, from which the Israeli settlements below had long been terrorized. This Syrian force was virtually wiped out in the last two days of the war.

Which was how Israel became the "thief" of the Golan Heights, too.

Without keeping in mind how Israel came to occupy the Sinai area, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights in 1967, the conflict over them becomes a travesty. I do not mean to suggest that the way Israel came to occupy these territories answers the question whether Israel should keep all or any part of them. That is a much more complex problem, involving other factors in past and future Arab-Israeli relationships. But the original basis of the Israeli occupation in a war of self-defense, deliberately provoked by Egypt, cannot be ignored or falsified without making it impossible to understand the events leading up to the Camp David agreement and beyond.

II

WHY were all attempts to get serious negotiations started so futile until Sadat went to Jerusalem in 1977?

* *Hussein de Jordanie: Ma "Guerre" avec Israël* by Vick Vance and Pierre Lauer (Albin Michel, Paris, 1968); *Hussein* by Peter Snow (Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1972).

† Who misled whom still needs some clarification. A telephone conversation between Nasser and Hussein intercepted by the Israelis made it appear that Nasser may have suggested to Hussein that they should blame the United States and Great Britain for aiding Israel. But this conversation was obviously garbled and fragmentary in transcription. Nasser later, in a speech on July 23, 1967, related that Hussein had phoned him on the evening of June 7, 1967, and had told him that Jordan had been attacked by 400 aircraft. Nasser implied that the planes could only have come from the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One reason stands out. Again we have Sadat to thank for confirming it in one, short sentence in his speech to the Israeli Knesset: "We used to reject you." Just before making this frank admission, Sadat had said: "You want to live with us, in this part of the world." Rejection, therefore, had meant that he and his fellow Arabs had *not* wanted Israel to live in that part of the world. Other rationales, such as Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory or recognition of a new Palestinian state, had been used in diplomatic negotiations or for public consumption. But this one—the survival of Israel—had always gone to the heart of the matter.

When Sadat also said, "We welcome you among us with full security and safety," he for the first time broke away from the "rejectionist" Arab front to which he had in principle belonged. There was nothing else in Sadat's speech that differed from the previous Arab negotiating position. Sadat himself recognized where the break had come. Immediately after his word of welcome, he added: "This in itself is a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change."

It was. But it also cast a lurid light on what the real issue had been from the birth of Israel in 1948 to that 20th of November almost thirty years later. For this reason, the rest of the Arab world responded to Sadat's initiative with execration. The one thing for which Sadat could not be forgiven was his acceptance of Israel's existence and survival as a nation, even if that acceptance was not unencumbered.

For Sadat named a price for the "tremendous turning point" and the "decisive historical change." He went out of his way to stress that he had not come for a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. He spoke of "our land" that could not be the subject of bargaining or even open to argument. He demanded "complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied after 1967." He made the Palestinian Arabs, not the Egyptians, "the crux of the entire problem." He specified that Israel had to accept a new Palestinian state. On everything but the tolerated existence of pre-June 1967 Israel, his conditions were maximalist. If he had left out his acceptance of Israel's existence and had not chosen to announce it in Jerusalem, his speech would have been unexceptionable from the point of view of the past Arab position.

ALMOST all attention was subsequently paid to Sadat's concession of Israel's national survival. This one-sidedness was understandable. The circumstances were so dramatic, not to say theatrical, that no one wished to spoil the effect. One could even believe that if the Egyptian acceptance of Israel was possible, everything else was possible. It was as if the fine print in a contract had been ignored.

Thus one important implication of Sadat's approach was by and large overlooked in the general euphoria. To take Sadat's speech seriously meant accepting him as the representative of the entire Arab world. He spoke as if he was not worried about what he could get for Egypt and even knew what he could expect to get. He devoted most of his speech to what he wanted for the other Arab states and interests. This assumption by him of Arab leadership was something of a tour de force. He asked to be accepted by Israel as the representative of the entire Arab world in the very act of breaking with that world on what it considered to be the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

That Sadat had this representative role very much in mind was soon confirmed by Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Sadat, he related, told him in Ismailia, where they met in December 1977, that he "represents the Arab cause and he would like to see a solution to the problem of the Palestinian Arabs." Begin accepted Sadat as just such a representative. The future negotiations were mortgaged to this understanding.

It was a peculiar understanding. Sadat did not have a mandate to negotiate for any other state than Egypt. He had, in fact, mortally offended the other Arab leaders by going to Jerusalem without consulting them,* by offering a deal with Israel for which they vilified him and even threatened his life, and by appointing himself to negotiate for them. It was a wonderful trick, if he could get away with it.

SADAT evidently calculated that the other Arab states would have to come in with him sooner or later. This calculation was by virtue of Sadat's strategy hardly more than a possibility. Sadat set up a situation which made it most humiliating for Assad of Syria to follow along meekly in the Egyptian leader's footsteps. The PLO would have had to violate the dictates of its own "Covenant," something it had stubbornly refused to do despite all sorts of bribes and blandishments in the past. Sadat had not consulted his paymasters in Saudi Arabia, for the good and sufficient reason that they would not have countenanced his initiative. Jordan's Hussein, seeing all choices as dangerous, had become a perennial fence-sitter. The more extreme "rejectionists," such as Iraq and Libya, were certain to cry out for revenge.

In any event, Sadat's strategy of pulling off a diplomatic coup by himself and somehow imposing it on the other Arab states left him vulnerable to their disapproval and retaliation. If all of them, including the Palestinian Arabs, refused to go along, he faced the prospect of going back to the other Arabs or going forward with Israel, in which case, whatever the appearance, he would have the

* Before going to Jerusalem, Sadat had merely informed Assad of his intention.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separate peace he had renounced. When Sadat, inferentially, volunteered to represent all Arab interests at Jerusalem and did so outrightly at Ismailia, he presented no credentials for assuming this role other than the vision in his own head of what an Arab peace with Israel could or should look like.

Sadat's offer to Israel sought to hold in tandem Egypt's national interest and Egypt's interests in the Arab world. A separate peace with Israel would substantially serve Egypt's national interest but only by risking the sacrifice of Egypt's putative role as leader of the Arab world. Sadat clearly assumed, with good reason, that he could have a separate peace for the asking. He rejected that prospect in his Jerusalem speech with such dispatch and finality that he was obviously determined to emphasize that he was not ready to give up Egypt's pan-Arab calling. All he was ready to do was to work it out in a different way; yet the difference was so hazardous that it could jeopardize both of his objectives—the Egyptian and the Arab.

Some observers could not believe that Sadat was aiming at anything other than a separate peace, suitably camouflaged. Israelis hotly debated whether Sadat merely wanted to have a "fig leaf" for his separate peace. Meanwhile Sadat had one inestimable advantage if there was to be any negotiation at all. There was no one else for the Israelis to bargain with.

III

Begin's response to Sadat's challenge also broke with the past. The Israeli counter-proposals never received the appreciation they deserved. They were virtually taken for granted, even though they were, in fact, startling, most of all in Israel itself.

At their meeting in Ismailia in December 1977, one month after the Jerusalem visit, Begin offered Sadat at one stroke the return to Egyptian sovereignty of all occupied Egyptian territory in the Sinai, including the key post at Sharm el-Sheikh, guarding the entrance to the Straits of Tiran, the immediate *casus belli* of the 1967 war. There was one qualification—that the Israeli settlements in the so-called Rafiah area, representing no more than 1 per cent of the Sinai, should be linked to Israeli administration and defended by an Israeli military force. This qualification was withdrawn, despite a great deal of embarrassment and anguish in Israel, when Sadat announced that he would not permit "one square centimeter" of Israeli settlement within Egypt's international borders. In the end, Egypt was offered the return of its entire territory and everything in it.

This offer was not something that should have been taken for granted. No such flat, unconditional offer had ever been made or even contemplated by any Israeli government before. Sadat did not even have to enter into negotiations to get back the whole of Egyptian territory. By holding out for the Sinai unconditionally, Sadat was able to get Israel to throw in three strategically important airfields in eastern Sinai, the major naval base at Sharm el-Sheikh, the oilfields which Israel had developed and which supplied it with 20 per cent of its oil needs, and ultimately the dismantlement of the Israeli settlements on the eastern coast adjoining Gaza. Begin and his chief lieutenants, Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, considered the move to be their most original and imaginative achievement. They boasted that their Labor-party predecessors would never have dared to make it. Indeed, it was widely criticized in Israel as premature and unnecessarily generous.

It is well to recall once more how Egypt had lost the Sinai to Israel. It had been lost in 1967 in a war deliberately provoked by Egypt with the open aim of extinguishing the Jewish state. The Egyptians had started a second war in 1973 to get it back and had nearly succeeded before they were turned around, narrowly avoiding total military disaster, thanks in part to pressure exerted on Israel by the United States. The issue was not merely that it was Egyptian territory that had been lost; it was also how Egypt had lost it.

Again, I am not suggesting that it is wise or necessary for Israel to hold on to the Sinai or any other part of the occupied territories in perpetuity just because they were won in a demonstrably defensive war. But I am concerned that this Israeli offer should not have been taken for granted, as if all past history were not full of countless examples of the opposite, including in the relatively recent past the vast territory acquired by the Soviet Union as a result of World War II and the even more recent seizure by force of almost half of Cyprus by Turkey.

The brute fact is that Begin was offering Sadat the fruit of war without war. Such an offer may well have been ultimately advantageous for both sides, but that is no reason for disregarding or discounting the rich prize freely tendered to the Egyptian side.

If Begin expected gratitude from Sadat for the offer of virtually total withdrawal from the Sinai, he received none. Sadat responded in the spirit of his Jerusalem speech—that he was not interested in a separate peace and that his responsibility for representing all other Arab interests took precedence over or was indistinguishable from Egypt's national interest. As a result, Begin might have saved himself the trouble of offering to give back the Sinai in advance of any serious negotiation on all other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In effect, Sadat forced the issue of the Palestinian Arabs to the forefront. Here also Begin and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially Dayan thought that they had something new and original to offer.

IV

COMPARED with previous Israeli positions, the so-called Begin plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip presented in late December 1977 was new and original.

Labor governments had proposed a "compromise" solution. Their compromise, however, was "territorial." It implied some sort of division of the West Bank, generally between Israel and Jordan, leaving the heavily populated areas under Arab sovereignty with an outlying, peripheral area going to Israel. Most Israeli settlements had been set down in this latter area. The emphasis in this plan was on "security."

Begin's old position had made Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the Golan Heights negotiable but not withdrawal from the West Bank, which he always referred to as Judea and Samaria to emphasize the area's Jewish origins. "I believe that Judea and Samaria are an integral part of our sovereignty," Begin said as late as May 22, 1977, six months before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. "It's our land." In principle, this was Begin's "hard-line" position. In reality, he made very little change in day-to-day conduct on the West Bank, except for authorizing a handful of new settlements by Israeli extremists. The emphasis in this approach, however, was on "sovereignty."

As long as Begin claimed the West Bank totally for Israel, the Laborite position could appear to be "dovish" because it entailed keeping only a part of the West Bank. In fact, neither conception had the slightest chance with the Arabs and amounted to little more than the Israelis talking to themselves. The West Bank's administration was actually a peculiar kind of tacit Israeli-Jordanian admixture, with security entirely in Israeli hands while Jordanian books were used in the schools, Jordanian law prevailed in the courts, and Jordan's old retainers in the West Bank received their accustomed stipends.

BEGIN's new plan did not fall into either of these two previous categories. It is worth more attention than it has received because parts of it later reappeared in different form in the Camp David agreement. In essence, the Begin government separated "administration" from "security." Under administration it included everything from education and finance to the administration of justice and supervision of local police forces. While the Israeli military government was to be abolished, Israeli armed forces were still to remain in charge of security.

To this extent, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza were to be given control over their own affairs with the exception of the armed forces. On all other matters, however, the plan pointed in the direction of Jordan.

One provision, curiously, permitted residents of the West Bank and Gaza to choose either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Those who opted for Jordan could be elected to the Jordanian parliament, sitting in Amman. Negotiations between Israel and Jordan were provided for to settle questions arising from the vote to the Jordanian parliament by West Bank-Gaza residents, and other matters into which Jordan was to be drawn. Israeli citizens were to be allowed to acquire land and settle in the West Bank and Gaza, but only those Arabs who opted for Israeli citizenship could acquire land and settle in Israel.

Finally, the plan addressed itself directly to the question of "sovereignty." At this point, too, Begin backed down from his previous hard, fixed position. His proposal declared that Israel stood by its right and claim to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. But it recognized that other claims also existed. To reach agreement, it proposed to leave open the question of sovereignty and to review the entire matter after a five-year period.

THE Begin plan presented such a complex set of conditions that sovereignty might ultimately go to the local Palestinian Arabs as an outgrowth of their "administrative" responsibilities, to an Israeli-Jordanian condominium, or to the Israelis alone. Yet, despite all the possible combinations and permutations, it was held together by a basic conception of the future of the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine.

This conception is chiefly identified with Dayan, who first put it forward in the early 1970's when he was still a Laborite in good standing. The main idea behind it is that Jews and Arabs should "live together" from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. It differs from the Laborite conception of a territorial division of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan in some manner that would leave a formal border between them. It also differs from what may be called the Egyptian conception—to create a formal border between pre-June 1967 Israel and a new Palestinian state or some autonomous Palestinian "entity" within Jordan. It differs from both of them by putting the main emphasis on some way of "living together" rather than on some way of living separately. Begin was apparently won over to this approach, judging from an interview on December 18, 1977, in which he said that "we should live together"—Dayan's favorite slogan.

In an interview on April 30, 1978, Dayan himself explained what he had in mind:

> So now this time we come forward with an absolutely different concept about it, not dividing the West Bank between Jordan and Israel, but living together, both the Arabs and Israelis liv-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing in the West Bank, the way we live in Jerusalem now (and no one really is now recommending dividing Jerusalem) so we say the same thing about the entire West Bank.

Dayan's analogy with Jerusalem left something to be desired. Jerusalem is under total Israeli sovereignty, as the West Bank might or might not be. As anyone who visits Jerusalem can see, the city is united juridically, not socially. There was some movement toward "living together" after the 1967 war, but it was reversed after 1973. Nevertheless, Dayan's aim of "living together" may well be as good a definition of peace in Palestine as is possible, for tomorrow or the day after if not for today. His conception, at any rate, helps to explain some of the complexity of the so-called Begin plan for Palestinian "self-rule" of late December 1977.

It was, from an Israeli point of view, a genuine innovation. It avoided both the Laborite formula of dividing the West Bank and Begin's old dogma that the West Bank belonged by ancient prescription to Israel. It was so unconventional that it succeeded in throwing the "hawk-dove" lineup in Israeli politics into disarray. Some former Laborite doves now began to attack Begin for having given away too much. Begin's hawkish followers began to feel the ground under them slipping away because the Palestinian Arabs were offered too much autonomy, while Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza would be moot for five years. Begin himself became temporarily unclassifiable as he alternately resorted to old-time Beginisms and anti-Beginisms. "Our preoccupation, our worry, is security," he told the Knesset on July 2, 1978, just the way Laborites used to talk. On July 23, 1978, he attacked the Laborite leader, Shimon Peres, on the ground that the latter was ready to give up parts of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. "I am not," Begin protested, while his critics were shouting and wailing that he was ready to give up practically everything.

From the Arab point of view, Begin's plan never had a chance. In June 1978, Sadat presented his own plan for the West Bank and Gaza. Like Begin's, it provided for a five-year "transitional period." But whereas Begin had merely stipulated a review of the entire procedure after five years, Sadat demanded that "the Palestinian people will be able to determine their own future" after a maximum of five years. Sadat also injected Jordan into his plan by proposing that the future would be decided by representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Arabs. Begin's plan would not have touched the existing Israeli settlements or Israeli armed forces. Sadat required them to be removed at the very beginning of the transitional period, during which Jordan would supervise the administration of the West Bank and Egypt of the Gaza Strip. Jordan and Egypt would thus have had five years of administering the two areas before the final adjudication.

Sadat's plan never had a chance with the Israelis. It was followed by the stalemate broken three months later at Camp David. Still, both the Begin and Sadat plans had elements which could be juggled or compromised. Most noteworthy in view of later developments was the agreement on a five-year transitional period before a final decision on sovereignty. Jordan was brought into both schemes. The inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza were drawn into varying degrees of immediate management of their own affairs. There were plenty of significant differences, but they were the stuff of which diplomatic compromises are made.

V

All during this period, the initiative belonged to Sadat. He had seized it in Jerusalem, and he held on to it with skill and tenacity.

His trump card throughout was U.S. policy. The relationship of forces in the Arab world vis-à-vis Israel was such that Sadat could not hope to prevail without the backing of Washington. By going to Jerusalem on his own, Sadat had found himself almost totally isolated in the Arab world. Egypt alone was in no position to enforce its demands on Israel. Egypt plus the United States was something else. Every move by Sadat was calculated primarily with an eye on the United States.

Sadat himself said as much repeatedly with disarming candor. Sometimes he said that the United States held 100 per cent of the cards. Sometimes he reduced the figure to a mere 99 per cent. The implication of this favorite observation was clear. If the United States held 100 per cent or 99 per cent of the cards and Israel none or 1 per cent, Sadat was inferentially negotiating with the party that held all those cards, not with the party without them. Thus Sadat's strategy was to get the United States to make up for what Egypt lacked. He set up and worked within a triangle—Egypt-Israel-United States. His success or failure was made to depend on his manipulation of the United States. This schema was designed as if all that mattered were American "leverage" on Israel. It left out of the account Egypt's leverage on the other Arab states.

Of greatest interest to Sadat must have been President Carter's choice of Zbigniew Brzezinski as his National Security Adviser.

Brzezinski is no exception to the rule that political intellectuals give literary hostages to fortune before they reap political rewards for their intellectual labors. In his case, efforts to find out what he had in mind for the Middle East before he took office have focused on the report issued by a Brookings Institution Study Group, of which he was a prominent member, in December 1975. But it was signed by fifteen others, some of whom did

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not agree with him on everything. For Brzezinski's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict before it became advisable for him to watch his words for their immediate political effect, it is necessary to turn to an article, "Peace In An International Framework," which he—together with François Duchêne of England and Kiichi Saeki of Japan—published in the Summer 1975 issue of *Foreign Policy*. This article put Brzezinski on record as advocating, among other things, that:

1. The United States should overtly take the initiative to present the substance of an international framework for an eventual settlement.
2. The solution had to "treat the whole problem" at once, not piecemeal.
3. Israel should trade occupied territories for Arab acceptance of the pre-June 1967 borders.
4. The result of such a trade-off would most likely be a PLO-dominated state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such a state was seen on one page of the article as coming "probably" and on another page "almost certainly."
5. The Soviet Union must be drawn into the negotiations. It was needed to provide a "joint guarantee by the superpowers" of any territorial settlement. No peace treaty was feasible without Soviet participation.

ONE more tenet was perhaps the most revealing of all. It appeared in this form:

> But the United States is also keenly aware that its relations with the Arab world impinge on its status as a superpower, and its support of Israel cuts across American *raisons d'état*.

This oracular pronouncement must be understood in terms of a longstanding argument in American policy-making circles about where the true American *raisons d'état* are located—in Israel, the Arab states, or some combination of both. The article by Brzezinski *et al.* shifted them sharply over to the Arab side. The Arabs were said really to matter so far as America's "status as a superpower" was concerned; *Israel cut across American raisons d'état*. The implication was inescapable—we may sympathize with Israel but we must in the final analysis support the Arabs, or at least get their support. This assessment was slipped in unostentatiously, though its implications informed the entire argument. With the exception of the stress on Soviet participation, there was nothing in the article that Sadat could not accept.

DESPITE this open manifesto on how to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict only a year before the presidential campaign and his choice of Jimmy Carter as his standard-bearer, Brzezinski's views were conspicuously absent from candidate Carter's campaign commitments in 1976. Carter denounced the Ford administration for having "tried to make Israel the scapegoat for the problems in the Middle East." He came out for "defensible borders," the Israeli code term for substantial changes. He rejected a Soviet-American imposed settlement. He told the Israelis that he himself would not relinquish direct control of the Golan Heights or Old Jerusalem. He advised them not to deal with the PLO. He put almost the entire onus for peace on the Arabs, from whom he demanded recognition of Israel, diplomatic relations, and a peace treaty as the "heart" of the matter.

After the election, most of these professions of deeply held convictions were consigned to the famous "dust heap of history," which in American politics receives another delivery in only as much time as it takes to get from the campaign to the election. All through 1977, the Middle East policy of the Carter administration moved in directions suspiciously similar to those which Brzezinski had charted in 1975.

1. The United States decided to adopt a more overt, operative role leading to a settlement. "We are not just an idle bystander," said President Carter on September 16, 1977. "We are not just an uninterested intermediary or mediator." A few days later came word from Brzezinski that the United States had "the legitimate right to exercise its own leverage" and was not "just an interested bystander, not even a benevolent mediator."*
2. The United States was committed to an all-inclusive "comprehensive" settlement, extending from Egypt to Syria. President Assad was persistently wooed; systematic efforts were made to find out what would be acceptable to him. As late as July 5, 1978, Carter called Assad "a major force for peace in the Middle East for many years."
3. Israel's "defensible borders" turned out to be just what they had been in the previous Nixon and Ford administrations. On March 9, 1977, Carter came out for "some minor adjustments in the 1967 borders." (A "minor adjustment" is understood to be something on the order of the reunification of a village cut in half by the 1949 armistice lines, which are all that the 1967 borders are based on.)
4. On a PLO-dominated state in the West Bank and Gaza the official policy began to move by degrees toward Brzezinski's 1975 prescription. On March 16, 1977, the President for the first time came out for a Palestinian "homeland." On September 16, he endorsed a Palestinian "entity," preferably associated with Jordan. Repeated efforts were also made to get the PLO to say the right

* Brzezinski liked the term "leverage" so much that he repeated it at the Overseas Writers' Club on October 18, 1977. The term was not original with him. It had been used twice by George W. Ball in his article, "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, pp. 454, 459. Ball had made clear just what "leverage" meant—that "America's continued involvement in the area depends upon acceptance by both sides of the terms it prescribes" (p. 459).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

words or even to pretend that they had done so in order to gain admittance for them at a reconvened Geneva conference.

5. The climax of all this American activity was the Soviet-American statement of October 1, 1977. It anthologized almost every important recommendation in Brzezinski's 1975 article. It called for a "comprehensive" settlement "incorporating all parties concerned and all questions." It recommended joint Soviet-American "guarantees" of any settlement. It maintained that a reconvened Geneva conference, no later than December 1977, was the only way to achieve a solution. It edged even closer to the PLO by employing the Arab formula of "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."*

IN LARGE part, this statement followed the line that had been urged by George W. Ball, Professor Stanley Hoffmann, and Nahum Goldmann as well as by the Brzezinski-Duchêne-Saeki article and the Brookings Report. What they had in common was the premise that the United States and the Soviet Union had to arrive at a prior agreement on the terms of a settlement in order to make an agreement by the parties themselves feasible.†

Not only that. The Soviet-American statement came as close to imposing a settlement on the interested parties as could be conceived of in the circumstances, despite official protestations to the contrary. The logic behind it had been worked out in the 1975 article by Brzezinski *et al.* It had envisaged a statement negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union to provide a joint guarantee for a return to the pre-June 1967 borders. Such a statement, it had delicately hinted, "would put great pressure on the Arabs and the Israelis, especially if it were then endorsed by Western Europe and Japan" (p. 16). The United States and the Soviet Union did not have to present their statement as an imposed settlement; their "great pressure" was expected to do it for them.

INSTEAD of great pressure, there was great shock in Egypt, Israel, and not least the United States.

The Soviet-American statement of October 1 was negotiated so secretively that neither Sadat nor Begin had been taken into Washington's confidence. Sadat let it be known that he was appalled by American sponsorship of Soviet intervention in a matter which primarily concerned Egypt without full Egyptian cognizance of what had been afoot. Israel was infuriated because the Carter administration had issued the statement with no advance consultation, in flagrant violation of a previous commitment dating from September 1, 1975, to consult fully and to seek to concert position and strategy with Israel in advance of any effort to reconvene the Geneva conference. Begin and Dayan were permitted to see the statement only twenty-four hours before it was issued. Congressional opinion, also taken by surprise, reflected incredulity and hostility. The most enthusiastic public support for the statement came from Syria and the PLO.

This diplomatic coup was the culmination of months of policy planning and weeks of diplomatic negotiations—"long weeks," President Carter later said. It could not possibly be attributed to a fit of absent-mindedness. Anyone who wants to know what the original Carter-Brzezinski-Vance policy for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict really was need only read this statement; the Soviets astutely recognized that that policy was good enough for them and their Arab clients. If such a coup was worth pulling off at all, however, it should have been followed by an exhibition of that "great pressure" which a Soviet-American statement was supposed to generate.

Pressure there was, but in the end it was not great enough. The Israelis protested bitterly and succeeded in getting some minor concessions. They were told that they did not have to accept the Soviet-American statement in advance of a reconvened Geneva conference. They obtained some nominal changes in the PLO's presence at the conference. But the Carter administration would not budge on essentials; the President still insisted at the end of October that the Soviet-American statement was a "major move in the right direction." American policy was hell-bent on going to Geneva and working in conjunction with the Soviet Union, with or without Egyptian and Israeli approval and cooperation.

One surprise begat another. While Washington was preparing to go to Geneva in December, Israel and Egypt quietly began to put out feelers to each other. Sadat's bolt-out-of-the-blue bid on November 9 for an invitation to Jerusalem was his way of rejecting Geneva. Begin's invitation and Sadat's speech in the Knesset—all within eleven days—came so quickly that all control of events was lost by Washington, which was reduced to watching

* Brzezinski for one could not have failed to understand what this term was supposed to mean. The 1975 article had noted that the "commitment [of the Arabs] to the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' would under the traditional interpretation mean the demise of Israel . . ." (p. 9).

† With varying degrees of emphasis and discretion, this premise may be found in the articles in *Foreign Affairs* by George W. Ball, April 1977, especially p. 468; Stanley Hoffmann, April 1975, especially pp. 421-422; Nahum Goldmann, October 1975, especially p. 124.

The origin of this statement is somewhat confusing. Reporters were first told that it was a Soviet idea and that the final text was based on a Soviet draft. Then the story was changed so that Secretary Vance had conceived the idea two months earlier but the Soviets had submitted a draft which had been modified by both sides. In any case, it must have been clear to the Soviets from previous articles and statements by leading officials in the Carter administration what they could expect and how far they could go.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them unfold on television. As significant as anything that was said in Jerusalem was what was unsaid—that the road to peace led from Cairo to Jerusalem, not from Washington to Moscow.

The effect of Sadat's Jerusalem speech was almost magical. The Soviet-American statement was put in cold storage. The new Geneva conference was indefinitely postponed. The plan to bring a recalcitrant Syria, an immobile Jordan, and a disinfected PLO into early, all-inclusive negotiations was sidetracked. The Soviets were again relegated to the sidelines.

Thus was a year of American policy-making for the Middle East undone. The only thing our policy-makers and planners could take credit for was that they had unwittingly helped to send Sadat to Jerusalem.

THE first reaction in Washington to Sadat's visit was compounded of bewilderment, embarrassment, and hesitation. But it would be a mistake to think that the American-Soviet statement was simply written off. It represented too great an investment and too deliberate a decision to be permanently abandoned. Instead, after a suitable period of recuperation and reflection, a determined effort was made to recover the ground lost without direct reference to the statement itself.

The most ambitious effort along these lines was made by Brzezinski, who now introduced the concept of three concentric circles. In the first, the United States supported an Egyptian-Israeli settlement. In the second, the "moderate" Palestinian Arabs and Jordan would be brought in. And the third was reserved for Syria and the Soviet Union, preferably at a comprehensive, reconvened Geneva conference. What the Soviet-American statement had contemplated achieving at one stroke, Sadat's visit was now supposed to accomplish in three stages.

Another way to achieve the same end was to make Sadat the negotiator for all the other Arab states. As we have already seen, Sadat had assigned this role to himself, and Begin had gone along with him. Now Carter also associated himself with it. In an interview on January 6, 1978, after meeting with Sadat, Hussein, and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, Carter asserted that he—and Hussein—felt "that Sadat is adequately representing the Arab position." Hussein and Khalid allegedly supported Sadat "unequivocally." Even more, Sadat was "almost uniquely trusted" not only by his own people but by the rest of the world, including "to a substantial degree" the Israelis. Only Syria was still inscrutable. But if Sadat could adequately represent the Arab position, we were in effect returning to the long sought "comprehensive" agreement.

Unfortunately, Hussein did not say that Sadat represented him. Khalid did not say that Sadat represented him. Carter said it for them. It remained to be seen how right the President was or how gullible he had been.

AT ABOUT the same time, Sadat was given the opportunity to find out where the real "leverage" was.

The Begin plan for Palestinian "self-rule" had been submitted to the United States before it was made public at the end of December 1977. Carter told Begin, according to the latter, that he considered the plan "a fair basis for negotiation to achieve peace." Publicly, Carter confirmed that he had been decidedly encouraging. In an interview on December 28, he agreed that Begin's plan "certainly is a realistic negotiating position" and declared that Begin "already has shown a great deal of flexibility." Begin had every reason to think that the Americans would back the Israeli proposals as a basis of negotiation with Egypt.

The test of American "leverage" came when Sadat categorically rejected the Israeli plan. Thereupon the Americans also discarded it. The lesson was not lost—that Sadat's "leverage" upon American policy was greater than American "leverage" upon Sadat's policy, and that Sadat's "leverage" on American policy set in motion American "leverage" upon Begin's policy. The 100 or 99 per cent of the cards that the Americans held, according to Sadat, was apparently to be played only in games between the United States and Israel.

Another example of how this "leverage" worked was given in a speech on April 5, 1978, by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., who had just been appointed U.S. special negotiator for the Middle East. Atherton was discussing the provision in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which was to assure Israel of secure and recognized borders. Atherton explained why such borders were not achievable:

> But borders that might give Israel the greatest sense of security in geographic and military terms are not those acceptable to Israel's neighbors. They could not, therefore, provide true security.

This reasoning was an American version of a familiar Arab argument. The Israelis might get a greater sense of security if their borders were substantially changed, but it would not be true security unless the Arabs decided what those borders should be. Inasmuch as the Arabs at best wanted no change from the pre-June 1967 borders, the Israelis therefore could not get a greater sense of security in geographic and military terms. Thus the United States had to accept the Arab demand for Israeli "withdrawal"—not qualified on this occasion by "substantial" or any other adjective—to the pre-June 1967 borders. There may be good reasons why Israel should agree to a total withdrawal, or to something substantially or insubstan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tially less, but this reason is surely not among them. It is, in effect, a rationale for giving the Arabs a veto power over both Israeli and American policy. Yet it was seriously propounded by the leading State Department official in direct charge of Middle East affairs.

BY MID-1978, American "leverage" was demonstrated in still another way. It concerned Begin's proposal of December 1977 for Palestinian "self-rule"—still the official Israeli position. By this time, Israelis and Egyptians were deadlocked over, among other things, the outcome of the transition period. Was the decision on Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza to be left open after the five-year period, as the Israelis proposed, or were the Palestinian Arabs to decide the issue at the end of this period, as the Egyptians urged?

In June 1978, the United States virtually took over the negotiations. It sent a questionnaire to Jerusalem, the nub of which was the question whether Israel would be willing to negotiate a final status for the occupied territories after a five-year transitional period. The response reiterated the original Israeli position—that "the nature of future relations between the parties will be considered and agreed upon" at the end of the period. The Carter administration clearly intended its question as a signal to the Israeli cabinet that only an affirmative answer would be considered satisfactory. No other supposition can account for the reaction in Washington to the Israeli reply. The State Department spokesman publicly expressed "regret that the Israeli replies did not fully respond to our questions." In a news conference on June 26, President Carter censured the Israeli responses as "very disappointing." He was clearly incensed.

On this occasion the Carter administration might just as well have issued instructions to Jerusalem on how to respond. The trouble with the Israeli response was that it was fully responsive but not according to Washington's intention or liking. In fact, the Israeli response would not have been so "disappointing" if it had been less responsive. Another peculiar aspect of this diplomatic exchange was the way it was flaunted in public. A request for information between governments is usually made discreetly. This incident was played up as if the Carter administration were determined to humiliate the Israeli government by getting it to reverse itself upon American demand or face a public dressing-down by the combined disciplinarians in the State Department and the White House.

IF THIS sort of American "leverage" upon Israel had worked, there would have been no need for the command performance at Camp David in September. Not that the United States was without leverage; it was merely without sufficient leverage to make Israel give up what it considered a vital interest. The distinction was critical to the success—and later breakdown—of the agreements reached at Camp David. The basic reasons for both went back to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

In his speech almost a year before, Sadat had anticipated no trouble reaching agreement between Egypt and Israel, which, he said, was not the problem. He proved to be right. The Egyptians correctly surmised that the Israelis would not permit their few settlements in the Sinai to stand in the way of an Egyptian-Israeli peace, however painful it might be to remove them. But most of Sadat's Jerusalem speech had been spent on his role as representative of the entire Arab world in its disputes with Israel, and the Camp David negotiations hinged on this aspect of Egyptian policy. Thus the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" was three times as long as the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." The presupposition of the former was that Egypt did or could represent the Arab states and interests in the Middle East. Without this presupposition, the agreement made little sense.

The Middle East framework made no secret of this assumption of pan-Arab representation on the part of Sadat. It was intended, the text said, "to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate with Israel on this basis." To make sure that no one missed the point, the document reiterated: "Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon." And once more, the framework invited "the other parties to the conflict" to negotiate peace treaties simultaneously with Egypt and Israel "with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area." One can imagine Sadat's reaction if Assad of Syria or Hussein of Jordan had made a deal with Israel and told Egypt to go and do likewise.

The most troublesome part of the Middle East framework, dealing with the Palestinian Arabs, had Sadat implicitly negotiating not only for the Palestinian Arabs but for Jordan. Sadat's ostensible aim had been to gain recognition for "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people"—and this language was incorporated in the framework. Sadat had also held out for a determination—not merely a review—of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza within a transitional period not exceeding five years. Begin's greatest concession came at this point, though he could claim that he had not promised any particular outcome of this determination. The entire process was, however, to be controlled from the outside—by Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. The three, according to the doc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ument, first had to agree on the "modalities for establishing an elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza," defined in the next paragraph as merely an "administrative council." The Egyptian and Jordanian delegations might—not would—include Palestinian Arabs. Jordan was brought into the exercise at every opportunity. After the "modalities" were agreed on, the next step was to be negotiations to determine the "final status" of the Palestinian Arabs. These negotiations were again to be carried on by Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, this time joined by the elected representatives of the West Bank and Gaza. Arab immigration into the West Bank during the transitional period was also to be decided by this quadrumvirate.

Nothing in the Palestinian framework committed Israel—or any other party—to any particular outcome or "final status." Nothing in the Egyptian-Israeli peace framework referred to the Palestinian framework or to Egyptian treaties with other Arab states. The peace framework was so worked out that it concerned Egypt and Israel only, and therefore could be controlled and carried out by them. The Palestinian Arab framework was so put together that it had to have the cooperation of at least two other parties—Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs. If Sadat was not really representing them, that framework was bound to come apart at the seams.

THERE was reason for this singular solicitude for Jordan on the part of Egypt, Israel, and the United States. However much they differed, the three of them agreed on one thing—that the new Palestinian Arab homeland or entity or self-governing authority should in some way be linked to Jordan. This was the only kind of "linkage" actually built into the West Bank-Gaza framework. And all the while, Hussein could not make up his mind whether to say yes or no. The autocratic Jordanian state could easily be disrupted by permitting an "authority" in Palestine to be "self-governing," and Palestinian Arab "self-government" could easily end up without much authority by linking itself to the autocracy in Amman.

Egypt, Israel, and the United States wanted the Jordanian link as a form of insurance against a PLO-controlled Palestinian state. Israel wanted this link the most, but Sadat had also resorted to the double-talk of an "independent" Palestinian state "linked with Jordan." Carter had never gone further than a Palestinian homeland or entity "in a very strong federation or confederation with Jordan." Meanwhile, no one had heard from Jordan how much independence it was willing or able to grant a state or entity which was also a constituent part of itself. At the same time, the Camp David formulas had, without Jordan's approval, assumed Jordan's participation in the determination of the Palestine Arabs' "final status."

The Jordanian link in the Camp David framework again put Sadat's representative function to the test. If he had had a prior understanding with Hussein, or could count on his support without it, the framework might not have crumbled so quickly. But Hussein had been sulking all the while, as decisions were made for him thousands of miles away. He finally asserted himself by publicly posing fifteen querulous questions about the Camp David agreement.

One would imagine that the answers should have come from Sadat, who, after all, signed the agreements and supposedly represented the Arab side. But no, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders rushed off to Amman to answer the King's questions. Saunders succeeded only in making a bad situation worse. He failed to satisfy Hussein, and he infuriated Begin. The Israeli Prime Minister understood Saunders's answers to imply that the Camp David framework was tantamount to a commitment to establish Arab sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza after the five-year transition period. Begin had given way on the issue, but not that much; he had agreed that the "final status" would be determined within five years, not what that status would be. And so Begin sent off a letter to Washington protesting that Saunders had distorted the plain language of the agreement. Saunders's indiscretion strengthened the already disturbing suspicion that the American side had never been wholly happy with the Camp David agreements and was trying *ex post facto* to smuggle into them more of what the Egyptians had originally demanded.

In effect, the Palestinian framework of the Camp David agreements was a self-destructive diplomatic instrument. It needed little help from the outside to explode from within. Once Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs let it be known that they would not play their allotted roles, the framework fell of its own weight. Only those who had not read the fine print could imagine that Egypt, Israel, and the United States were enough to make it stand up without Jordan or the Palestinian Arabs, not to mention Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. The verdict was in even as President Carter's standing in the public-opinion polls shot up for his seeming diplomatic triumph and Prime Minister Begin went to Stockholm to receive a peace prize he had not earned.

VI

AND yet, there was something about the Camp David agreements that let a glimmer of reality into the murk of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The glimmer came through the crack between the Israeli-Egyptian framework and the West Bank-Gaza framework. The separation of the two

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

frameworks was itself a decision of utmost significance. It implied that the negotiators formally distinguished between what was binding and what was contingent. A separation between the two frameworks did not mean that they were unrelated. It meant that they were not necessarily related. They were related, if only because Israel was central to both of them, and one could help the other to succeed. But Israel was not central to both in the same way, and one could also hurt the other. If they had been necessarily related, there would have been no need for the two frameworks at all, or there would have been a built-in connection between them. In the latter case, the Camp David agreements would have been only as strong as their weakest link. The only way out of this predicament was to separate the two.

This move was clearly understood by the Americans at Camp David. A "senior White House official," whose disguise deceived no informed reader, told reporters that each of the frameworks "stands on its own." President Carter clearly distinguished between the legal and the psychological relationships when he said: "The two discussions on the Sinai, which relate to Egypt and Israel only on the one hand, and the West Bank-Gaza Strip discussions on the other, are not legally interconnected, but I think throughout the Camp David talks and in the minds of myself, Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat, they are interrelated." In agreements of this sort, there is a world of difference between what is legally interconnected and what is mentally interrelated.

ONE word has bedeviled this subject. It is "comprehensive." Sadat, Begin, and Carter have all paid tribute or lip-service to this shibboleth, which Carter seems to cherish the most. The term lends itself to different interpretations in different circumstances, so that it is hard to know just what is meant by it. The Egyptian-Israeli framework was a comprehensive peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, but not comprehensive enough to take in the West Bank and Gaza. The other framework was designed to be comprehensive for the West Bank and Gaza, but still left out Syria. A truly comprehensive settlement of the conflict would have to embrace all the neighboring states and perhaps even get the blessings of Saudi Arabia. Such a settlement is not considered possible in present circumstances even by the most wild-eyed advocates of comprehensiveness *à outrance*. In practice, no one expects a truly comprehensive agreement by all interested parties at one stroke; all that is immediately attainable are degrees of comprehensiveness—which is the same as degrees of non-comprehensiveness.

The trouble with a fully comprehensive agreement in these circumstances is that it is illusory in practice, not that it is wrong in principle. The more comprehensive an agreement sets out to be, the more it has to take in Arab states that are the most intransigent. Comprehensiveness thus negates itself. What is important here is not how comprehensive an agreement is, but how effectively an agreement can be carried out within its own terms.

The French saying that "the best is the enemy of the good" may be reworded in the Arab-Israeli context as "the impossible is the enemy of the possible." The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was possible because the issues were not intractable and, above all, because Sadat had a mandate to negotiate them. The West Bank-Gaza treaty was not possible at this time because the issues were much less tractable and, above all, because Sadat did not have a mandate to negotiate them. Yet in order to get the negotiations started at all, it was necessary to assume or to pretend that Sadat represented the Arab and not merely the Egyptian side.

But Sadat did not and could not represent the Arab side. His self-appointment as representative of the other interested Arab states inevitably excited their resentment and hostility. Hussein spoke for them rancorously in an interview which appeared in the New York *Times* on January 12, 1979. Sadat had to understand, Hussein told Christopher S. Wren, that "it is not a situation where Egypt is a shepherd and the rest are a herd that can be moved in any direction without question." The implications of Sadat's representative role were never clearly understood, or at least never made understandable to the wider public. For Sadat was not merely reaching agreements with Israel, whether for a peace with Egypt or disposition of the West Bank and Gaza issues. He was not merely protecting his Arab flanks. He was doing both, but he could not do them both without at the same time imposing Egyptian leadership on Arab states, which were put in the position of taking or leaving an agreement which he had negotiated for them.

THE intractability of the non-Egyptian issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict is not merely the result of willfulness or pettiness. With the best will in the world on all sides, the issues would still be cruel and painful. Words cannot make them go away, and good intentions cannot change the realities on the ground. One of the greatest obstacles to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the assumption that all such differences are amenable to rational, practical arrangements. This sort of remote-control optimism makes a settlement all the harder by making agreement seem too easy and by encouraging a susceptibility to gimmicks and shortcuts.

Take the pre-June 1967 borders of Israel, which are so much in dispute. They are merely the armistice lines of 1949, where the opposing armies happened to come to a halt. The West Bank was taken by Jordan by force of arms. The Jordanians

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had invaded the West Bank in 1948 in defiance of the UN partition plan in order to prevent the emergence of an independent Palestinian Arab state called for by the plan. In all the years since then, only two states, Great Britain and Pakistan, and no other Arab state, had ever recognized Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank. On July 29, 1977, Secretary of State Vance acknowledged that it is "an open question as to who has legal right to the West Bank." Legally, then, the position of the West Bank could not be more ill-defined. If forcible occupation is illegal, Jordan had no more right to it than has Israel—and Israel at least has the justification of having occupied it in a war of self-defense.

The geopolitical aspect of the pre-June 1967 borders also resists easy manipulation. The hardest strategic nut to crack is the fact that the 1949 armistice lines left Israel with a waist about ten miles wide at the narrowest point between Arab territory and the Mediterranean sea. Israel's largest city, Tel Aviv, was only about fifteen miles from the Arab lines. The Gaza Strip under Egyptian military control—never legitimized as part of Egypt—was situated at the tip of the traditional southern invasion route into Palestine. The Golan Heights provided the Syrians with a fortress-sanctuary from which to harass the Israeli settlements below. None of these strategic monstrosities left by the 1949 armistice lines can be ameliorated by "insubstantial" territorial changes. But if the changes are "substantial," they must cut into territory that Arabs inhabit or consider their own.

Anyone who has ever set foot on the Golan Heights knows how little leeway they permit. From one direction on a clear day one can see the Israeli city of Haifa on the Mediterranean coast; from the opposite direction, the Syrian capital of Damascus. The plains below on both sides of the Heights are virtually defenseless, or at least desperately difficult to defend against an enemy entrenched overhead. Both sides have too little space at their disposal. The space factor in any Arab-Israeli conflict governs the time factor; there is just too little room for taking risks or making serious compromises so long as tensions remain high.

The most frequent suggestion by outsiders of a way out of this impasse has been "guarantees" by the superpowers. Unfortunately, Israel's position is such that guarantees would not be worth the paper they were written on. Among other reasons, the time factor in any Arab-Israeli war is against them. Israel won the 1967 war in the first two days and almost lost the 1973 war in the first three days. An effective guarantee would have to go into effect immediately, which would be possible only if the guarantor's protective forces were in place in sufficient numbers with sufficient arms on all fronts before the outbreak of hostilities. Israel, in effect, would give up responsibility for its own self-defense, and American soldiers would conceivably have to die instead of Israeli soldiers (it is too great a strain on the imagination to see Soviet soldiers dying to save Israel). Any threat to the guarantee would set off an international hubbub over who was to blame, whether and how to make the guarantee work, and what sort of resolution to pass in the United Nations. Those who advocate a guarantee make no provisions for enforcing it, want foreign soldiers to swarm all over the area, or assume that it would not have to be enforced.*

THE problem of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is another vexing dilemma. At the heart of it is a question which is rarely considered: should there be any Jews in the West Bank? And if so, where and how?

There are about 500,000 Arabs in Israel itself out of a population of about 3,500,000. If the same proportion of one-seventh of the population of about 700,000 in the West Bank were permitted for Jews, the latter would number about 100,000. This figure is so unrealistic that no one gives it a thought, for which very reason the imbalance in any proposed distribution of Arabs and Jews in Israel and the West Bank is all the more glaring.

The Jewish communities in the West Bank happened to be the oldest in Palestine. The oldest of all Jewish communities was situated at Hebron, south of Jerusalem, where David was first anointed King of Judah. It survived the destruction of both Temples but not Arab violence in 1929 and 1936. Only one Jewish family remained

* George W. Ball provides a good example of how a guarantee can be bandied about without giving the slightest hint of what it would entail (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, p. 461).

Professor Stanley Hoffmann would have had foreign troops, not excluding the possibility of Soviet and American soldiers, stationed in the Sinai, at Sharm el-Sheikh, the Golan Heights, and those portions of the West Bank closest to the Mediterranean "for a long period." His "guarantee" would have virtually amounted to a foreign military occupation by an international conglomeration under the aegis of the United Nations, whose tender mercies toward Israel are so well known. Professor Hoffmann thought of guarding against "the tragic experience of UNEF in 1967" through an agreement "against the arbitrary dismissal of the peace forces by one of the countries in which they are stationed, or the arbitrary removal of a national contingent by the country of origin." Apart from the fact that all these agreements would hinge on the interpretation of the term "arbitrary," and every participating country would interpret it as it pleased, Hoffmann chose to ignore the larger problem—that such a UN force would ultimately be controllable by the Arab bloc and its allies, and a good part of it would have to be contributed by countries which do not recognize Israel, do not see fit to have diplomatic relations with Israel, or are subject to Arab oil blackmail (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, p. 425).

Professor Richard H. Ullman has proposed a plan for guarantees, the effect of which "would be to make it exceedingly unlikely that those forces would ever be involved in combat" (*Foreign Policy*, Summer 1975, p. 26).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Hebron when Jordan took over in 1948 and made the entire West Bank *Judenrein*. The Jewish return to a suburb of Hebron, now called Kiryat Arba (the older name of Hebron), with a population of a few hundred, came after the June 1967 war. Kiryat Arba is atypical in that it is a relatively large Jewish community owing to its biblical associations for the Orthodox; it is typical in that it is still a small, self-enclosed Jewish enclave in a hostile Arab environment.

What constitutes historical justice here? Who is to say?

A few of the other Israeli settlements in the West Bank are like Kiryat Arba—a return to places where Jews lived before 1948. But many are not real settlements by long-term homesteaders; they are military-farming outposts for young people organized by "Nahal," a youth branch of the Israeli army. Others are civilian settlements of various political colorations. At latest count, there were 48 Jewish settlements in the West Bank with a total population of about 4,500, most of whose support comes from those who work in Israel and commute morning and evening. Gush Emunim, the extremist religious faction, claims 15 of these settlements, few of whose residents work in them and some of whom merely spend the weekend there. If the number of existing settlements and settlers were doubled, the result would still be nothing but small, barbed-wire-enclosed Israeli enclaves drawing their sustenance from Israel itself and numbering fewer than 10,000 Jews. Meanwhile, Israelis worry about the natural increase of the Arab population in the Galilee and the reluctance of Jewish immigrants to settle in that part of Israel in sufficient numbers to offset the growing Arab concentrations.

THE tenacity with which these settlements are espoused by many Israelis and opposed by most Arabs tells us something else about this problem. It is not altogether amenable to ordinary diplomacy or practical politics. Its roots are too deeply historical, religious, and in some cases irrational. In present circumstances, isolated settlements are the only way for Jews to live in the West Bank, which also happens to be the Judea and Samaria that constituted the original Jewish homeland. The only way is, however, more symbolic than real. In the 1973 war, the settlements on the Golan Heights demonstrated the difference between symbols and realities, when the hard-pressed Israeli army had to deflect soldiers desperately needed elsewhere to pull out the settlers at the first sign of danger.

Whatever one has in one's head, the reality is paradoxical on the ground. If the West Bank is Jewish territory, it is a peculiar kind of Jewish territory on which Arabs live and will continue to live almost exclusively. If it is Arab territory, it is a peculiar kind of Arab territory which was previously denuded of Jews by coercion and violence, was lost in a war provoked by Arabs, and is so situated that in the wrong hands it could mortally endanger both Jordan and Israel. The worst thing about the problem of the West Bank is that it is so tormentingly intractable; it would be much easier to resolve if it were only the product of ill-will or stupidity.

WHAT, one may ask, has all this to do with the Camp David agreements? The answer is that it has everything to do with them.

As I have tried to show, one of those agreements, dealing with the future of the West Bank-Gaza area, was fatally flawed. But its faults should not blind us to its chief virtue. It recognized that this problem was one that had to be dealt with circumspectly and experimented with in order for there to be a chance of finding a solution with which all interested parties could live.

The old Labor-party compromise of partition could never work because it was totally unacceptable to the Arabs and made no provision for anything but an Israeli-Jordanian future for the Palestinian Arabs. The Camp David arrangement was a different type of compromise. It was based on the provisional distinction between Palestinian Arab civil autonomy and Israeli security, the former very broad in scope, including a strong local police force, the latter limited to a thinned-out Israeli military deployment—numbering only 6,000 soldiers—within specified security locations. For such a compromise, the five-year transition period was minimally indispensable. It would have given all sides an opportunity to move toward a new relationship without feeling totally hedged in. The negotiations for a final status were set to begin almost midway through the transition period—no later than three years. If "peace process" has any meaning, this arrangement was just such a process.

It was, moreover, a genuine compromise. It was especially a compromise on the part of Prime Minister Begin. He was the one who gave away the most. How much he gave away can be seen by comparing the open-ended Camp David agreement with the 1977 election platform of Begin's electoral Likud bloc, which called for "Jewish sovereignty alone between the sea and Jordan." Not a single one of Begin's chief lieutenants in his own party went along with him in favor of the Camp David agreements; several of those who had been closest to him attacked him the most savagely; he was put in the curious position of being saved from defeat by the opposition. Sadat compromised by agreeing to leave some Israeli security forces in place in the West Bank for the time being, to postpone the final status for up to five years, and to exclude the disposition of East Jerusalem, on which the sides were too far apart. But the com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

promise was uneven. What the Israelis gave up, they actually had; what the Egyptians gave up, they had merely wanted.

WE MAY now come back to Dayan's formula of "living together." It can be misused, as it is misused when it is applied to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. These settlements are evidence of just the opposite. They are in the West Bank only in a geographic sense; socially, they might just as well be in Israel; their inhabitants live farther apart from their Arab neighbors than Jews and Arabs live apart in Israel.

Yet the ultimate validity of the idea cannot be rejected. Whatever the juridical arrangements, Jews and Arabs can have peace in the small, cramped space of Palestine only by "living together" in some manner. There is no other way to make any arrangement work, and any peaceful arrangement must finally be judged by how it contributes to living together, not by largely unrealizable abstractions—whether Israeli or Arab—about sovereignty in the West Bank.

Can Jews and Arabs live together some day in the whole of Palestine? In this matter, optimism is futile, pessimism fatal. When it comes to staying alive, people do what they must—not always, but often enough to give some hope for the survival of the human race. The Camp David framework for the West Bank and Gaza, shorn of its flaws, offered some hope for a peaceful future for Jews and Arabs in Palestine. That much cannot be said for the all-or-nothing proposals for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

VII

THE first loser as a result of the breakdown of the Camp David agreements was Egypt.

It was a classical case of giving up a bird in the hand by chasing a bird in the bush. The bird in the hand was the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. It would have been no mean feat of diplomacy to regain all that Egyptian territory without war. But the bird in the bush lured Sadat into an effort to bulldoze his way to a West Bank-Gaza settlement without assured cooperation from the Palestinian Arabs, Jordan, or any other Arab state. That Begin and Carter played along with Sadat in his pretense that he could represent all Arab states and interests does not make him any less responsible for putting himself and them in that position.

That Sadat chose to reopen the Camp David negotiations at all was far more important than the grounds he gave for reopening them. These grounds, moreover, undermined the most realistic aspects of the agreements and magnified the most illusory.

The necessarily loose connection between the Egyptian-Israeli framework and the West Bank-Gaza framework was undercut by the demand for a rigidly set, time-bound linkage between the two. To make matters worse, another linkage was proposed making the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty subject to the vicissitudes of Egypt's treaties with other Arab powers, which have never repudiated the political doctrine enunciated in 1967 by Nasser and Assad, the latter with far more power today, that the very existence of Israel in itself is an "aggression."

The West Bank-Gaza framework had been built around the basic design of a five-year transitional period, which was to proceed by stages with Jordanian and Palestine-Arab cooperation. All previous proposals, Egyptian as well as Israeli, had provided for a five-year interval. When Sadat insisted on rushing ahead with the elections for the West Bank-Gaza administrative council—the first Egyptian proposal made the intervening period as short as three months, then altered it to six, and finally to nine—without Jordan and with no sign of support by the Palestinian Arabs, he was short-circuiting the transition period to the point of ensuring that nothing of lasting value could come out of it.

Sadat did not need the oppositionist Baghdad summit meeting of Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, on November 2-5, 1978, to tell him that he had lost his gamble at Camp David. The West Bank-Gaza framework had been so constructed that it could not work without prior agreement with, or almost immediate acquiescence by, Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs. When they refused to go along, before the Baghdad meeting, the framework fell apart. What the Baghdad meeting did, by uniting "extremists" and "moderates" against Sadat, was to serve notice that Egypt had to be humiliated and punished for breaking ranks, attempting to serve its own interest, and presuming at the same time to represent the Arab world. The message of the meeting was not that Sadat's version of peace with Israel is wrong; it was that any peace with Israel is wrong. It was not merely a verdict on the past; it was also a mobilization for the future. For that mobilization, Egypt was told that it could no longer count on being the dominant factor, as it had liked to think of itself. The point of the exercise was to confront Egypt with the choice of having peace with Israel or peace with the other Arab states, but not with both. It is too often forgotten that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only one going on in the Middle East; there is also an inter-Arab conflict, sometimes reflected in the jockeying for position against Israel, sometimes quite apart from Israel.

Sadat's greatest problem is that his policy tends to outstrip his power. He seeks to manipulate forces much greater than those at his disposal. Ironically, he has found it much easier to manipulate the United States than his Arab brethren.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE second loser as a result of the breakdown of the Camp David agreements was the United States.

The American performance was not one to be proud of. Nothing could have been more embarrassing than the outcome of the policy consecrated in the Soviet-American statement of October 1977. To make a deal with the Soviet Union that neither Egypt nor Israel nor much of the U.S. Congress could tolerate must set some sort of record for wrong-headedness. After Sadat's end run to Jerusalem, the Carter administration had to limp along after him. When Sadat's momentum finally gave out after Camp David, the chief executive of the United States completely lost his bearings. By saying that the Egyptian-Israeli differences over Sadat's new demands were nothing more than "tiny technicalities, phrasing of ideas, legalisms" which had "absolutely no historical significance," President Carter unwittingly confessed that the full meaning of Sadat's turnabout had eluded him.

In its initial spasm of disappointment, the Carter administration turned the full force of its wrath on the Israeli government. After recovering from shock, the masterminds of U.S. policy came up with a "compromise"—they stretched Egypt's new demand for nine months between treaty signing and West Bank-Gaza elections to twelve months, as if they did not understand what the real issue was. Mechanically tacking on another three months could make no difference so long as Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs refused to cooperate. Without one or the other, and probably both, a hasty election imposed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States was sure to make the existing confusion worse.

The Carter administration would have been better advised to expend some of its wrath on Jordan. If any Arab country is beholden to the United States, it is Jordan.* The Camp David framework was composed as if there were good reason to believe that Jordan could be counted on. Yet Hussein had burned his fingers so often that he could least afford to take chances. His reflexive disposition is to stay on the fence or join forces with the prospective winner. Hussein's defection to the anti-Sadat camp did more to undermine the Camp David agreements than any other single action or inaction. It was at the same time a stunning defeat for and blatant affront to the United States. That Hussein can get away with this ambidexterity without the slightest sign of official disapproval or a whimper of protest from the American press suggests that some American leverage has been misdirected.† Now that Hussein has been flirting with Syria and even the PLO, one wonders how much longer he can count on American indulgence. To be sure, he has not always guessed right. He jumped the wrong way in 1967; he may be jumping the wrong way again.

The fundamental problem facing American policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict is whether, as Brzezinski thought, "Israel cuts across American *raisons d'état*." The State Department's Middle East specialists tried to prevent American recognition of Israel in 1948 with essentially the same argument, and the attitude has survived underground or above ground ever since.** The upheaval in Iran should especially bring this thesis into question. The resurgence of militant Islamic ortho-

---

* Someone ought to remind Hussein of what happened to him in 1970. When Jordan was invaded by Syria in support of the PLO in September of that year, Hussein frantically called for U.S. help. The U.S. in turn, having no other immediate way to help Jordan, turned to Israel for assistance. Hussein himself urged Israel to engage in ground action against Syria. Then Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger worked out a plan for Israel to send 200 tanks into Syria; President Nixon finally approved an Israeli plan for an Israeli air strike and, if necessary, tank attack against Syrian forces in Jordan. As the present Middle East expert on the National Security Council tells the story: "Hussein, with the assurance that Israel and the United States were behind him, finally ordered his own small air force to attack the Syrian tanks around Irbid, which it did with satisfactory results" (William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, pp. 116-19). Faced with evidence that Hussein had recovered his nerve and with the threat of U.S.-Israeli intervention, the Syrians withdrew.

† The responsibility of the American press and especially television for this sorry state of affairs is, I believe, considerable. The personal favoritism and political myopia exhibited by the media have been flagrant. I have seen interviewers fawn on Sadat and badger Begin or Dayan. The Egyptians could not demand too much and the Israelis give up too much to please most of them. Sadat could say, with a straight face, "We have given Israel everything," without being challenged to name anything in particular that he proposed to give Israel beyond what it already had, without his help, within the pre-June 1967 armistice lines. I can well understand that American correspondents and interviewers should find Sadat's personality more beguiling than Begin's or Dayan's. But even Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman received the same prosecutorial treatment. I have watched an interview with Weizman by Barbara Walters in which she dropped the mask of interviewer midway through the program and openly announced that she was going to adopt the role of antagonist. The television bias was so flagrant that it seemed to be competitive.

** One who should know from his personal experience as deputy in the Middle East office of the National Security Council staff from 1972 to 1974 described this view as follows: "The conventional wisdom, especially in the State Department, was that American support for Israel was an impediment to U.S.-Arab relations. By granting economic and military aid to the enemy of the Arabs, the United States was providing the Soviet Union with an opportunity to extend its influence in the Middle East. Although few questioned that Israel's existence should be defended by the United States in an extreme case, many felt that an 'even-handed' policy, whereby the United States would not always align itself with Israel and would not become her primary arms supplier, was the best guarantee of the United States interests in the region. In this view, Israel was more of an embarrassment for the United States policy than a strategic asset. Even if Israel was an impressive military power, that power could be used only to defend Israel, not to advance American interests elsewhere in the region" (William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, p. 120).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doxy on the Iranian model threatens the *raisons d'état* of the United States in the entire region more than any other single force. It cannot be held back by the movement of an American battle fleet toward the Persian Gulf (recalled) or a visitation by F-15's to Saudi Arabia (unarmed). The reaction of the Saudi rulers to the events in Iran should be most disturbing in Washington. If all the Saudi rulers could think of was to blame the United States for the Shah's debacle, they have not begun to understand the social and political conditions which can also erupt in Saudi Arabia and have shown how ready they are to turn on the United States for an alibi. In comparison to most Islamic states, Israel stands out in the area as a rock of steadfastness. I do not mean to propose that Israel should be the only state in the Middle East befriended by the United States. I mean that it is self-defeating to befriend other states at the expense of Israel rather than in addition to Israel.

THE third loser was Israel.

The Camp David agreement was extremely costly to the Israeli political system. It tore up each party and left wounds that may be difficult to heal. Begin suffered a major ideological split in his own party and gave up a lifetime of political consistency. In the opposition, the former dovish spokesman, Yigal Allon, turned hawkish, and only the critical support of the Labor-party leader, Shimon Peres, saved the Camp David agreements from parliamentary disaster. The Gush Emunim fanatics and their fellow-travelers resorted to actions and language that amounted to civil disobedience.

The political turmoil which the Camp David agreements provoked might have been a cheap price to pay for a peace with Egypt and a transition period in the West Bank and Gaza with a reasonable chance of success. But when they were quickly frustrated by Sadat's equivocations, the damage to Israeli political institutions was not matched by any equivalent reward.

The U.S.-Israeli relationship was also subjected to unprecedented strain. Sadat's entire strategy was based on the 100 or 99 per cent of the cards that the United States was supposed to hold against Israel. On this account, he could always make the United States responsible for anything he did not get from Israel; the Carter administration tried its best not to disappoint him and, in any case, considered that it had far more "leverage" to move Israel than to influence Egypt. As a result, Israeli resistance to Egyptian demands could be translated into Israeli defiance of American desires, and Egypt could sometimes exercise a virtual veto power over American policies. The classic instance in the first case was Israel's rejection on the same grounds of both Egypt's nine months and America's twelve months for the West Bank-Gaza electoral timetable. In the second case, a classic example was Carter's initial praise for Begin's West Bank-Gaza self-rule plan of December 1977 as "a long step forward" and then his backing away as soon as the Egyptians made known their refusal to consider it.

Because, at times of hard bargaining, Israel was not negotiating with Egypt alone but rather with Egypt backstopped by the United States, the future Israeli negotiating position may have been seriously compromised. Prospective negotiations as a result tend to start from what Israel has already conceded and turn on what more Egypt wants. Made-in-America "compromises" usually give the Egyptians much or most of what they want and thereby raise the level of Israeli concessions to only a little lower than the original Egyptian demands. All the post-Camp David demands by Egypt were designed to provide Egypt with escape clauses for scaling down Egyptian obligations without any compensatory way out for Israel. So long as this type of bazaar diplomacy goes on, with tacit and sometimes open U.S. connivance, the end for Israel is never in sight.

The paradox in the Israeli position is that it may well be true that only Begin could have made the concessions necessary for the Camp David agreements and that Begin could make them only by acting as if he were his old political enemy, David Ben-Gurion. The tension between David Begin and Menachem Ben-Gurion is so great, however, that it may not be able to stand the strain of much more pulling and hauling.

WE MAY yet look back at the Camp David agreements as having been in essence the most that Israel could give and the least that Arabs could accept. If so, sturdier frameworks for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors need a better understanding of what was right and what went wrong at Camp David.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lionel Trilling, A Jew at Columbia

Diana Trilling

If Lionel Trilling had lived to write the autobiographical memoir he had for a long time wanted to write—it was scarcely begun at his death in 1975—an important section of it would no doubt have been devoted to his early career at Columbia and to the difficulties of establishing himself in the English-teaching profession. In part this would inevitably have been a story of the Depression of the 30's, since the decade in which he was chiefly trying to get his start in the university was also the decade in which his family, always firm in the middle class so far as its social expectations were concerned but never financially secure, finally lost its economic foothold and dropped the burden of its support, together with the responsibility for decision in family affairs, upon his young shoulders. But it would also have been the story of what it meant to be a Jew in the American academy before we actually let ourselves recognize what was happening in Germany and what the casual anti-Semitism of our own country could portend.

Lionel's situation as a Jew who wished to teach in a college was at once typical and untypical. Typical was the uncertainty whether the choice was a possible one—quite apart, that is, from academic qualification. This was not the uncertainty of graduate students today as they face academic recession and a steadily diminishing job market. In Lionel's time there was no problem of the continuing strength of the universities. The question was, could a Jew realistically plan on a university career? The consensus was that especially in certain fields he could not. Several of Lionel's friends had already given up. Elliot Cohen had been a brilliant student of English at Yale but with university teaching closed to him, or so he was convinced—correctly, I think—he had become editor of the *Menorah Journal*, a magazine of Jewish thought for which Lionel and other of his Columbia contemporaries had begun to write as undergraduates. Another Jewish friend from Columbia days, unable to foresee a job in a college history department, had deserted graduate study to become a taxi driver, until one day his father discovered how his son was occupying himself and persuaded him to become a lawyer

Of course, there were the usual hindrances to generalization: one knew of exceptions to the ruling proscription of Jews from college teaching. Sidney Hook was at New York University; the physicist I. I. Rabi and several philosophers, including Irwin Edman, whose mother was a friend of Lionel's mother, were at Columbia; Morris R. Cohen was at City College. Even art history, then the most socially fastidious of disciplines, had been forced to make place for a Columbia scholar of Meyer Schapiro's spectacular abilities. But English gave no such promise of breakthrough: university English departments were still under the vigilant protection of something called the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

Untypical were Lionel's tenacity and courage—he was among the most unostentatiously *enduring* of people—and the curious assumptions of his upbringing. The belief that was commonly inculcated in the sons of East European Jewish immigrants, particularly those whose fathers had been deflected from the scholarly lives toward which their own early training had been bent, was that Jews came into a hostile world armed with notably superior intellectual powers. To achieve success, which also meant advancing in Americanization or (much the same thing) moving upward on the class ladder, they had only to deploy their native capacities to advantage.

The message of Lionel's upbringing was of a different order. It seemed not to have occurred to his parents that money was necessary to social mobility; as naturally as they breathed they thought of themselves, and always had, as middle-class people—were they not honest, respectable, committed to the solidity and progress of their adopted country? They were not people who went much into the world. They seldom ate in restaurants or attended the theater, although they occasionally went to an opera or concert. They belonged to no clubs and limited their social life to relatives and a modest group of neighbor-friends. But they never felt excluded from life on the ground of having little money or being Jews. English was always the language of the home, well spoken, and Lionel's mother in particular moved among Gentiles without self-consciousness—when Lionel was not accepted as a freshman in good standing be-

DIANA TRILLING is the author of *Claremont Essays*, *We Must March My Darlings*, and, most recently, *Reviewing the Forties*. This memoir will serve as the Foreword to a volume of previously uncollected early reviews and essays by Lionel Trilling which will be published in 1980 as part of the uniform edition of Trilling's works being brought out by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cause he had done badly in math, his mother had no hesitation in approaching the Columbia officer who had these matters in charge so that the decision was altered.

Unlike others of his intellectual generation, that is, Lionel had no need to make for himself the strategic leap into the American middle class, with what this so often involves in defensiveness. Also, unlike many first-generation Jewish intellectuals, he had not been taught to think of himself as "smart." It was not his sense that life was a contest of minds or that intellect was a weapon; it was more an instrument of conscience. But his parents had made him feel unusually valuable, or certainly much valued by them. While he had no belief that he possessed outstanding skills—on the contrary, throughout his life he thought that virtually everyone with whom he associated had read more than he had, had a better memory, and was better trained in the use of the basic tools of the intellectual trade—he had grown up with an undefined feeling of personal worth, some secret quality of being to which he could give no name but on which he could ultimately rely. As a child, or perhaps even at birth, he had been proved, as if born with a caul. Just as Jewish intellectual arrogance has its mythic dimension, this curious intuition of whatever it was that Lionel's parents cherished in him also had a magical character. For example, without truly distancing himself from the incident, not finally, Lionel told me of the day in his childhood when he was the object of an ugly street assault by a group of boys who pelted him with snowballs, possibly with rocks in them. He had not run. He had continued on his way, though frightened, telling himself that, like Baldur, he could not be hurt—and he was not hit.

CASUAL acquaintances of Lionel's father—these would of course be contemporaries—referred to him as "a perfect gentleman." With more daring, he might once have been a fop. Failed as he perhaps knew himself to be and all too manifestly inferior to his wife in attractiveness and energy, he still didn't entirely conform to the now-established image of the failed father of Jewish-American fiction. His wife said that as a young man he had been a prodigious dancer. And even Lionel described him as having been an excellent swimmer. I found all this hard to imagine—I would have thought him afraid of cold water—but then it was also easy for me to bypass the fact that early in his marriage he had cared for his mother, sisters, and brothers much as he now assumed Lionel would care for him.

A gentleman he was in his manner of speech and in his public stance but his family temper was violent. He was also an overbearing hypochondriac. And he had a most faulty sense of money, quite regularly confusing it with something distinctly less tangible, such as personal due or honor. In the worst years of the Depression, when we had all of us, Lionel's parents, Lionel, I, to apportion our infinitesimal funds among many creditors, he would solicit Lionel for money with which to meet, not the rent or food bills—these were not his concern—but his debt (as he interpreted it) to a porter whom he accused himself of once having unfairly laid off; his tone in these approaches was that of a man the plain plausibility of whose mission must be self-evident. Innocent of guilt or, so far as one could see, pain for shifting his responsibilities to a son who was not yet started in his own career, he lived in great fear of punishment for the neglect of fancied obligations outside the family.

The weak hold that his father had on reality was maddening to Lionel, especially because of the blandness with which his father met opposition to his conduct or contradiction of his views. While still living with his family as a student, Lionel had returned home one day to find his father rifling his desk and reading his mail. To Lionel's angry protest his father replied, "I'm not reading your mail, son. I'm just interested in your life." He spoke in hurt because his son so misunderstood his motives.

At Lionel's birth his father had been a decently successful custom-tailor but he had given this up to become a wholesale furrier—years later, struggling to maintain two families, Lionel would tell his friends in weary irony the reason that had been given him for the change: his father wanted Lionel to be able to say that he was the son of a manufacturer, not a tailor! I doubt he was meant for any business, but wholesale-fur dealing offered him irresistible temptations to calamity. Probably the most notable, the last, was his decision in the late 20's to make the most beautifully-matched raccoon coats that had ever been put on the market—they were for chauffeurs. Closed cars had by now come in but he was convinced they were not here to stay; the passengers in open cars could cover themselves with rugs but chauffeurs had no such warmth. When Lionel inquired why, instead of trying to outfit chauffeurs in such expensive coats, he didn't look to the colleges for his customers, his father smiled in pity and explained that obviously it was only rudimentary good sense to know that students couldn't afford such costly garments.

And was it also rudimentary good sense to know that a young man with a salary of $2,400 a year—but this would be considerably later, when Lionel got his first job at Columbia—and with two families to support couldn't afford custom clothes? In 1932 Lionel had just been made an instructor and to meet the occasion he had bought himself a suit at Macy's—the price, as I recall, was $29.99. Lionel's mother liked to have us to dinner on Friday nights—although her husband, eating outside the house in better days, ate ham and even shellfish, she kept a kosher home and lit Sabbath candles. Waiting vainly, irritably, for his father to notice his new suit, Lionel at last asked his opinion. His father sighed: "Get up, son." Lionel tried to re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strain his annoyance while his father slowly twirled him about, yanking up the collar of the jacket and hauling at its skirt. Finally he gave his judgment: "Don't you think a young man in your position owes it to himself to have a tailor-made suit?" What position, *what* position, Lionel wanted to shout—but could he attack a pride as perilously rooted as his father's? Around the house there was of course no talk of the determining experience of his father's childhood, but long before 1932 Lionel had learned the story: slated for an intellectual life, probably the rabbinate, in his native city of Bialystok, his father's course had all in a single day been abruptly terminated. He had broken down during his Bar Mitzvah: I suppose he forgot his lines. In consequence, a thirteen-year-old had been shipped off to America, put out of sight. For the rest of his life a cloud of disgrace and of the potential for still-uncharted disaster hovered about him.

LIONEL'S mother was determined that her husband's tendency to panic, overlaid as it was with disquieting fantasies of conquest, should not be communicated to Lionel—Lionel remembered his initial appearance in a school play, and his confused awareness that his mother didn't want his father in the room when she heard him go through his part. It must have given her singular pleasure (but she kept it to herself) that she lived to see Lionel such a relaxed lecturer. But this is not to say that hers was only a negative capability. Lionel's mother was a vigorous presence for anyone who knew her. Few people I have met have been so educable so long: her character and outlook on life changed radically in her middle and old age, the small-spirited values she could once share with her wealthy, self-imposing brothers and sisters steadily giving place to impulses that weren't validated by the conventions of their segment of the world.

Her parents, too, had been East European but she had been born and schooled in London's East End—without ever saying it, she could somehow suggest that Israel Zangwill had been a neighborhood intimate. But then, in celebration of female sturdiness, she could also speak of her "little English mother" in a way to suggest the natural family resemblance to Queen Victoria! Literary to her fingertips and wistfully envious of younger sisters who had been sent to Hunter College when the family had moved to New York, she was among the best-read people I have known, with critical perceptions that were the more impressive for always being voiced, and only to Lionel or me, with unaffected tentativeness: "Li dear, I never went to college and maybe I'm all wrong but did Stendhal . . . did Thackeray . . . did Tolstoy . . .?" or "Di dear, you know these things better than I do. Did Henry James . . . did Mann . . . did Lawrence . . .?" Lionel's father had been a reader too, but not like this. She read incessantly until her eyes gave out in her late eighties.

Lionel's mother had early decided that Lionel was to have an Oxford PhD; he said he couldn't have been more than four or five when she first announced this to him. That it didn't work out as she had planned and that his closest approach to the fulfillment of that particular dream was to become Eastman Professor at Oxford in 1964, a few months before her death, was—I think—troubling to him.

It was to his mother's confident expectations for him that Lionel, following Freud, ascribed his own ambitions and such faith as he had in his intellectual capacities. But in his later years he began to feel that this might not be a just assessment of the situation and that perhaps, if only genetically, he drew more from his father than he might once have liked to admit—this was when he heard of Trillings scattered in many parts of the world, an unusual number of whom were of high professional repute; they all of them traced their lineage to a common ancestor in Bialystok, a rabbi renowned for his learning. (How could one not think of a small boy in Bialystok, fluffing his Bar Mitzvah speech!) To be sure, the Cohens, too, and not Lionel's mother alone but others in her family, had their own demonstrable claim to gift, but among the Cohens as Lionel had known them in his formative years—even his own mother not altogether apart—the line between intellectual seriousness and intellectual chic had not been unblurred. Among the Trillings there seemed to be no such push for status on the basis of "culture."

I HAD met Lionel in 1927 and we married in June 1929. In October came the stock-market crash. I was not a particularly welcome addition to his family until slowly, very slowly, over the next strenuous years, as she was forced to confront not only the financial callousness but also the emotional isolateness of her Park Avenue brothers and sisters, four of them unmarried and living together in an apartment sealed to life, consecrated only to a remarkable art collection, Lionel's mother transferred much of her loyalty from them to me. My father was wiped out in the crash; anguished by "robbing his children," as he put it, he lived by borrowing on his life insurance. Lionel's father soon lost his fur business; we couldn't carry *his* insurance, it had been taken out too late in life. I became gravely ill with hyperthyroidism; far from being able to contribute to the family income I was an expense—in the next ten years, until I regained my strength, I asked much of Lionel, more than is easily told, in emotional support. The bills mounted. My mother was no longer alive: my sister did my father's laundry and housework; the money this saved they gave us to help Lionel's family. We borrowed from everyone we knew, $50 here, $100 there—the people to whom we were sufficiently close to be able to borrow seldom had more than small sums to lend. When my father died at the end of 1932 and I inherited my third of an insurance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trust, all that remained of a once-substantial estate, we owed the capital distributions before they could be made.

Because he looked as he did, so quietly self-possessed; spoke as he did; was as he was, unscarred by grievance, Lionel has been pictured since his death as socially privileged above most intellectuals, someone to whom everything had always been given, nothing exacted: a child of gracious fortune. Surely his students couldn't have known the difficulties of his early career, although a sharp observer might perhaps have read a reminiscence of them in his eyes and in his never-completed smile. "Tell your husband to move over and give *us* a chance," raged a Columbia revolutionary of 1968 who had been busted and was now phoning to vent his fury at the "authority," not any authority but the one who must have been nearest to his own ideal. Lionel was not at home to take the call; the message was to be passed on by me.

SEVEN years had elapsed between Lionel's graduation from Columbia in 1925, shortly before his twentieth birthday, and his appointment as an English instructor in 1932—there was of course no tenure in an instructorship, but the appointment was an accolade; both families felt very proud. But no one was under the illusion, unless perhaps Lionel's father, that Lionel's professional problems were now permanently solved. My own father was ill, terminally, and I remember a conversation with him that fall in which I tried to divert him with an account of a debate Lionel and I had recently attended between Earl Browder for the Communist party and McAlister Coleman for the Socialists at the Morningside branch of the Socialist party, near the University. My father was upset; "Don't you know that President Butler has his spies at meetings like that?" I pointed out that Lionel was in no danger, I had even seen Corliss Lamont at the meeting. "A Communist like Corliss Lamont Lionel should be!" To the son of a Morgan partner—my father was saying—life offered safer harbors than to an anonymous Jew. But he was reflecting as well the then-prevalent idea of the university, contradictory though it was of his own deep-rooted respect for all institutions of learning, as a bulwark of entrenched political and social values, and in itself a power entity. To all Jews and maybe to most non-Jews, too, certainly in New York, the university had an authority not unlike that of the state: remote, virtually absolute. And this view was fortified at Columbia by the public image of Nicholas Murray Butler who was known to associate with the great financiers and political leaders of the day and to want the Presidency of the United States. We forget that our picture of the college as a liberal citadel is of recent vintage, post-Roosevelt.

It had not been a calm road Lionel had traveled in the seven years since his graduation in 1925. He had remained at Columbia in 1925-26 to take his MA, after which he had spent a year as what would now be called a teaching assistant in Alexander Meiklejohn's experimental college at the University of Wisconsin. My knowledge of 1927-29 is not precise: while I know he taught at Hunter under Blanche Colton Williams, I am unsure whether it was in the day or evening session; he regarded the experience as only a degrading one and afterward didn't wish to speak of it. In this area, too, we have to keep in mind the changes that have taken place since that period: the city system was then well-locked into the system of Tammany patronage; merit was scarcely the sole ground on which one got a Hunter appointment.

We married in 1929 and during the next year Lionel worked as an assistant editor of the *Menorah Journal* for Elliot Cohen, apparently giving satisfaction neither to Cohen nor himself—it was another experience he preferred not to discuss. Between 1930 and 1932 he taught in the evening session of Hunter; in the second of those two years he also had an $1,800 fellowship from Columbia—he had to appeal for special permission to augment this by his part-time teaching. Evening teaching at Hunter was piece work: one was paid a bit more than $3 an hour for an undergraduate class, something over $5 an hour for graduate teaching. Lionel had one undergraduate and one graduate class. When there was insufficient graduate registration, several of my friends signed up, the investment of the $15 registration fees being justified by our need for the income. But a bout of flu could spell financial catastrophe: on an evening when Lionel was too ill to leave his bed, we could think of no salvation but for me to take his classes for him. As a direct result of that undertaking—I tried to teach his graduate students a book I had never read—I have not again ventured into a classroom.

ACCESSES of inexplicable power can suddenly come to one—as Lionel would learn a few years later—and sudden beneficences too: the offer to Lionel of an instructorship at Columbia is not readily accounted for. By and large, except for Raymond Weaver, who was outspokenly hostile until a long time afterward when his enmity changed into affection as precipitously as it had appeared, his teachers liked Lionel well enough, but he was far from esteemed above all others—it is even possible that a piece by Mark Van Doren in the *Menorah Journal* in 1927, in which he describes some of his former Jewish students, reflects more than just his own estimate that Lionel's was one of the less commanding talents of his college generation. (What strikes one, reading the piece today, is surely not any prescience it can boast but its subject. In 1927 only an editor of Elliot Cohen's ironic imaginativeness could have thought to invite a college teacher of English, even in New York, to write about the Jews he had taught!) The person directing Lionel's dissertation was Emery Neff, a scholar of Carlyle and Mill.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Neff was personally not unfriendly but Lionel had given him little to go on in judgment of his capacities other than vague gropings toward a book about Matthew Arnold. When the appointment as instructor came, it was from an entirely unexpected source. There was no reason to suspect that Ashley Thorndike, then head of the department, took notice of Lionel, yet it was Thorndike who offered him the job. Did Thorndike, in proposing Lionel for the English department, have a programmatic purpose? Had he caught something about Lionel that others missed? Lionel never learned. Obviously, if it was Thorndike's intention to test a Jew, Lionel made a good gamble both in appearance and name. Had his name been that of his maternal grandfather, Israel Cohen, it is highly questionable whether the offer would have been made. (This was the grandfather whose uncanny resemblance to Freud would in later years capture Lionel's imagination.)

It was a period in which one earned one's keep: for $2,400 an instructor taught four full courses while commonly working for his PhD. If, like Lionel, he had ambitions to write elsewhere than only in scholarly periodicals, he also wrote book reviews when he could get them. If he was desperate as Lionel was for money, he added to this schedule such literary odd jobs as came his way—for $10 fees Lionel talked to womens' clubs in Staten Island or Westchester; he pasted up anthologies to be given away as bonuses with newspaper subscriptions; at one stage, he tutored a rich young man in novel-writing and, at another, he taught a class at a Junior League. I don't know if the quality of his teaching suffered under the pressure but undoubtedly his thesis did. It would nevertheless be inaccurate to blame the difficulties he was having with his book wholly on the strains of such urgent money-earning, severe as these were. He was depressed, he had a considerable writing block though fortunately not a total one, he didn't know what kind of book he had undertaken to write: how did you write an intellectual biography of Matthew Arnold without writing the history of the 19th century? From the start his department had no great enthusiasm for his dissertation subject; it was too big, too amorphous, and who cared about Arnold anyway? Yet with no clear notion of what he was about, which might have persuaded them to take a more cheerful view of his project, Lionel never yielded his determination to stay with his topic. No one could have worked harder, nor less fruitfully—he went out no more than one evening a week, he read, he brooded, he drafted chapter after chapter. My own recollection of his early efforts on the Arnold was of a dissertation that, week in and week out, found yet another way of saying that England had had an Industrial Revolution and that the roads were bad! Although Lionel knew better than to show all these versions to Neff, an occasional presentation was unavoidable, and each time Neff read a chapter he sent Lionel back for a fresh try. Later, when life improved, Lionel confessed to me that he didn't always go to the library when he told me that that was his destination: things were too bad. In fact, even earlier in our marriage, assailed by depression, he would go to the movies, sitting through interminable double features like someone homeless.

IT WENT this way for four years. In 1936 the Columbia department dropped him. The way it was done was not harsh. The departmental spokesman said he would not be reappointed for a next year because "as a Freudian, a Marxist, and a Jew" he was not happy there. Lionel said he *was* happy in the department. They said he would be "more comfortable" elsewhere.

Obviously in the midst of the devastation produced by his dismissal—what would he do now?—Lionel couldn't grasp the complex truth of what was involved in this termination of his appointment. But though not yet formulated with the conviction that would later come to him, at least one thing was immediately clear: his dismissal was not any *simple* act of anti-Semitism, any more than it was a simple act of anti-Freudianism or anti-Marxism—while he had been known to be a Communist fellow-traveler at the time he got his job in 1932, in the years since then he had moved steadily away from his earlier Marxist commitment, although never ceding his interest in and respect for Marx's thought; as for his Freudian preference, it could be known only through conversation because in 1936 it had not yet appeared in his writing. Although over the years the story of Lionel's dismissal came to be talked about among people we knew as a gross instance of collegiate anti-Semitism, this was a bargain-basement version of the actual scenario. What was in fact going on doesn't make the ready matter of religious polemics, it makes the more textured matter of fiction. Lionel was a harried, frightened young man. He proclaimed no confidence in himself—this was true outside the University as well as within it—and he therefore inspired little confidence in others. In 1936 his dissertation was not yet visible to the naked eye. His moral and intellectual force, like his tenaciousness and wit, was visible chiefly to me and a few other intimates. When his department said he wasn't happy with them and would be more comfortable elsewhere, what they meant was that *they* weren't happy with *him* and would be more comfortable if he went somewhere else. The documentation they produced in evidence of his—their—unease was the aspect of the situation that had significant social implications, for what it revealed was that Jews were people who made the Columbia faculty uncomfortable, Freudians were people who made the Columbia faculty uncomfortable, Marxists were people who made the Columbia faculty uncomfortable. It is in this sense, circumscribed but charged enough, that in dismissing Lionel, Columbia can be accused of anti-Semitism together with other biases and cautions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was a few days before Lionel responded at Columbia to his dismissal: the action he took was the single most decisive move of his life, undoubtedly its source his mother's insistence that *her* hope for her son, her certainty of his firm future, must triumph over his father's long tragic concourse with defeat. One after the other Lionel confronted those members of his department whom he knew best: Van Doren, Weaver, Neff. He didn't reason with them, he didn't argue with them. He told them that they were getting rid of a person who would one day bring great distinction to their department; they would not easily find another as good. It was his habit to speak quietly but now he spoke so loud that Neff was distressed, closed the transom. It wasn't a ploy, it wasn't planned—for the rest of his life Lionel would recur to this deeply uncharacteristic moment. With me or with friends, he would speculate on what had generated conduct this alien to his usual temper and also what lessons about our human workings were to be learned from its outcome. All at once he had presented himself to these people as the opposite of what he had previously been, someone who tempted their aggression, and, as he analyzed it, it was this that had accomplished its miracle: with such high opinion of himself, was it not possible that he deserved their high opinion? At any rate, so it worked out: it was agreed that he was to stay on for another year; the year multiplied because he was now a changed person. He began his book anew, his confusions about the direction it must take seemed overnight to vanish. By 1939 it was published to his department's satisfaction and President Butler's pride. In those days a dissertation had to be published and a hundred copies deposited in the library in order to earn one's degree; it was a last unhappy note to the history of Lionel's *Matthew Arnold* that W. W. Norton required a subsidy to publish it. Somehow—more borrowing!—we found the money.

THE role of President Butler in the next stage of Lionel's academic career importantly modifies the image of Butler that has come down to us. Few good words have been written about him; in general he has been made to appear, especially in the recollection of students who were engaged in Communist activities on the campus in the 30's, a fiercely repressive administrator, indeed a tyrant. I don't know the justice or injustice of these reports. His relation to Lionel, however, was exemplary in an administrative tradition that no longer exists.

One day in early 1939—his book had just been published in England as well as here—Lionel met his old friend and teacher, Irwin Edman, in the neighborhood. As they chatted, Irwin asked Lionel whether he had thought to send Butler a copy of the *Matthew Arnold*. No, Lionel had not; it had not occurred to him. But Butler *liked* to be sent copies of books written by members of his faculty, Irwin explained; in fact, he considered it a breach of etiquette if this courtesy was denied him. No one was more knowledgeable in such matters than Irwin. He was the only person of our acquaintance who also had acquaintance with the President; his urging of this duty upon Lionel was not to be written off. To Lionel, Butler was a distant, formidable figure, known for his almost comically exalted style of life: how did one even address him? Irwin must be bothered once more. In reply to Lionel's embarrassed phone call, Irwin explained the procedure: addressing him "Dear Mr. President," Lionel must write a letter asking the privilege of sending him his recent book; the book, inscribed "To President Butler, Respectfully. . . .," was to be mailed the next day. Insisting that he could not do it, would not do it, could not be prevailed upon to do it, Lionel followed Irwin's instructions.

That night I had a waking dream in which President Butler got Lionel's book, read it, and rushed into the next office to Frank Fackenthal, Columbia's Provost. "Frank, do you mean to say we have an instructor in this university who can write a book like this? He must be promoted!" I later learned that as nearly as a fantasy can be reenacted in reality, this one had been.

If President Butler wanted a young man promoted, he had his procedures. Every spring the Association for University Teas gave a reception at the Faculty Club for the President and his wife. Several weeks before the event this spring an engraved invitation arrived at our house: Lionel and I were asked to dinner at the President's the evening of the reception. No one we knew had ever been at the Butlers' for dinner, perhaps not even Irwin Edman—I remember I had to go afield for advice about dress, but that could have been because Irwin had no wife I could consult. I felt I was taking my life in my hands in even calling the Secretary of the University, a white-haired gentleman who suggested a plumper smoother Cordell Hull, to inquire whether it was white or black tie that was indicated for our occasion. "White tie, I should think," said Mr. Hayden in a voice that froze the heart. It was decided: Lionel would hire tails and I would buy a ball gown. A terrible thought came to me: need I wear long white gloves? Who was there to tell me? I called the fashion department of *Vogue* magazine which assured me that there was no occasion or place that any longer required long white gloves, unless it was the Court of St. James's. This convinced me: long white gloves would be worn at President Butler's. I called the fashion adviser of Bonwit Teller and got the same reply but this time I was more specific: "What about dinner at the home of President Butler of Columbia University?" "Well, yes," came the reply. "That might be a good idea."

Public figures and University people were obviously not to be mixed; on the evening of our dinner the guests were entirely from the faculty, I think there were twenty people present. For dinner at eight, Lionel and I carefully arrived at 8:02.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We were the last to arrive and were rather urgently propelled toward the closed drawing-room doors by a footman. The doors were flung open, we were announced by a butler. The receiving line consisted of the President and his wife. "Let me congratulate you, sir, on your splendid English reviews," was the President's greeting to Lionel. "There's only been one," said Lionel. "There have been two, sir," the President corrected him. In the meantime I was being welcomed, if that's the word, by his wife. "Do you know everyone here, my dear?" I made a lightning survey of the room. "I'm afraid I don't know anyone." "That, my dear, is because you never come to any of the teas or receptions." In the dining room it was possible to study the company. All the women but one wore long white kid gloves, the hands now rolled back. Lionel was the obvious purpose of the evening. Dean Hawkes of the College was a guest and so was Ernest Hunter Wright, now head of the University English department. For his communication to be unmistakable, Butler would have had to do no more than invite Lionel, an instructor, in this company. But he had yet another arrow to fire.

Through dinner the President ate nothing; he drank a great deal of Scotch. The food was delicious: his wife was a Frenchwoman of mature years built with the kind of one-piece sloping bosom that made a properly solid armature for a lavender cut-velvet Worth gown, very expensive, elegant, and unbeautiful, that was then in favor among higher-echelon ladies of two continents, and I knew about her table from the grocer we shared. One day when I had been offered a bargain in loose carrots from a corner basket and I had rejected them as "horse carrots," he had confided to me that these were the ones Mrs. Butler bought for the servants' kitchen; nothing was too good for her own table. There were several footmen to serve so that the meal went swiftly. At its end the women repaired to Mrs. Butler's sitting-room upstairs while the men had cigars and brandy in the President's library. The President sat on a bench with his back to the fireplace, Lionel told me, and did all the talking. He was growing old; under any circumstances it would have been easier to talk than listen. In a circle in front of him the men attended what he had to say.

What the prefatory monologue consisted in was of no import, it was where it inescapably led that mattered: Butler recounted the correspondence he had had with the Chancellor of the University of Berlin when the two universities, Berlin and Columbia, had decided on an exchange of philosophy professors. Columbia proposed to send Felix Adler and the Chancellor had written to protest a Jewish visitor. Lionel recreated the scene. Having got this far in his narrative, Butler had put down his brandy glass and firmly planted his hands on his knees, fixing his eyes on Professor Wright as he boomed: "And I, gentlemen, I wrote back: 'At Columbia, sir, we recognize merit, not race.'" Silence. The party rose to join the ladies and move on to the Faculty Club reception. In the summer, "under his summer powers," President Butler appointed Lionel an Assistant Professor of English, the first Jew of that department to become a member of the faculty.

How much, then, had anti-Semitism actually been a factor in Lionel's dismissal in 1936? Who can say? Certainly it was by Butler's intervention, by fiat of the top authority of the University, that a Jew was first given a post teaching English at Columbia, which in those days implied permanence.

Everyone was easy with him; Lionel felt no hidden tensions. Indeed, the generosity that he met from this point forward in his Columbia career has, for me, a legendary quality—his departmental colleagues could not have taken more pleasure in his academic or critical successes if they had been their own.

One day, however, very soon after his promotion, Lionel had a call from Emery Neff: he wished to come to the house and he hoped that I would be at home too. Although we were mildly on visiting terms with Neff and his wife, a call of this kind was unprecedented.

What Emery Neff came to say was that now that Lionel was a member of the department, he hoped that he would not use it as a wedge to open the English department to more Jews. He made his statement economically and straightforwardly, ungarnished; it must have taken some courage. And he seemed to be speaking for himself alone; he cited no other departmental opinion. Lionel and I just sat and stared. Neither of us spoke. Emery turned to other subjects and soon left.

World War II had started. In the next years the situation of Jews in American universities changed radically. Not only at Columbia, but everywhere, even Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and not only in English departments but in all fields of study and in administration, Jews made their comfortable way. I remember Lionel's grin the day he came home to report: "We hired a new English instructor today. His name is Hyman Kleinman." I also remember, in fact together we remembered, one of his father's wilder—no, wildest—flights of fancy back in the early 30's when it seemed to us that if we had to endure yet another of his unrealities we might ourselves lose our hold. We had been talking about Jews in college teaching, the failure they almost surely faced. His father, as always unperturbed in his reading of this world we presumably inhabited with him, had fixed his most unbearably pitying look on Lionel. "Why, son, this is America. A Jew could be President of Columbia University."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why the Shah Fell

Walter Laqueur

THE Iranian crisis is far from over; in fact it may still be in its early stages. Nevertheless, the mythmakers are already hard at work. According to one school of thought, the cause of the recent uprisings and the fall of the Shah is to be sought in the "very bad economic situation." According to another, the crisis was provoked by the great "social injustices" in Iran. According to a third, it was the "stifling political atmosphere" which caused the explosion. All of these may be true, but what do they explain? The economic situation in most Third World countries (and indeed in many others) is certainly much worse than in Iran; social injustice is equally glaring; the political atmosphere at least as stifling. Why, then, Iran?

Partly it was a failure of the ruling elite. The Shah was isolated, cut off from the people whose aspirations he thought he embodied. As Lord Curzon wrote in the early 20th century about another Shah: "The exigencies of his rank and position render it almost impossible for him to receive the assistance which tried and independent counselors can afford. The attitude and language employed toward him are those of servile obeisance and adulation: 'May I be your sacrifice, Asylum of the Universe' is the common mode of address adopted by subjects of the highest rank."

The language in which the Shah was addressed had changed somewhat since Curzon's days, but it does seem to be true that while no one had dared to lie to the Shah's father, few dared to tell the truth to the son. Mohammed Reza Pahlevi showed an awareness of this problem when he wrote that in Iran the entire tradition surrounding the Shah accentuated his loneliness, and that though he himself was less forbidding in demeanor (his own words!) than his father, his role inevitably kept him at arm's length from other people. But the Shah was still convinced that he could rely on God's support, that God had ordained him to do for Iran things that no one else could do.

Indeed, after a shaky, uncertain beginning the Shah had been quite successful. The "White Revolution" of 1963 was given qualified acclaim even by many of his critics; the Muslim clergy, which condemned it at the time as the work of the devil, came reluctantly to accept it, especially after the oil windfall of the 1970's, leading to a growth rate of 35 per cent and 42 per cent in 1974 and 1975 respectively, opened breathtaking vistas to Iran's development. In the early 1970's, with the Shah at the height of his power and his political opponents in a state of disarray, Iran seemed to be making quick progress.

But the appearance was deceptive. In fact, the enormous oil royalties were mishandled by the Shah's regime; by 1975 the boom was out of control, and by 1976 it was clear that Iran was vastly overspending. The official goals, which included a more or less complete welfare system, were overambitious in every respect. By October 1976, the Shah admitted partial failure:

> We have not demanded self-sacrifice from people, rather we have covered them in cotton wool. Things will now change. Everyone should work harder and be prepared for sacrifices.

But nothing is more difficult in politics than to carry out an orderly retreat, and even when the boom ended, everyone still expected its benefits to last forever.

In retrospect it is obvious that these years should have been used to reform the political system and to broaden its base. Instead, there were manifestations of a growing arrogance. In 1974, the Shah announced that within the next quarter of a century Iran was bound to become one of the world's five mightiest powers, and his minister of finance predicted that it would be among the first five in per-capita income as well. Dazzled by the enormity of the windfall, the Shah failed to understand the grave difficulties the country would have in absorbing the new wealth. More important still, the Shah and those surrounding him did not realize that an old-style monarchy was no longer effective in providing legitimacy to the regime. It was not only the economy that had to be modernized, but also the political structure. A growing number of people, including most of the educated class, found the medieval pomp and circumstance humiliating and ridiculous.

This was the real weakness of the regime—not

WALTER LAQUEUR, whose many books include *Guerrilla, Terrorism,* and *The Middle East and World Politics,* is chairman of the Research Council of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and a contributing editor of COMMENTARY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it was a "tool" of U.S. "imperialism," or that it engaged in savage repression and widespread corruption. Both of these charges are seriously exaggerated.

It is true that the CIA had saved the Shah in the early 1950's—with an investment of less than half a million dollars—but thereafter he had followed an independent nationalist policy. It is also true that Iran received American help in the 1950's, but Yugoslavia received more than twice as much, and no one accused Tito of being an American satellite. Since the early 1960's, the Shah frequently used Washington for his own purposes; it would be difficult to point to many instances in which he was used by the Americans. (In 1963, the Shah promised the Soviet Union that he would not provide bases to foreign powers on Iranian soil, and for the next ten years excellent relations prevailed between the two countries; the Soviets even condemned the anti-Shah demonstrations of the "reactionary mullahs" in the 1960's. All this changed only in the 1970's, when Moscow switched its support to Iraq and the radical elements in the Gulf.) The nationalization of the oil companies in 1973 was hardly a step serving Western interests; among OPEC members, moreover, Iran was until recently among those pressing for very substantial rises each year.

Thus, the Shah's foreign policy was not pro-Western, but pro-Iranian. As he saw it, Iran could not in any case count on long-term American and European support, in view of the general decadence of those societies. If he looked for American military supplies, it was for the obvious reason that without such assistance Iran, like Afghanistan, would be sucked into the Soviet sphere of influence. Such a policy of trying to avoid Russian domination has been followed traditionally by all Persian rulers and will also be followed by future ones no matter what their political philosophy—unless, of course, their loyalty happens to be not to Iran but to a foreign country.

This is not to say that the charges made against the Shah's rule were completely without grounds. There was corruption, the new wealth was unequally distributed, and Savak, the political police, engaged until about two years ago in brutal repression. To take these accusations one by one: the Shah himself was a very wealthy man, and was not out for personal gain, but the same could not be said of all his numerous family and many of his ministers and other hangers-on. Corruption in Iran, as in most Oriental countries, is an endemic problem; in this connection it is useful to recall that until quite recently officials were not paid by the state but were expected to enrich themselves through time-honored ways and means. The new prosperity magnified this sort of corruption, against which the periodical clean-up drives were quite ineffectual.

Prosperity also brought about greater income inequality, as Charles Issawi and other students of the Iranian economy have pointed out. This is a phenomenon common to all rapidly developing countries, whatever their social system, and it was further accentuated by regional differences between the prosperous northern provinces and the more backward southern regions. But this inequality was not the main factor swelling the anti-Shah movement: Teheran, with one-tenth of Iran's population, accounts for one-third of the country's expenditure, and it was precisely in the capital (and in some religious centers such as Qum) that the opposition was strongest.

Lastly, the question of repression. There has been a great deal of violence in Iran since World War II. Two prime ministers have been assassinated (Ali Rasmara and Ali Mansur), and there have been attempts to kill others, as well as the Shah. The Iranian government under the Shah responded by mass arrests, by torture, and by executions. According to sources hostile to the regime, there were about 20,000 political prisoners in the early 1970's; the Shah admitted to only 3,000. But even if the higher figure was correct, it was still proportionately smaller than in countries such as Cuba; and even if more death penalties were imposed in Iran than elsewhere, the number of actual killings was higher in neighboring Iraq, to give but one example. Yet there were no demonstrations in Western capitals in favor of human rights in Cuba or Iraq, and this, of course, is the decisive factor. The impression was created in the Western media that Iran was a more brutal dictatorship than others, whereas it was in fact only less effective.

THE anti-Shah movement gained momentum not at a time of increased repression, but on the contrary, at a time when the regime was trying to reform itself and to offer a greater degree of liberty, partly under pressure from outside. Was the collapse inevitable? Robert Graham concludes, at the end of a massive indictment of Iranian government incompetence and folly:

> To cast the Shah as the villain is in one sense misleading. There is nothing to suggest that another leader or group of leaders in Iran would have done better or behaved much differently under the circumstances. It would be surprising if the same basic motivations did not apply: namely, preservation of personal power, a concern with prestige, a chauvinistic pride in seeking Iranian solutions, and a general impatience with detail. The Shah's critics decry his authoritarianism, but there is scarcely a liberal tradition in Iranian history.*

Fred Halliday, the author of a study of Iran written from an extreme left-wing point of view, reaches conclusions which are not much different. Noting the internal division of the Iranian Left,

* *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its preoccupation with rhetoric, its tendency to look for ideological guidance from notions borrowed from abroad, the subservience of the Tudeh (Communist) party to the Soviet Union, Halliday expresses skepticism about the Left's ability to administer power, let alone to produce a democratic alternative to the Shah.*

Circumstances, one has to agree with Robert Graham, were not propitious, and the oil boom turned out to be not a blessing but a curse. But the disaster was not foreordained. If there is a lesson to be learned, it is surely that in our age a more effective (and repressive) method of dictatorship is needed for survival in Third World countries than old-fashioned autocratic monarchy. If the Shah had been able to transform himself into a Middle East Castro, all would have been forgiven—the indifferent economic performance, the political oppression, the intellectual regimentation.

A comparison with the late Colonel Boumédienne of Algeria is quite instructive on this point. Boumédienne's achievements were hardly impressive—about a third of the Algerian workforce is unemployed, wholly or in part, despite the boost given to the country's economy by oil revenues. Any criticism of the regime is severely dealt with, and the erstwhile leaders of the Algerian revolution have been assassinated or are in prison. Boumédienne was in a way a more farsighted ruler than the Shah; *he* would have never permitted tens of thousands of students to leave for abroad and have paid for their studies. In Iran the breakthrough of the opposition came after freedom of assembly had been granted de facto, which is again something Boumédienne would never have done. The Shah released his chief political antagonist (Mossadeq) after a short while; Boumédienne kept the man he overthrew in prison to the last day of his life. There is a great and growing inequality of both income and living standards in Algeria, but this, unlike the case in Iran, is discreetly hidden. Much has been written about overcrowding and high rents in Teheran as one of the causes of the revolution there, yet in Algiers sixteen people on the average live in one apartment; the rents, outside the slums, are every bit as high as in Iran; and even if Boumédienne did not die a rich man, some of his colleagues in the leadership amassed fortunes as the result of property speculation. Yet because of the crucial difference in how the regime was conducted, when the Algerian leader died, he was mourned by many millions of his compatriots as a hero and liberator, a man of the people. This image was also accepted almost without question abroad. On a single day *Le Monde* devoted five solid pages to the memory of a great democrat and humanist, while, according to the (Manchester) *Guardian*, Boumédienne was a "good man" and a "good liberal." This, of a man whose regime was more anti-democratic than the Shah's.

The Shah, in contrast to the Castros of the world, was quite incapable of playing the part of a "man of the people": cold, remote, a bad public speaker, he had considerable political intelligence but utterly lacked both charisma and the demagoguery needed to be a successful modern-style dictator. He did not even pretend that he was an egalitarian. Nor was he familiar with the uses of contemporary myths and the techniques of modern mass manipulation. He labored under yet another considerable handicap, that of having been at the helm of his country for almost four decades. During this period, Egypt was headed by Farouk, Neguib, Nasser, and Sadat; Syria and Iraq by dozens of colonels, generals, and prime ministers; America by seven Presidents; and even Russia by at least four sets of rulers. Only in Iran did the same ruler stay on and on; as a result, all the complaints and all the frustrations were directed at him. In a volatile country, he became the target and the victim of the natural human desire for variety and change.

But even with this great handicap the Shah could still have done better. He could have either destroyed the power of the Islamic clergy, thus continuing the policy of his father, or alternatively, if he felt he was not strong enough to do so, he could have made greater concessions so as not to antagonize them. He could have worked for a reconciliation with the middle class, which in its majority had supported Mossadeq's "National Front." This class greatly benefited under the Shah's rule, but it lacked and wanted political power, which the Shah had no desire to share. The treatment of the intelligentsia was equally short-sighted. The Shah showed far more sensitivity in dealing with workers and peasants than with the intelligentsia, whom he did not even try to understand. He was accustomed to being flattered, but he did not flatter others, he did not infuse enthusiasm, and he did not try to heal old wounds, to persuade, to placate, to make friends. He did not care whether he was loved but rather deliberately cultivated the image of the stern, remote, but just autocrat. And thus in the end he found himself in greater isolation than the last of the Czars.

II

THE Iranian Left was the most consistent enemy of the Shah, but it played only a modest part in the movement which led to his downfall. The Left cannot be ignored, however, in a contest for power which may go on for a long time. A political factor of considerable importance in the 1940's and early 1950's, the Left has for two decades been bitterly divided into several factions, and its influence on the whole has been much stronger among Iranians abroad than inside the country.

* *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (London, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The downfall of the Tudeh (Communist) party in the 1950's was partly the result of police repression and perhaps even more of infiltration, but there were other reasons as well. While the party at the time denied its Communist character, it was, in fact, one of the most Stalinist of all, and it has not wavered in its pro-Soviet orientation since. Its dependence on the Soviet Union has been a source of both strength and weakness; it got considerable assistance from the Soviet Union and the East European countries, but whenever relations between the Communist bloc and the Shah improved, its activities were restricted, and even its radio station (located in Bulgaria) was closed down on occasion. Furthermore, this dependence on a foreign power limited the party's appeal in a country with strong nationalist traditions.

Following on the Sino-Soviet split, several pro-Chinese groups broke from Tudeh and some of them founded their own organization which bitterly attacked the "agents of Soviet imperialism." They agreed with the pro-Soviet wing that the government of the Shah should be overthrown, but they equally opposed a regime which would cast its lot with the Soviet Union. For according to Tudeh, Iranian foreign policy has to take into account the 2,500 kilometers of common border with the Soviet Union, the proximity to a country infinitely more powerful than Iran, which can both offer great advantages and mete out punishment. The "highest national interests" are invoked by Tudeh to persuade Iran to place itself, Finland-like, under the Soviet umbrella. This, of course, is anathema to the pro-Chinese wing. But the pro-Chinese elements have in turn been gravely compromised by Peking's policy of maintaining friendly relations with the Shah; this came to a head in early September 1978 during Hua Kuo Feng's visit to Teheran.

In addition to the now divided Maoist and pro-Chinese elements, at least two more leftist factions should be mentioned: the Trotskyites, also split into several sects, and sundry "independent Marxists" deriving their inspiration from the New Left. These continuously accuse one another of deviating from Marxism, of being pseudo-revolutionaries, of engaging in opportunistic maneuvers such as striving to enter coalitions with bourgeois elements of the Shi'ite clergy, and of being foreign, or even CIA, agents. In these acrimonious controversies the Shah is seen alternatively as Nicholas II, Chiang Kai-shek, or Adolf Hitler, with the Ayatollah Khomeini viewed as Father Gapon (of 1905 fame) or the Red Dean of Canterbury, and the Iranian liberals as the Russian Cadets, the Zemstvo, or at best the left wing of the Kuomintang. In a recent interview, one Teheran university student leader of the extreme Left noted bitterly of the religious students that "when they say they want an 'Islamic government' and you ask them what they mean, they can't really tell you. . . ." For their part, the Marxist-Leninists are proud to have an answer, and little does it matter that it is a rehash from another age and another continent.

Lastly, the terrorist Left: this includes one Maoist faction and two other groups, the Iranian People's Fidajin Guerrillas and the Organizations of the People's Combatants, better known as the Mojahidin. The Fidajin began their activities in 1971 and drew their inspiration from Che Guevara, and to an even greater degree from Régis Debray (even though Debray had made it known that he no longer believed his own theories formulated in the 1960's). According to the Fidajin, patient, political work of the kind recommended by Tudeh and others was pointless. The regime was too strong, and the consciousness of the working class not sufficiently developed. There was only one way to mobilize the masses, namely armed struggle. The Mojahidin, on the other hand, who originated among a group of theology students, initially advocated a synthesis of Islam and Marxism, but subsequently, in their majority, renounced their erstwhile Islamic orientation. Between 1971 and 1976 they killed several Iranian police officials and some members of the U.S. military mission. The political effect of their actions was very nearly nil, and they hardly contributed to the wave of anti-Shah demonstrations in late 1977.

Almost all of the terrorist Left are students, and while they have had sympathizers among the intelligentsia, political activity among industrial workers has remained very much a Tudeh preserve. Among the peasants and the minorities, none of the left-wing organizations has had any influence.

IT HAS been said that the fragmentation of the Iranian Left was the inevitable result of suppression and defeat, and that in the new revolutionary period they may put aside their doctrinal and organizational quarrels and establish a common front. But quite apart from doctrinal hair-splitting, there are divisions within the Iranian Left which make a lasting reconciliation unlikely. The question of orientation—pro-Soviet or independent—is only one of these bones of contention. There is also a sharp divergence in motives and outlook.

In some ways Tudeh is the only group that knows what it wants: an Iranian client state, gradually to be transformed into a People's Democracy. Most other Iranian "Marxists" are essentially radical (and confused) nationalists trying to combine inherently contradictory doctrines. Many of them have become almost totally Westernized, but they also consider Westernization undesirable. They claim that by accepting European values the Iranians will reject their origins, become subject to "spiritual exploitation," lose their integrity and self-reliance. Here the romantic Left meets

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the Shi'ite clergy, which has been arguing all along that the materialist West cannot possibly satisfy the soul of the Iranian people. But since the intelligentsia has become accustomed to Western living standards (what with engineers in Teheran earning $6,000 a month or more) it will have to make a choice—even though, for the time being, it seems only dimly aware of it and continues to profess (as the Shah did, and the mullahs do) that there is a specific "Iranian solution" to the problem.

Such confusion is reminiscent of populist movements in other parts of the globe, with their simultaneous fight for tradition and revolutionary change. Ernst Halperin has interpreted the political struggle in Latin America during the last hundred years in the light of the struggle between old and new oligarchies of civilian or military politicians. The new oligarchies have to conquer the state in order to provide power and prestige for the leaders and bureaucratic positions for their clients; they usually do this under the banner of populism. The same applies with minor changes to the struggle for power in Iran, where religion adds further complications. It is a class struggle of sorts, not in accordance with the classic Marxist pattern, not even between the people and the Shah, but between rival oligarchies.

This is not to say that the sloganizing for freedom, democracy, and social justice is fraudulent; most of those voicing such sentiments genuinely believe that they are acting in the best interests of the whole people, for whom they will provide more freedom and more prosperity than the hated and bankrupt old regime. It is, however, unlikely that their good intentions will be put to a test in the foreseeable future. For even if the Left were not split, it would still be weaker than the other contenders for power. All may agree on the nationalization of the property of foreigners, and perhaps also on the expropriation of some of the super-rich identified with the old regime. But neither the mullahs nor the class of merchants and shopkeepers known as bazaaris (on whom more below) have any intention of abiding by a Tudeh, or Maoist, or Trotskyite regime. The clergy want a veto power on all legislation such as was promised in the first constitution of 1906—a theocracy, in short—and the bazaaris want business as usual.

III

THE recent political revival of Islam has by now been widely observed, but its manifestations have differed from country to country. In some countries Islam has supported the right wing, elsewhere it cooperates with radical forces; but the main enemy is always secularization.

The resurgence of Islam as a political force was one of the causes of Ali Bhutto's downfall in Pakistan; it is one of the reasons behind the present unrest in Turkey; and even President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who at one time favored the abolition of the veil and other reforms, has had to beat a hasty retreat. Whatever the long-term prospects of this revival, it certainly will be a factor of considerable importance for years to come.

The Shah and his court never failed to pay homage to Shi'ism, the state religion. He took every opportunity to stress his belief in God, always maintained that his reforms were in conformity with the prescriptions of Islam, and went on pilgrimages to Meshed and other holy cities. But with all this, the Shah was regarded by the mullahs and ayatollahs as a modernizer, and hence a threat to their power. This conflict went back to the rule of the Shah's father, who carried out many reforms and encouraged the removal of the veil. Thereafter, there were ups and downs in the relations between the clergy and the monarchy. In the late 1940's the clerical opposition to the Shah was headed by an erstwhile Nazi agent; in the 1950's relations improved, but in the following decade the most serious challenge to the Shah's rule was again spearheaded by the clergy.

The latent struggle for power between the mullahs and the Shah entered a new and sharper phase when, more than fifteen years ago, the Shah's government first announced its agrarian-reform program and suffrage and equality for women. The Islamic clergy bitterly denounced these measures as contrary to the spirit and the letter of Islam. After the death of Borudjerdi, the "Grand Ayatollah," a fiery and uncompromising theology teacher named Khomeini emerged as the leader of the campaign. Khomeini saw that the agrarian reform would further weaken the position of the clergy in the villages, who were among the largest landowners in the county; and as for the reforms concerning the status of women and the role of religious courts, these were "abominations" whose acceptance would entail giving up positions which Islam has held for more than a thousand years.

Khomeini was exiled to Iraq in 1963, and from there continued his attacks against the Shah's regime. Both the substance of his attacks and his imagery were religious. Thus the Shah became "Yazid"—the Khalif detested more than any other by the Shi'ites. But despite his obscurantism, despite even his occasional denunciations of Marxism, this prince of the church became the darling of the extreme Left. For however reactionary his views in every other respect, on two main counts they were "progressive": he was against the Shah and he attacked the Americans.

FUNDAMENTALIST Islam, like all fundamentalist religion, has always been xenophobic and intolerant toward infidels; thus, by a stretch of the imagination, it could pass as "anti-imperialist." The fact that Khomeini and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his colleagues wanted to replace the Shah's system by another autocracy, that they envisaged a state dominated by the clergy and run according to the principles of the *Shariet*, the Islamic law, was of course a little inconvenient for their Western sympathizers. In other countries a movement of this kind would have been branded as "clerico-fascist," but in Iran in the 1970's it became an important, if somewhat unreliable and capricious, ally of the Left. The reasons were quite obvious: the Left was weak and disunited, and could not afford to be choosy. The power of the mullahs was unbroken; the mosque had in recent years been the only place where open criticism of the Shah could be voiced; the clergy could still get the masses into the streets; and the most radical of the ayatollahs, the only one calling openly for the overthrow of the regime, was Khomeini.

Khomeini's views have the advantage of great simplicity. He is not the most profound of present-day Shi'ite theologians, and in his propaganda he concentrates on a few essentials. On land reform he has retreated from his position of total rejection and says now that he opposed it mainly because the Shah had only wanted to create a market for foreign countries, whereas his, Khomeini's, land reform, will be run according to Islamic law. He also claims that he does not oppose freedom for the Muslim woman but only wants to "restore her dignity," and to this end the veil must stay, women must disappear from public life, coeducation must cease, and Islamic law must prevail on all issues of women's status. The cinema and other evil places of entertainment will have to go.

Khomeini has reiterated his opposition to Communism (which "always stabs us in the back"). But on the other hand the Ayatollah surrounded himself in Paris with some curious advisers whose prime loyalty is certainly not to Allah and his prophets, and this inevitably raises the question who has been manipulated by whom and what foreign power (or powers) have supported the Khomeini operation. Some of these questions are by now of historical interest, others are decisive as far as the struggle for power in Iran is concerned. In the wake of the fallout of the anti-Shah coalition, we shall certainly learn more about these machinations which at the moment are still shrouded in some mystery.

Khomeini's ideal is the creation of an Islamic republic ("our only basis of reference is the time of the Prophet and Imam Ali"); if pressed hard, he will point to the changes carried out in Pakistan after Bhutto's fall as the closest to his ideal society.* As he declared in an interview with a German journalist:

> Once Iran is independent it will also have freedom and social justice. Once the country is liberated from political and economic dependence on foreign powers, all the other causes of repression and exploitation will disappear and all citizens will be able freely to develop.

THIS is sheer demagoguery. It is only fair to add that other Shi'ite leaders have discussed the issues of fundamentalism and reform on a higher level of sophistication. According to the orthodox, the teachings of Islam are divine in origin and cannot be changed even according to the wishes of the majority. The reformers, on the other hand, of whom there are many, claim that Islam will not survive unless it adjusts itself to new conditions, although spokesmen of reform are frequently at a loss to provide answers to the new questions constantly arising. Fundamentalists and reformers are in broad agreement that Islam should be a third independent ("middle") way between capitalism and Communism. The social problem, they believe, will be solved if the faithful live up to the prescriptions of Islam—that is, if they are good and just and extend help to the needy. There is a remarkable, often textual, resemblance between these ideas and the social policies of the Christian churches in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which also rejected both liberal capitalism and socialism and advocated a "third way." But Islamic thinkers seem to be unaware of this; instead, they accuse the West of ignoring their important contribution to the development of social thought.

Such general sentiments are in any case of limited help in the management of contemporary societies. No more than other religions does Islam have clear political rules or economic formulas, although some leaders, including the Pakistani theologian Maududi and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, have tried to codify various prescriptions in a rather arbitrary way. Islamic democracy as they envisage it should be based not on political parties, but on the "will of the people." The will of the people, they go on, should express itself through its clerical leaders (the ulema) or through "mass participation" such as instant popular acclaim as in tribal days. Libya is so far the only showcase where one can observe these techniques of establishing the popular will in practice.

The strongly religious character of the demonstrations against the Shah took most Western observers of the Iranian scene by surprise.† Spokes-

* According to recent reports from Pakistan, the "Council of Islamic Ideology" has decided to abolish interest, limited liability, and incorporation. Religious taxes will be imposed. No more than a skeleton staff will be needed at the various ministries because the Pakistani economy will become an "economy of self-employment." Most judges will also become unemployed for "one severed limb can warn off more offenders than a thousand rotting away quietly in the jails" (*Guardian*, London, December 27, 1978).

† Robert Graham has nothing at all to say in his book about the role of the Shi'ite clergy, nor does it figure in Fred Halliday's long chapter on the opposition to the Shah; it is mentioned only in his epilogue written in late 1978. Soviet authors have, on the whole, devoted more attention to the political influence of the clergy; E. A. Doroshenko's *Shiitskoe Dukhovenstvo v Sovrennom Irane* ("The Shi'ite Clergy in Contemporary Iran") is the only full treatment of the subject in any foreign language.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

men of the Iranian Left argue that the religious element should not be taken too seriously and that in any case the demands of the clergy are "objectively progressive." The organ of Iranian students in the U.S. has informed its readers that any attempt to portray the movement as religious is erroneous; all that it is willing to admit is that "there are Muslims in our movement," a fact that has never been in dispute. Communist and Trotskyite publications, and those of the New Left, have taken more or less the same line: Khomeini has had so many followers not because of his religion but because of his intransigent attitude toward the Shah.

But this is not convincing, for Khomeini was by no means the only consistent foe of the Shah. There were others, and some gave their lives in the process. Yet it was precisely the Ayatollah who became the hero of the masses, whereas the dead leaders of the armed resistance—the Jazanis, Farahanis, and Ahmad Zadehs—are all but forgotten. Furthermore, the Left has now had almost a year to organize more or less freely and to wrest the leadership of the mass movement from the hands of the clergy: Lenin had much less time in 1917. But far from succeeding, the Left has actually lost ground, even in the university.

During the first phases of the Iranian crisis most of the attacks were directed against the Shah and his party, and there were relatively few individual assaults (but many threats) against foreigners and minorities. But as tensions increase, the xenophobic element, never far from the surface, becomes more pronounced. The Bahais were the first butt of attack, but the Jews may not be far behind. Lord Curzon noted almost a century ago: "As soon as any outburst of bigotry takes place in Persia or elsewhere, the Jews are apt to be the first victims. Everyman's hand is then against them and woe betide the luckless Hebrew, who is the first to encounter a Persian street mob." Another foreign observer commenting on the revolution of 1906 wrote with some amusement about a Seyd from Shariz who most aptly epitomized the new idea of liberty: "In a fit of enthusiasm this worthy man raced down a street shouting 'Long Live Freedom,' punctuating his cries by sticking his knife into the scholars of a Jewish school" (David Fraser, *Persia and Turkey in Revolt*, London, 1910).

In sum, the mixture of religious and nationalist motives typical of Islam, even more typical of the Shi'ites, makes for a movement with considerable popular support, but it seems far-fetched to assume that it could be also a reformist or even liberalizing force.

IV

The bazaar and the urban crowd connected with the bazaar—the merchants owning Teheran's 60,000 shops and their business associates and relations in the other big cities—make up a political force equal in importance to the clergy and more powerful than the Left. It is a heterogeneous group, some being small shopowners while others are multimillionaires, but they have common interests. They have a closely knit organization based partly on family ties, and resembling a medieval guild. Their political orientation has varied; they were the backbone of the constitutional movement before World War I, but their general outlook has always been conservative, and their attitude to the Shah at best lukewarm. Furthermore, the bazaaris as a class have felt threatened by the appearance of department stores, the activities of multinational corporations, and other forms of modern business organization. For the bazaar has not been just a marketplace but a way of life—in the words of one historian, "the granary, the workshop, the bank, and the religious center of the whole society. It was there that the landowners sold their crops, craftsmen manufactured their wares, traders marketed their goods, those in need of money raised loans, and it was there that businessmen built and financed mosques and schools."*

This economic, political, and cultural center has been threatened with extinction by modernization in the last two decades; hence the increasing dissatisfaction among the bazaaris. Resentment turned into active opposition when in 1975 some 10,000 inspectors were appointed by the government in yet another attempt to combat profiteering. Thousands of merchants were arrested, including some of the most substantial, and while the Shah failed to bring the prices down, he made new enemies, for it was at this stage that the bazaaris decided that the Shah must go. They increased their traditional support for the clergy, and passed the word to the thousands of professional and semi-professional crowd leaders who frequently act as officials of bona-fide or spurious athletic clubs.

These crowds are an important but underrated part of the Middle Eastern political scene, just as they were an important phenomenon in European capitals in the late 18th and 19th century. Karl Marx had harsh things to say in an article he wrote in 1853 for the New York *Tribune* about "the mob in the great cities of the Near East" which "in every important coup d'état has to be won over by bribes and flattery." More recently, an Iranian Marxist-Leninist, the late Bizhan Jazani, provided an analysis of what he calls the Teheran lumpenproletariat. He included "professional louts, tramps, and extortionists" (50,000), professional smugglers and pushers (50,000), and prostitutes; but also most bus conductors, and members of the cattle-slaughter trade and the vegetable and fruit trade, altogether several hun-

* "The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953," by E. Abrahamian, *Past and Present*, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dreds of thousands. Jazani noted that this crowd has played an important part in all riots since the first revolution of 1906 and that its role has always been counterrevolutionary.* Another Marxist author (E. Abrahamian) has provided a far more positive description of the crowd, attributing to it a high degree of political and class consciousness and noting that in Teheran, as in Paris and London, the main centers of radical activity are not the slums but the regions of industry, crafts, and trade.

Both these accounts are by now partly out of date, if only because the population of Teheran and the other big cities has increased so much in recent years. The population of Teheran alone has grown from 500,000 in 1939 to more than four million at the present time. The crowd thus contains slum dwellers, recent arrivals from the villages who follow the guidance of the neighborhood mullah, the lumpenproletariat, but also tens of thousands of students, and hundreds of thousands of boys in their teens for whom the demonstations are simply the most exciting show in town. It is a heterogeneous and volatile mass, easy to mobilize against certain targets—such as foreigners—but difficult to array against others. It can be flattered and bought but it has also, within limits, a will of its own. Having asserted its power, it might not easily remove itself from the streets, and there is no saying against whom it will turn next.

V

IRAN produced 276 million tons of oil in 1977, a little less than 10 per cent of the total world production. Even if the supply of Iranian oil should cease altogether, the results for the consumer overseas would not be catastrophic. Of the big oil companies, only British Petroleum obtains as much as 40 per cent of its supply from Iran. And since oil production will not stop for any length of time, the supply of the West does not seem to be in immediate danger; only the price of oil will go up. Nor is it at all likely that Iran will become in the foreseeable future a Soviet satellite like Afghanistan. The real threats are that the Iranian disarray (as well as the process of disintegration in Pakistan and Turkey) will spread to other Asian and African countries, and that Iran will need a long time to emerge from the present economic and political chaos. On the other hand, it is not unthinkable that precisely in view of the consequences of the crisis, Iran may act as a deterrent to crisis elsewhere.

It is a well-known fact that the more primitive a country the easier its recovery. Bangladesh, given up as a hopeless case only a few years ago, has made a spectacular and almost unnoticed recovery. But Iran is no longer a poor, agricultural country. Its per-capita income is $2,400, almost four times as high as in neighboring Turkey. The great majority of the population feels angry and frustrated about rising rents and food prices, about the inconveniences of big-city life, and about the general decline in the quality of life. But at the same time it takes for granted that it will at least maintain its present standard of living, and it expects the state to fulfill its material needs, to keep taxes low, to provide a high income and an almost complete welfare state.

Unfortunately, most of the new industries in Iran were working at a loss even before the unrest started, and one consequence is that the economy has now virtually collapsed. A British correspondent has provided a revealing account:

> Workers of one Teheran factory, for example, first demanded a large wage increase. They got it and then asked for free transport to and from work. They got that and then asked for payment from the moment they left home to the moment they returned. Then they demanded free lunches and dinners. Finally they asked for one and a half hours off each afternoon for political lectures. The enterprise is now an economic nonsense and its unsalable products are piling up in the warehouse.

This state of affairs seems to be fairly typical, which means that the Iranian economy faces a difficult period of retrenchment and readjustment. Luckily there will be for years to come a life belt to prevent total disaster—the oil royalties.

There is no such life belt in Iranian politics. A great many scenarios for the future of Iran have been discussed. One, unfortunately, has to be ruled out from the beginning as next to impossible: the more or less smooth transition, as in Spain or Portugal or Greece, from dictatorship to democracy.

Iran has a long tradition of periods of great excitement followed by years of apathy, and it is possible that the present feverish activity will run its course and eventually give way to a new order. The first Persian revolution was followed by fifteen years of chaos and eventually by the dictatorship of the Shah's father. At that time, Iran was a far more backward country, and the great powers were preoccupied elsewhere, but then as now there was the ardent desire to abolish tyranny and to sweep away abuses, the belief that all that was wrong with Persia was the fault of one man and his retainers, and also the assumption that decent government would be established following the introduction of a new political system and new institutions.

But the sources of misgovernment go much deeper than this, and it is doubtful whether there has been any change in those basic attitudes in society without which a free political order cannot work. The political elites that acted for the over-

* "The Socio-Economic Analysis of a Dependent Capitalist State" (first published in Iran in 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

throw of the Shah are not notable either for competence or for their attachment to democracy. The fact that there are conflicts of interest and differences in outlook among these elites may prevent for some time the emergence of a new autocracy, but this is more likely to result in anarchy than in freedom. In the final analysis, this is the Iranian tragedy, for which the Shah and his technocrats have to bear part of the responsibility: it should have been clear from the beginning that even complete success in economic development could not have provided an answer to Iran's political problems.

VI

THE attitudes of the superpowers toward the Iranian crisis have been predictable. The Soviet Union has given massive support to the Tudeh party and also to other opposition groups. It has been said that the Soviet Union has a vested interest in a stable Iran, and that the establishment of an Islamic republic would have adverse effects on the Muslim republics of Central Asia. But while there is tension along nationalist lines in Soviet Central Asia, the power of organized religion has been broken there, and a religious "infection" seems unlikely; nor will Iran in a state of turmoil act as a political magnet for the Soviet Central Asian republics. On the contrary, seen from Moscow, a weak and unstable Iran must seem much the more preferable alternative—barring, that is, the installation of a pro-Soviet government, which is at present unlikely. At least a weak neighbor would be susceptible to pressure, and might gradually pass into the Soviet sphere of influence.

As for America, its inability to influence events in the Persian Gulf reflects its diminished stature in world affairs. Whether or not U.S. intelligence suffered a major setback by failing to read correctly the signs in Teheran is a side issue, except that it may be symptomatic of a general incompetence in the field of intelligence. The point about the Iranian crisis is that it is a typical détente conflict in which direct military involvement by the powers is ruled out, political propaganda plays a great part, and to the extent that there is any fighting, it is done by proxy. But the initiative is all on one side; Soviet broadcasts and other media, after an initial period of restraint (or hesitation), were aggressively anti-Shah and anti-American, while the American media simply reflected the shilly-shallying in Washington. American interference by proxy was, of course, ruled out *a priori* as it has been in other recent cases.

As a result, the impression has been created in Asia and Africa, but also in Europe and above all in the Middle East, that while the Russians will take good care of their friends even if they are very exposed, the U.S. is neither able nor willing to do the same; that a power which cannot cope with the activities of a few hooligans in Beverly Hills cannot (and perhaps should not) influence the course of events in the Persian Gulf; that, in short, U.S. foreign policy has written off not only Iran but a far wider area, and that the countries concerned would be therefore well advised to come to terms with the Soviet Union as best they can. The Soviet media have relentlessly hammered away precisely at this point in recent weeks.

Such an appraisal may be exaggerated, but it is nevertheless very real and therefore dangerous; it may signal the beginning of a major realignment of forces throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It may also encourage the Russians to engage in a forward policy elsewhere, as the risks involved must now appear small or nonexistent. For has not the Secretary of State himself declared that nothing could (or should?) be done in Iran, and has he not threatened to resign if U.S. foreign policy should become a little less accommodating?

But the decisive test is yet to come. To the extent that the Iranian crisis is a purely Iranian affair, nonintervention may have been the only possible policy for the U.S., and after all, American influence in the area may again increase. For any Iranian government of whatever complexion which does not want to commit national suicide will have to look sooner or later to the United States to counterbalance Iran's powerful neighbor to the north. But this can only happen if the United States still exists as a political and military factor in the Middle East, and one which Russian policy must reckon with. And this, in turn, entirely depends on the political will of the makers of American foreign policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Welfare Reform and the Liberals

Leslie Lenkowsky

ON JUNE 22, 1978, Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill announced that due to the lack of time remaining in the 95th Congress, further consideration of welfare reform would have to be postponed. Thus ended the Carter administration's first attempt to overhaul the domestic program which most Americans would place at the top of their lists of wasteful and ineffective public services. Though put forth with all the fanfare customary for a major initiative, including a televised address, the President's proposed Program for Better Jobs and Incomes (PBJI) lived less than a year and died without ever having been debated by either house of Congress. Even Richard Nixon's ill-fated Family Assistance Plan (FAP), proposed almost a decade earlier, had come nearer enactment.

This, despite the fact that PBJI enjoyed several apparent political advantages that FAP lacked. In the first place, the White House was now inhabited by a Democrat whose concern for the minorities and the poor had played an important part in his winning the Presidency. The key agencies—the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare and of Labor—were staffed by people profoundly committed to reforming welfare, people who had, in truth, thought about little else during the eight-year Republican interregnum. By almost any measure, the 95th Congress was more liberal than its predecessors, and, of course, it was controlled by the President's party, and was, therefore, presumably willing to share credit with the administration for what would surely be hailed as a crowning achievement in social policy. Finally, in a striking bit of political irony, the Senate Finance Committee, which had been the major legislative stumbling block a decade earlier, now included FAP's most influential proponent, newly-elected Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, who chaired its Subcommittee on Public Assistance.

In the event, Moynihan's presence availed little, for PBJI perished in the House of Representatives. Indeed, it was not even considered on the House floor, nor in any of the three standing committees that share jurisdiction over such a far-reaching and complex piece of legislation. For by the time it emerged from the ad-hoc subcommittee that Speaker O'Neill convened to review it, the price tag had risen well above $20 billion. With Proposition 13 only recently having passed, and with the "Kemp-Roth" federal-tax-reduction juggernaut already gathering momentum, this was too much.

Despite claims that a consensus behind a somewhat scaled-down proposal was beginning to emerge just as O'Neill postponed further consideration of PBJI, in fact the prospects for welfare reform in the 96th Congress appear even slimmer. This is partly because President Carter's determination to hold down federal spending means that adding any large new program will force the reduction of existing programs and thus elicit the opposition of those who benefit from them. No nascent coalition for welfare reform is apt to withstand its members' determination to save their favorite projects from such cutbacks.

Of far larger significance, however, is the sorry state of the beliefs and goals that have guided the efforts of liberals to reform the welfare system. Over the past decade, liberals have increasingly come to think of welfare not as a means of fending off starvation among the destitute, or even as a means of keeping a roof over the heads and clothes on the backs of young children with no working parent, but rather as a mechanism for redistributing income. To be sure, some such redistribution, as wealthier citizens are taxed to assist poorer ones, is one of the consequences of the welfare system. But that is not to say that redistribution is its aim or that reforming the system demands fealty to an abstract conception of individual equity. Yet liberal insistence that it does and must played a major role in defeating FAP and a still larger one in killing PBJI. Far from being political advantages, the presence of a Democrat in the White House, of ardent reformers in the agencies, and of liberals in the Congress all but assured that the administration's ambitious proposal would be stillborn. And so long as liberal ideas

LESLIE LENKOWSKY is research director of a private foundation in New York and is the author of several articles about welfare policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about welfare reform remain unchanged, a similar fate will befall any similar initiative.

THE debate over welfare reform has become inseparable from the issue of poverty and how to reduce or eliminate it. In the past, most liberals shared the general American view that the poor need no more than opportunities to advance to better circumstances. They differed from conservatives mostly in favoring more extensive public programs to provide education, job training, and other services which they thought would accelerate this movement. Welfare was useful mainly insofar as it permitted those who *could not* support themselves—the old, the young, and the infirm—to receive some minimal level of subsistence. But it could also do harm if it produced dependency, broken homes, or other conditions that might hinder the social mobility of the poor. Economic growth and opportunity, not welfare, were the real cures for poverty.

But as the nation prospered in the 1950's, the poor seemed to remain poor. Another remedy was advanced: since what the poor lacked most was money, providing them with more income came to be seen as a simple, efficient, and effective way of fighting poverty. A growing economy alone would not suffice; nor would educational and other social services, which turned out to have little effect in increasing earnings anyway. In this context, the trouble with welfare was that it was inadequate and ill-designed for the task. It should be expanded, or preferably replaced with a comprehensive income-maintenance plan which would give money to all the poor, solely according to need. By the mid-1960's, this view had obtained a substantial following.

At first, liberal politicians stood firm behind the older idea of providing opportunities for the poor. This was the fundamental strategy of the War on Poverty and the Great Society. Apart from some popular programs for the elderly, little attention was given to welfare. (For Lyndon B. Johnson, some said, it was the Department of Health and Education, period.) Inside the Office of Economic Opportunity, plans for redistributing income were drawn up, but Presidential Assistant Joseph A. Califano administered the *coup de grâce* to the few proposals that came near the White House. Not until his final year in office did Johnson show any interest in the "income strategy," and then all he did was appoint a commission to study income-maintenance programs.

Before the commission could even submit its report, however, Richard M. Nixon startled liberals and practically everyone else by proposing a guaranteed income.

In August 1969, he put forth the Family Assistance Plan, which would have replaced the existing welfare system with a program assuring all families an income of about two-thirds the official government "poverty line." This first major domestic initiative of the Republican administration was nothing more or less than a plan to aid the poor by redistributing income; its origins lay in schemes devised during and rejected by the Johnson administration. But FAP had a more conservative lineage as well. For many years, Milton Friedman and others had argued that the emergence of a paternalistic welfare state could be slowed and the apparatus of government simplified if myriad programs were replaced by a simple income-supplement scheme or "negative income tax" that would permit the poor to buy what they needed in the marketplace, just like everyone else. This idea also appealed to the Nixon administration, as did its corollary: the proposition that any new plan should provide stronger incentives for self-support than the current welfare system did. Accordingly, FAP was offered—albeit with more hope than confidence—as a program that might actually restrain the softer liberal tendencies of government, even though its most apparent effect would be to create a mechanism for income redistribution on an unprecedented scale.

Paradoxically, perhaps, but not surprisingly, liberal politicians were disconcerted. For eight years, they had made eliminating poverty the central objective of domestic social policy, but they had proposed nothing so daring as that which a Republican President offered within months of taking office. Worse, it was this particular Republican President, who was thought to draw some of his advice and much of his support from those who had opposed the most progressive measures of the Great Society. Now, Nixon appeared to be in the vanguard of social policy, while they seemed to be clinging to outmoded ideas.

This role reversal was hardly more than momentary. If Richard Nixon could support a radical plan for redistributing income, then, judged the liberals, so could they. Three months after FAP was proposed, Johnson's commission recommended a near-identical plan. Moreover, unlike the Republicans, the liberal Democrats determined to provide *real* help to the poor. At issue was the size of the income guarantee. Some insisted that it be sufficient to enable a family to leave poverty entirely. Others went further, calling for benefits considerably above the poverty-line. The price of such plans was staggering—up to $50 or $60 billion more than the cost of existing welfare programs—and the consequences for the economy were far-reaching. But so long as FAP provided less, it could be denounced as inadequate, inhumane, or worse (precisely the sort of scheme that might be expected to emerge from the Nixon White House).

The new liberal enthusiasm for income redistribution ultimately helped to defeat FAP. From the start, the administration knew conservatives would be suspicious of the proposal, but hoped that loyalty to the President might command enough of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their votes to obtain its passage. That is approximately what happened in the House of Representatives. But in the Senate, liberal defections tipped the balance the other way. Southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans had been expected to be against redistributing incomes; they were. Liberal Democrats were expected to be in favor; they were, but they would not have FAP unless it was expanded in ways unacceptable to the Nixon administration and its congressional loyalists. Stalemate ensued and after three years of debate, nothing had been enacted but another program of aid for the elderly, the blind, and the disabled.

Support for massive income redistribution now became the touchstone of liberal attitudes toward social policy. In 1972, Senator George McGovern made it a major theme in his campaign for the Presidency. After his defeat, congressional staffs and HEW planners set about designing programs that they hoped would have a chance of being enacted. They were assisted by a host of sympathetic economists in the universities, the research institutes, and such major liberal lobbies as the AFL-CIO. Republican interest had waned, however, and nothing much came of these efforts. Nonetheless, the Democratic platform of 1976 put the party again on record as favoring the replacement of welfare with a "simplified system of income maintenance, substantially financed by the federal government. . . ." This was Jimmy Carter's mandate and among the first commitments he set out to fulfill after his election.

But redistributing incomes, it soon became apparent, was easier to talk about in opposition than to propose in office. One problem was the cost. The fanciful sums thrown about in the debate over FAP could not be taken seriously. As Senator McGovern had discovered, the public would not allow such generosity nor would the budget of any prudent President. And *this* Democratic President was prudent, or so he wanted to be thought. Working under orders to limit new outlays, administration planners produced a program whose income guarantee was almost identical to the one Nixon had proposed. (For families headed by an employable man or woman, the aid available might be even lower.) Liberals outside the administration were dismayed, but hoped to correct matters on Capitol Hill. Despite its attempt at frugality, the Program for Better Jobs and Income would still have cost an extra $6 billion by the first official estimate. And nearly four times that when modified by the special subcommittee.

In any case, the more important problem was not how much PBJI would cost, but how little improvement it seemed to buy. Much had changed in the eight years since FAP had been proposed. Applications for public assistance had surged in the late 1960's and early 1970's with the result that up to 90 per cent of those eligible were now thought to be receiving aid. In addition, the food-stamp program, a federally-financed plan that gives the poor coupons redeemable for food, had been massively enlarged. From virtual insignificance at the end of the Johnson administration, it had grown to assist upward of 18 million people at a cost nearing $6 billion per year. A similar expansion had occurred in Medicaid, which supplies health care to the poor. Not only were welfare recipients eligible to benefit from these "in-kind" programs but so too were the "working poor," that is, those who were employed at low wages. Moreover, a new form of aid had been created in 1975 for this group (mostly at the instance of congressional conservatives worried about the more comprehensive schemes under discussion): the *Earned Income Tax Credit, which augmented the* incomes of families with earnings up to $8,000. Although each change reflected the particular circumstances and constituencies of a single program, the combined result was that by the time liberals returned to the White House, the nation had already made a tacit decision to abandon the idea of only giving the poor opportunities and had begun giving them money as well.

As a consequence, the $6 (or $20) billion to be spent on PBJI seemed to yield little promise of further reducing poverty. In 1965, at the outset of the War on Poverty, 15.8 per cent of all families had been classified as poor; a decade later, after the expansion of cash assistance and the various in-kind programs, the proportion had fallen well below 10 per cent. When fully implemented in 1982, PBJI would still have left 5.7 per cent of all families in poverty (compared to a projected 8 per cent if no changes were made in the existing programs).

To be sure, many of these families would receive more money from the President's program than they did from current ones, and would thus be less poor. But such families were to be found mostly in the handful of states in the South and Midwest which had traditionally set low standards for aiding the needy. These states had long had the option of raising their standards, had they wanted to, and most of the cost of doing so would have been borne by generous federal matching grants. But in the main they had not wanted to. The singular achievement of the Carter administration's proposal would be to allow them no choice.

Moreover, despite its immense cost, PBJI did little to help those states and localities that had taxed themselves heavily to provide for their poor. Despite the looming bankruptcy of New York City, for example, which spends more than a billion dollars a year of its own money for welfare and Medicaid programs, even the most expensive version of PBJI was estimated to yield the city no more than $66 million in "fiscal relief." Such savings as would result from more generous federal matching grants would be more than offset by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rule changes that enlarged the welfare rolls to include families, childless couples, and even single people who were not previously thought (even in New York), to be in need of much assistance.

At the same time, PBJI would have restored to social-welfare policy something like the old Poor Law practice of "work relief." This, too, was a response to the political realities of income redistribution. The more money to be provided, the greater the public insistence upon good-faith efforts at self-support by those able to support themselves, a group which, in the wake of the massive increase in the number of working women, might now include even mothers with young children. Conservatives had sought mostly to require employable recipients to register with an employment service or to work at raking leaves or similar jobs in exchange for their checks. In contrast, the Carter administration now proposed to set up a huge public-works program that would enable anyone—welfare recipient or not—to choose from among more than a million minimum- or prevailing-wage jobs in fields like public health, environmental care, recreation, and education. The underlying rationale was that these jobs would increase the demand for low-skilled labor, thereby forcing salaries up for similar work in the private sector. But the few precedents gave little assurance that such numbers of jobs could be created or that they would not produce equivalent reductions elsewhere in the economy.

WHAT was "liberal" about such a scheme, apart from its price tag? Certainly one impulse was the desire for simplicity and rationality in welfare policy. The current array of federal, state, and local programs being generally regarded as complex and confusing, a liberal supporter of PBJI would hail the effort to replace multiple programs with a single national system. In practice, however, this goal is all but unattainable. For example, in order to avoid *reducing* benefits for families in states with the most elaborate programs, it is necessary either to raise the national standard to that of the most generous state or to continue allowing the states to supplement the federal payment. The former is fabulously expensive and may lead to such politically dubious results as putting half the population of Mississippi "on welfare" in order not to slash payments in Milwaukee. But the alternative (which the designers of PBJI reluctantly embraced) undermines both rationality and simplicity.

Far more significant in defining PBJI as a liberal measure was its extension of the principle of egalitarianism, which had, in the wake of FAP, replaced opportunity as the gauge of progressive social policy. Income, in this conception, should be treated as a matter of right and the amount of it one receives from the national government should be based solely on how much of it one does not get from other sources. It does not matter that one chooses to live in Texas, where the political culture has produced relatively ungenerous welfare benefits but where the cost of living is relatively low and the economy booming, instead of in Massachusetts, with its high prices, declining industries, and long established habit of decent provision for the poor. It does not matter that an intact family, a childless couple, or a single individual ordinarily is much better able to fend for itself than is the unmarried teenage mother of two toddlers. It does not matter that an able-bodied adult may simply not like certain kinds of work, preferring leisure or a "meaningful" job instead. Rather, the fact of low income is *prima facie* the basis for an income supplement (or a guaranteed job), and the size of that supplement should be as uniform as the national government can make it.

In short, what was "liberal" about PBJI was its attitude toward distinctions. Whether someone was poor for reasons beyond his control or as a result of his own actions made no difference. Whether poverty was apt to be a temporary situation or a chronic condition was inconsequential. Whether opportunities were plentiful or scarce was irrelevant. To each according to his needs: that was the new ethic of liberal social policy.

EVEN when PBJI was first proposed, it was clear that there was scant political support for such a Rawlsian version of egalitarianism. Opinion polls had consistently recorded large majorities of the public opposed to guaranteeing an income. While guaranteed jobs had more support, this was undoubtedly because the public saw them as a temporary assist to the unemployed, not as a permanent public-service corps. The amended version of PBJI that emerged from the special House subcommittee came close to embodying the principal liberal concerns about the Carter administration's design. Yet it found virtually no enthusiasm on Capitol Hill.

But the problems of an income-redistribution strategy go beyond its predictable lack of political popularity. Research findings gathered in the years since FAP was proposed suggest that giving the poor money may in fact render them less likely to become self-sufficient.

That welfare might lead to dependency has always been a matter of concern to social-policy planners. The fear that benefits based solely on need would cause recipients to work less has long been the principal justification for restricting help to those whose poverty stems from circumstances beyond their control, such as age, disability, or loss of a family breadwinner. In the 1960's, a conflicting theory had appeared: the possibility that welfare programs using requirements other than need actually encouraged the poor to fit themselves (where possible) to the requirements. Some even suspected that the rapid increase in families headed by mothers was tied to the fact that such families could more readily obtain entrée to an in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

creasingly generous welfare system. In truth, there was never any solid evidence that families split in order to obtain welfare benefits, but the logic was powerful and encouraged the Nixon administration to think that by extending aid to all needy families, FAP might actually prevent still greater dependency.

At about the same time, the federal government began a series of experiments aimed at testing the main hypotheses that underlie a guaranteed income. Although different in some particulars from either FAP or PBJI, these experiments yielded findings which strongly suggest that a national income-redistribution program may have vexing social consequences. As was expected, income guarantees produced some reduction in work effort; not a large one when measured in hours per person per week, but large enough to indicate that as much as half the additional money spent on such a program might simply replace income that would otherwise have been earned. (These findings came from tests of relatively short duration, five years at the most; the work reduction from a permanent program might be expected to be larger.)

Less predictably, it turns out that making all needy families eligible for support does not have a consistently salutary effect upon their stability. To the contrary, at benefit levels approximating those of FAP or PBJI, the prospect of assured income may increase the likelihood that intact families will break up. According to the most widely accepted explanation, the certainty of such publicly financed alimony makes a person less dependent on his or her spouse, and thus provides the financial ability to end an unsatisfactory marriage. In hindsight, not a particularly surprising result, but not particularly helpful either to those who had hoped that a guaranteed income would build happier homes and stronger families.

Conservatives were not especially startled by these findings. If anything, they were somewhat vindicated by this fresh proof of what they had long suspected: that giving money to people whether they work or not tends to encourage them to work less and also tends to increase the incidence of dependency. But then, many conservatives have for some time been suspicious of the income strategy. Although perplexed at first by the advocacy of such as Milton Friedman and Richard Nixon, they soon followed the lead of Ronald Reagan, and through various administrative devices, sought to make welfare more difficult to obtain.

In contrast, most liberal champions of a guaranteed income have responded to the unsettling experimental results by trying to discredit them. Failing that, what could not be disproved could always be stonewalled. Testifying last April before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Assistance, the Brookings Institution's Henry Aaron, then HEW assistant secretary for planning and evaluation, maintained that aiding intact families simply made sense: "I would suggest that really the burden of proof ought to rest on those who deny that such a patently sensible change in the incentives American families face . . . will improve, over the long haul. . . . the prospects for family stability." The Carter administration tried to claim that it had, in fact, taken the findings into account. One part of PBJI would repair what another part harmed: if a breadwinner quit work to live off welfare, he would be given a public-service job and by virtue of again being employed, would be less likely to leave his family. Perhaps; but no one could know, not unless more experiments were undertaken.

In truth, the fundamental issue was one of values, not facts. If poverty could most easily be ended by redistributing money, then advocates of a guaranteed income were prepared to tolerate some increase in the number of broken homes or some decline in the number of hours worked. A good many other people might well agree. Few Americans would allow children to starve simply because help might cause their parents to behave badly. Mothers ought have some alternative to working night and day in order to support their children. Disastrous marriages ought not be preserved simply because neither partner can afford to live alone. Such decent sentiments underpin a welfare policy that in many ways and many places is already quite generous. But the principle is much different from that of the redistributionists. Most Americans do not believe that need alone should entitle a person to money. The cause of poverty still shapes the public's willingness to provide income support. To each according to his deserts: this remains the dominant ethic of American social policy, even where standards of deservingness have slackened. Against it, the new liberal ethic based on simple need could not prevail.

CHASTENED by the experience of the 95th Congress, in early 1979 the Carter administration was developing a new welfare-reform proposal bearing little resemblance to its first one. It is now proposing only to increase welfare payments in the least generous states, provide a little fiscal relief to the more generous ones, and establish a scaled-down version of the public-service-jobs program. This proposal makes no pretense of being a guaranteed income for everyone. Yet it is apparent that the administration has advanced this measure with little enthusiasm. Spokesmen claim that the new bill incorporates all the "principles" of PBJI and act as though they were ashamed at not having been able again to offer the real thing. This attitude is unfortunate, because the obsession with a guaranteed income will continue to blind liberal policymakers to the real nature of poverty and to sounder alternatives for reducing it.

Long-term studies conducted chiefly at the University of Michigan have shown that the incomes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the poor fluctuate dramatically. Over nearly a decade, less than 2 per cent of the people whose incomes were watched remained impoverished throughout; conversely, fully one-quarter of the group were poor at one time or another during the period. In the words of one of the researchers, poverty is "a great deal more pervasive and a great deal less persistent than most people think."

The implications of this are much in dispute. Clearly, having so much of the population on the fringes of poverty is disturbing. But except for that relatively small group of people who seem chronically indigent, the adequacy of welfare programs may be less important than their accessibility. If poverty is a temporary condition for most of the poor, then—apart from measures which might prevent a loss of income—the most useful help is that which is easily obtained.

The great virtue of welfare programs that base eligibility on objective conditions beyond an individual's control is that they reduce doubt about the cause of need. A person is either elderly or not; disabled or not; a parent or not; married or not. This can usually be readily ascertained. In contrast, programs that base eligibility on need alone present what insurers call a "moral hazard": is an individual needy because he wants to be or because he has no alternative? Since that is often hard to tell, complex tests are employed. Indeed, in states whose benefits are now so generous that they risk "moral hazard" (as, for example, when a person might quit work to live on an equivalent or even higher income from welfare), obtaining aid has become more difficult; New York, which provides some of the highest levels of aid in the land, is now also among the leaders in rejecting applications for it, even though some number of these may well have been valid. Much the same situation would have arisen if FAP or PBJI had passed. Ironically, in seeking to give money to the poor solely according to need, a guaranteed income can be less effective in meeting their *real* need for temporary support.

CONTEMPORARY liberalism has not been inclined to rethink its views on these matters in large measure because of the difficulty of working up much enthusiasm for alternative solutions to the "welfare problem." Sensible though they may be, they are neither simple nor electrifying. They do not lend themselves to comprehensive programs, to emotional crusades, or to ready translation into specific legislation. Moreover, they start from several premises that are unsettling to many liberals.

The first is that the United States already has a fairly comprehensive array of programs, uneven and complex though they may be, through which practically no one who is unable to provide for himself goes unfed, unclothed, unhoused, or uncared for when ill. To be sure, gaps remain, but these can generally be filled by reforming existing welfare and social-insurance programs, instead of replacing them.

The second is that the poor are not helped by encouraging dependency. Able-bodied persons should ordinarily be expected to support themselves, and assisting them to do so is likely to be sounder for them and the society than providing them with money instead. National policy should also do what it can to promote family stability. The single-parent, female-headed family remains most vulnerable to poverty.

Finally, perhaps more than the middle class and the wealthy, the poor depend upon stable communities in order to have a chance of prospering and advancing. Some elements that make for such stability—religious or kinship ties, for example—may well be outside the scope of government influence. But other requisites—safety, adequate public-health services, decent schools, accessible jobs, and corollary social services—are not, and these may in fact be more important for social policy than focusing only on the incomes of individuals.

THE income strategy was a useful idea in its day Although not yet adequately developed in every corner of the nation and perhaps too well developed in others, it is probably nearing its practical limits as federal social policy. At best, continuing to seek a national minimum income is an inadequate objective. At worst, it may be an inappropriate one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Women Want

Brigitte Berger

NOWHERE is the confusion that characterizes public discourse in the second half of the 20th century more evident than in the recent avalanche of publications on what the German social theorist August Bebel called the "woman question." Even the most cursory reader of this literature must be struck by a sense of unreality at its description of the world, and a sense of dismay at its lack of perspective. Even when it talks about very real problems—the attempt of women, in Virginia Woolf's words, to break out of "the cotton wool of daily life" and participate in the public sphere of work and politics—it does so in a curiously flat and lopsided way. It dismisses all arguments that do not fit in with current dogma, it disregards the fact that every particular social issue is bound up with a wide array of other cultural and social factors, it comes up with conclusions which are disturbingly ignorant of the most basic (and readily available) biological and social data. Yet these conclusions are not merely theoretical; they have already had serious consequences for social policy toward women, children, and the family.

Most disturbing of all is the confusion pervading discussions of the American woman's situation. Here the rhetoric about the "oppression" of women through the customs, traditions, and language supposedly permeating American society is allied to an almost obsessive concern with the American woman's "search for identity"—a search which is held to be thwarted above all by the evils of Western capitalism and its built-in "sexist oppression." In other words, the freest society the world has yet known is judged to be oppressive; the economic system, of whose fruits women have been the chief beneficiaries, is held to be obstructive; the extraordinary tolerance that characterizes pluralist American society is pronounced a "myth." What is one to make of the fact that these judgments—flying in the face of all observed reality—have by now become part of the common currency, so much taken for granted they are scarcely argued any more? Four decades ago Joseph Schumpeter warned that the very openness of democracy made it especially vulnerable to exploitation. It is this same openness, of course, ironically enough, which is the necessary precondition for all the demands of the Women's Liberation movement.

Against this background, the recent publication of three books about the status of women in three very different contemporary societies* offers a welcome occasion to bring into truer focus the situation of women in general and the myth of the oppressed and exploited lot of contemporary American women in particular. It also offers the occasion to discuss the larger questions of tradition versus modernity which are—at bottom—what so much of the current women's furor is all about. These questions and their implications are not restricted to women, but like so many other pressing issues facing American society today, they have entered public consciousness as an aspect of the "woman question."

THE first of the three books, a collection of essays on the situation of women in the Muslim world, is of several minds on the subject. Those contributors who view the subject through Western eyes point out that judging by the Western criteria of liberty, equality, and justice, Muslim women still have a long way to go. For most of these women, life is dominated by legal, social, and cultural institutions that relegate them to a separate world. Their lives (especially those of peasant women, who are still by far in the majority) are a never-ending succession of hard labor, child-bearing, and child-rearing in an environment where such amenities as running water and electricity are the exception rather than the rule. Work on the land is made compulsory by tradition. Rigid sexual mores, illiteracy, and a near total exclusion from outside contacts make for the most pervasive domestic authority imaginable. Women are locked into immutable positions that are rarely, if ever, questioned, and it is taken for granted that a woman must obey at every stage of her existence: first as a daughter to her father, then as a wife to her husband. Only after she reaches menopause, especially if she has by that time also been widowed, is this control loosened somewhat, but it is in effect throughout a woman's most productive years. Only those who stand altogether outside the domestic environment —the professionally free women or *huryin*—enjoy a bit of freedom.

BRIGITTE BERGER *is professor of sociology at Long Island University and the author, with Peter Berger, of* The Homeless Mind, *among other works.*

* *Women in the Muslim World*, edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, Harvard University Press, 698 pp., $30.00; *Women Under Communism*, by Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Johns Hopkins University Press, 291 pp., $16.00; *Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices*, by Sheila M. Rothman, Basic Books, 290 pp., $12.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not all the contributors to the book share this evaluation. Some go to great lengths to dispel the impression that Muslim women occupy a position of unmitigated servility, arguing that the domestic environment in Muslim countries is far less monolithic than is commonly assumed. They claim that far from being treated as inferior beings and mere sexual objects with no voice in their destiny, Muslim women enjoy a daily existence which is flexible, lively, and vital. Some who hold this view are defenders of the traditional Muslim way of life; others point to evidence of increasing liberalization of women's status in Muslim countries.

Unfortunately, such evidence is still mainly in the planning stage. Although there have been impressive legal reforms, inspiring political platforms and pronouncements, sweeping programs in education and population control (with Turkey, Iran, Algeria, and Egypt in the lead), all designed to benefit women in recent decades, a substantial gulf still exists between paper legislation and promises on the one hand, and actuality on the other. Indeed, if there is any situation to which those overused terms "male chauvinism" and "women's oppression" can be said to apply (and I myself would hesitate to make this application) it would seem to be the situation of women in Muslim countries.

No doubt, there are specific elements in Islam as a religion that have contributed to the subjugation of women. Yet the situation of Muslim women is not really all that different from the situation of women in most pre-industrial societies, Muslim or not. If there has been any impetus toward changing this situation throughout the Third World, it has come primarily from the forces of modernization. It must be stressed, however, that the impact of these forces is not always visible in the short run. Thus, a number of studies in the present volume of such disparate societies as Algeria, Turkey, and Iran show quite convincingly that, so far at least, modernization seems to have worsened the position of women in these countries, rather than improved it. As industrialization has begun to gain momentum in recent years in these societies, a growing number of women have migrated with their husbands to new urban centers. Removed from the land where in spite of their subjugation they had nonetheless been essential to agricultural production, these women are now caught in a transitional stage. Bereft of their traditional economic function, they have not yet acquired a new one, and hence are far more cloistered and segregated from the wider society than ever before. As they have become more dependent on their husbands economically, they have also become dependent in other ways as well.

A GOOD example of this dependency has been the recent revival, throughout the Arab world, of the discontinued practice of veiling. Interestingly enough, the practice is now most widespread not among the peasantry but among women in smaller urban centers. There are clearly a variety of reasons for this paradoxical development and the rather virulent neotraditionalism which it represents. Perhaps the least convincing, however, is the one given by the book's editors, Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, who blame the increase in veiling—like nearly everything else connected with the oppression of women in this part of the world—on economic factors. "Some villagers in North Africa," they write, "seclude and veil their wives as soon as they accumulate a little economic surplus." The editors go on to say (though it contradicts testimony in their own book) that "the removal of women from some of their productive activities, as more goods and services came to be purchased, was a result of capitalism and often of imperialism." Capitalism and imperialism where, one is tempted to ask? In post-independence socialist Algeria? In socialist-oriented Turkey? In Bourguiba's Tunisia after 1969? In Libya, where the treatment of women is especially backward?

The dramatic case of women in capitalist Kuwait is particularly interesting in this connection. Once the immense blessings of oil revenues reached this tiny but oil-rich sheikdom, Western patterns of living came to be accepted almost immediately. Kuwaiti women encountered no obstacles in escaping the domestic environment. They embraced education at all levels in large numbers and had absolutely no difficulty in obtaining jobs, since the government is committed to providing jobs for all Kuwaitis, men *and* women. Indeed, one contributor to the present volume was told that "if a suitable job did not exist when a particular Kuwaiti woman applied for employment, an entire new section was created in a department to provide for her."

The fascinating question that emerges from the Kuwaiti case is why, given all this encouragement, including also the presence of an abundant supply of domestic help (imported), and the absence of strong societal resistance, women's jobs in Kuwait remain largely sinecures? In spite of the extraordinary opportunities created by the immense national wealth, Kuwaiti women seem strongly reluctant to apply themselves to those professions that are commonly considered "male" (science, medicine, engineering, and the like) and devote themselves mainly (if they choose to work at all) to the typical "female" ones (education, social welfare, and the arts). And Kuwait is not an isolated example. Soviet sociologists have reported similar findings, and so have students of the role of women on Israeli kibbutzim —two very different societies which have encouraged the idea of equality for women rather strenuously. The author of the article on Kuwait does not pursue this disturbing question, perhaps because it might yield complicated answers about women that come out on the wrong side ideologically. Nor does she pay much heed to such trivial matters as evidence. The only lesson she draws from the Kuwaiti case is that liberation and equality cannot be brought about except by extraordinary governmental measures.

The editors, for their part, also do not comment on Kuwait, either as an example of a capitalist society that has provided every possible opportunity for full equality for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

women or as an example of women's failure to avail themselves of these opportunities. Instead, they continue to voice the standard militant view that salvation for women can come only from the Left. Thus, describing the situation of women in Muslim countries, they write:

> Only where there have been efforts by leftist movements to mobilize masses of women and men around women's emancipation, as in South Yemen, Dhofar [Oman], and sections of the Sudanese and Palestinian movements, has there been a radical improvement in status for women of all classes.

Needless to say, the Beck-Keddie volume contains no studies of South Yemen and Dhofar, not to mention the Sudanese and Palestinian radical movements, and this is hardly an accident. The editors' comments represent wishful thinking, grandly independent of evidence and frequently flying in the face of it. In leftist Algeria, for example, once celebrated for its "progressive" tendencies, the cause of women's rights has, if anything, moved backward over the past decade, for reasons that have nothing to do with capitalism or imperialism. Rather, they have to do with the tensions of modernization that cannot be perceived, let alone comprehended, in the editors' quasi-Marxist frame of reference.

It is true that the cause of women's emancipation has always been championed by the Left and it is therefore not surprising that the language and the imagery of Women's Liberation should be Left-inspired, its strategy modeled on the Left, and its aims in general those espoused by the Left. For this reason, it is helpful to have available Barbara Wolfe Jancar's survey, *Women Under Communism*, which offers a clear-eyed and skeptical assessment of the discrepancy between ideology and reality in this area.

Dr. Jancar points out first of all that, contrary to the prevailing view, Soviet women are far from emancipated from domestic concerns. Though work outside the home is obligatory for women in Communist societies, and the general demands of work are high, women are underrepresented in high-status positions which continue to be dominated by men. For women, work is understood to mean a *job*, not a career, with all the implications of self-fulfillment contained in that term. But in addition to this job a woman is also expected to be a homemaker in the traditional sense of the term. Communist ideology in both theory and practice sees the family in thoroughly bourgeois terms and women are expected to be its mainstay, insofar as practically all of the work connected with family living falls upon them alone. Yet services and arrangements that could aid them in this task are conspicuously absent. One of the principal burdens in the life of women in Communist countries, according to the author, is the relative lack of those labor- and energy-saving devices for the home that are taken for granted in highly developed Western countries. "No Communist system," she writes, "is yet in a position to assure the standard of living that would truly alleviate the amount of housework required of women." This is true even in so highly industrialized a country as East Germany (a country, incidentally, that is strangely underrepresented in the present volume).

Given the amount of time spent on housework (so substantial that some observers have called the work done at home the "second shift"), it is hardly surprising to discover that women in Communist societies are non-participants in political life, and remain in general apolitical. Since the system is perceived as immutable, it seems to make little sense to women to engage with it—politics is seen as part of a "man's world," which women, because of their "biological situation," rarely enter. In this respect, all Communist societies—including Castro's Cuba—appear to be alike, though the author still has some lingering hopes about China. Whether or not these hopes are justified, will soon be made clear.

Women Under Communism portrays a world in which daily life for women is largely one of hard work and ceaseless efforts to navigate the Byzantine complexities of the bureaucracy—efforts which require extraordinary patience, adaptability, and perseverance. In these societies, there are very few options for women (or, for that matter, for men either). Being concerned with women only, Dr. Jancar urges the Western women's movements to divest themselves of revolutionary Marxist leanings and leftist rhetoric, and concentrate on giving priority to women's interests, regardless of the economic base of society. Her book should be required reading for those students of women's position in underdeveloped societies who, like Nikki Keddie and Lois Beck, are still seeking salvation for women in places like the Communist regime of South Yemen.

The grim situation of women in backward societies emerges in haunting severity if one compares it to that of women living under Western democratic capitalism. Even if the paradoxical and often disquieting effects of modernization are taken into account, there can be no doubt that a modernizing technology and an economic system which allows for mass production and the widest possible distribution of its products have been responsible for turning the liberationist vision into a realistic possibility for women. It is one thing to romanticize about the "wholeness" and superiority of peasant life if one lives in superindustrialized and superdeveloped America; it is an altogether different thing actually to live that life.

Among the proponents of women's causes there is of course a pervasive suspicion of modernization along Western lines, which is frequently expressed as disdain, if not outright disapproval. Liberationists never tire of quoting Betty Friedan's observation that merely having a washing machine or a vacuum cleaner does not necessarily cut down on housekeeping, and this may even be true so far as the amount of time spent on tasks related to the household is concerned. Yet surely there is a difference between time spent scrubbing the floor on one's hands and knees and time spent first on comparison

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shopping, then on purchasing, transporting, and finally plugging in and pushing around a vacuum cleaner.

In habitually bemoaning the alleged "consumerism" of American society, these women's advocates fail to understand that the affluence and diversity of available consumption patterns provide what a Marxist would call the "material substructure" of the liberation they are seeking. Liberation means, above all, a quantum jump in the *choices* open to individuals. And there seems to be a crucial correlation between the range of consumer choices and all other choices in a given society, including choices about such things as competing political alternatives and competing "life styles."

THAT only capitalism has been able to provide the material foundation for the liberation of women is unequivocally borne out by the third book under examination, Sheila M. Rothman's *Woman's Proper Place*. This very readable survey of the changes that have taken place in the role of women in America since 1870 shows vividly how technological improvements at the end of the 19th century in water supply, sewage, and electricity revolutionized the life of American women. For the first time there was some letup in the incessant daily grind as developing industries began vying with one another to produce the labor-saving devices which were to prove of immeasurable benefit not only to middle-class women, but increasingly to poor and working-class women as well. "These conveniences," the author writes, "are so much part of our lives that we may easily forget their significance to the first generation of women who enjoyed them: they reduced—almost eliminated—an extraordinary amount of menial tasks."

Not until these tasks were out of the way, Mrs. Rothman reminds us, did women even begin to have the leisure to cultivate those questions of purpose and identity which have come to be the central preoccupation of the women's movement today. Her book supplies an indispensable background for understanding how concepts like "self-realization" and "self-actualization" came to dominate feminist discourse in America, and also for understanding the implications of these concepts for today's women and for society in general.

Mrs. Rothman sees four major changes in the definition of woman's role in American society between the end of the Civil War and the present: the ideal of "virtuous womanhood" flourishing in the post-Civil War period was supplanted in her view by the newly emerging ideal of "educated motherhood" at the beginning of the 20th century; this in turn was superseded in the 20's by the ideal of the "wife-companion" as women, in the author's words, moved "from the nursery to the bedroom." Whether or not one agrees with this rather schematic progression, there is no doubt that the fourth, and current, definition of "woman as person" is very much the dominant one in American society today. It represents the triumph of that Rousseauian vision of human freedom which underlies all the demands of the current Women's Liberation movement. (That the notion of "liberation" itself is a singularly Western concept only makes the current liberationist outcry against the "oppressiveness" of Western society the more incoherent.)

Rousseau's famous dictum that "men are born free yet everywhere they are in chains" referred to all of traditional society as a prison, but above all, it referred to the family, which in Rousseau's view was the most powerful generator and reinforcer of wretched traditions, and must therefore be destroyed. It is this view of the family as the major obstacle to a better social order—a view of long standing, for which Rousseau provided particularly persuasive arguments—which has come to occupy the forefront of current women's-liberation theory. This view has also, for whatever reason, found a receptive audience among many who are unaffiliated with the women's movement as such.

As Sheila M. Rothman shows, the family started coming under siege around the late 50's when American women began to assert the separation of their own rights and needs from those of their husbands and children. Soon the family was being diagnosed as no longer viable—in an acute state of crisis, if not actually already dead. Needless to say, these pronouncements were by no means unanimous, but were issued rather by a small yet extremely vocal minority of women arrogating to themselves the right to speak for all their "sisters." Still, there is no denying that they have had a profound effect on American society. Reading Mrs. Rothman's book after the other two books on the position of women under Islam and Communism, one is reminded once again of how public policy in a democratic society can be shaped by pressure groups. In such a society rhetoric has real consequences—sometimes in excess of what the rhetoricians themselves may have intended.

Mrs. Rothman shows how this new emphasis upon "woman as person" almost immediately engendered a new set of social circumstances. To begin with, the new self-definition of women came into sharp conflict with the needs of their children. As women began to leave the home in large numbers in order to find their "selves" in the area of work, governmental agencies came under pressure to come up with a solution to the child-care problem. In this way, the women's movement unwittingly contributed to a much wider process that had been going on for some time: the expansion of the power of the state. Mrs. Rothman's description of the paradoxical and, at times, even tragic consequences of this shift is very persuasive indeed. The replacement of the family's authority by the authority of the state, which Rousseau demanded more than 200 years ago in the name of justice and equality for all, finally appears to be taking place—and bringing with it no great joy to anyone.

Take, for example, the question of work. *Woman's Proper Place* shows how in the course of the past hundred years American women have increasingly turned away from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what sociologists call the "private sphere" (family, neighborhood, and religion) to seek fulfillment in the "public sphere" (work and politics). Equality in politics and, above all, in work is the issue of the day. Success as a woman has come to mean success in a career. Yet work clearly means something very different to upper-middle-class American women in their search for identity from what it has to most of the human race for most of history. To Muslim women, finally relieved by modernization of enforced drudgery on the land, there is considerable satisfaction in their new situation in the separate world of the family. To women under Communism, liberation would probably mean the chance for the first time *not* to work—to live the life they imagine a Western capitalist woman lives, with an abundance of consumer goods, freedom to move about, holidays, and leisure time for their families and themselves. It is only to the small segment of women living in the West—in particular those living in the United States—that work appears as the only possible salvation to that dilemma of loss of identity which is endemic in the modern world.

YET this vision may prove self-defeating. American women are giving up on the family and the private sphere at the very moment in history when it is coming to be argued with increasing frequency that work can no longer endow life with a sense of meaning. In a recent British publication, *The Ideology of Work*, P. D. Anthony maintains that the sensible thing is to recognize that work itself is essentially meaningless and should be understood only as a means of buying what is *really* wanted. Even without going this far, one can wonder how long it will take for women to discover the meaninglessness of the abstract world of work, and to turn away from it back to the *real* world of private life. Eventually they may even have to realize that true liberation and their ultimate identity are to be found in the leaden "jail" of the past: in tradition, marriage, and the family.

It is important to understand the class factor in all of this. Mrs. Rothman writes primarily about those upper-middle-class, college-educated women to whom freedom has become a burden. Having given up the commitment to their families, this group of women is now searching for a way out of their uncommitted lives. The women of the American working class have a very different set of priorities, and indeed often fail to understand what their more privileged "sisters" are about. Although Mrs. Rothman clearly is aware of the class dimension, she is disappointingly hesitant about confronting it squarely. This neglect is the major flaw of her book, for by ignoring the values and hopes of those large numbers of American women who, for reasons of class, ethnicity, race, or individual choice are quite at odds with the small segment treated in this book, Mrs. Rothman has mainly written the "official" history of one class of women. For the rest of American women, liberation means primarily being liberated from the economic necessity of working and the chance to spend more time caring for their children and pursuing more traditional interests—these are frequently centered around family, neighborhood, religion, and voluntaristic organizations. (One curious aspect of the matter, incidentally, is that the attitudes and values of American working-class women are not so different from those that appear to prevail in modernizing Muslim countries and, allowing for obvious differences, in the Communist societies as well.) If Mrs. Rothman had pursued the class perspective in her *Woman's Proper Place*, she would indeed have written the book she has been acclaimed for. Unfortunately, she has not.

THE discontents of modernity are not basically rooted in the material and physical benefits industrialization has to offer. Ultimately they are rooted in the disruption of traditional cultural patterns, and especially in the weakening of the family. The resurgence of traditionalism we are witnessing in Muslim countries today shows dramatically that too deep a split between the doctrines of modernizing-secularizing governments and the popular culture of the people breeds discontent and fear. The popular response to this fear—as the case of Iran has most recently illustrated—is an instinctive return to such traditional bulwarks as religion and the family.

Modernity has produced a world of affluence and comfort unparalleled in human history; yet the very material abundance mankind has struggled for since the beginning of history seems to create new problems. Modernity has liberated human beings from the narrow confines of family, tribe, and tradition and this very liberation has brought with it new forms of loneliness and despair. Modernity has opened up a hitherto unimagined range of options, yet their very number has resulted in more confusion than happiness.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the lives of some American women today, who seem to grow angrier and angrier the closer their demands for total liberation come to being fulfilled. The first step to liberation of any kind for women is indeed the modification of cultural barriers and social constraints. But once "liberated," women (and men) begin to discover something very unexpected—that meaning is not necessarily to be found out there in the public world. Rather, it may more likely be found in a private sphere that is somewhat protected from the turbulence of modern society. There follows then a question which should not seem strange to anyone who has ever read Marx: what are the socioeconomic conditions that best favor the emergence and survival of such a relatively protected sphere for personal choice and self-realization? The evidence points to only one answer: such conditions exist, almost exclusively, in the societies of democratic capitalism—and in America more than anywhere else.

Unless and until the Women's Liberation movement in this country has grasped this fundamental fact, its advocates will continue to impose an empty rhetoric on a reality they fail to understand.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Prophets in Modern Idiom

Chaim Raphael

ONE greets every new translation of the Bible into English with excitement—and foreboding. The excitement is obvious. The Bible, for all the hold it has on us, is in many ways remote and puzzling; a new translation, in the idiom of our time, may give us its message clearly and coherently, drawing on scholarship and archeology to clarify what is obscure, "making straight in the desert a highway for our God." But this is where the foreboding comes in. Are we sure that we want everything cleared up? May not the new translators deprive us of the encrusted charm that is precisely the appeal of the older versions, even if they are full of mistakes? Will something neat and tidy allow for the magic that has made the Bible speak with a direct power that transcends archaism and obscurity?

At this level, our foreboding may seem merely sentimental, but there is an issue here which goes deeper. A new translation is not merely a rewriting of the old words in modern English: it includes an effort to change the focus. In the foreground, the Bible's words are to be made more "natural" to us as 20th-century readers—for example, by substituting "you" for "thou." But the real concern of translators is less with the present than with the past. They claim—as in the preface to a new translation by the Jewish Publication Society of America—that their objective is to convey the meaning which these words had thousands of years ago. "What thought," they say, "did the person who first recorded these words really intend to express by means of them?"

Scholars are on hand today, in great number, to offer the ordinary reader much expert guidance on this. They are at home in the life, language, thoughts, and motivations of those far-off days. Their grasp of their arcane subject flows not only from the intensity with which they have studied the Bible itself but also from their immersion in civilizations that were contemporary and cognate. Out of this knowledge they are able to tell us how these stories, commandments, psalms, prophecies, and rituals are related to the original background. Information of this kind is, to some, of boundless interest. But is this, in the end, the way the Bible affects us? More pertinently, can a new translation, however scholarly its base, take us back into this ancient world by paths that have hitherto been barred?

There is no better way to consider these questions than by reading the new translation of the Old Testament by the Jewish Publication Society of America. Designed to replace their earlier translation of 1917, this new version (which we will call JPSV) is now moving strongly toward completion. The first section, *Torah* (Pentateuch), appeared in 1962, revised five years later. The second section in the traditional Jewish division, *Nevi'im* (which means Prophets but also includes the historical books Joshua to Kings), has now been added.* For the third section, *Ketubim* (Writings), some parts (such as Psalms) are already published, and the remainder will presumably not be too long delayed.

Without any doubt, this is an excellent translation, easy to read and conveying in brief—though perhaps too brief—footnotes the immense care of the learned editors in considering what the original text really said and what it meant. To arrive at their decisions, they have compared variants in ancient translations (e.g., the Septuagint) and rabbinic sources, assessing these readings, where possible, in the light of Bible passages in the Dead Sea Scrolls. To understand the Hebrew more accurately, they have considered roots in cognate languages. To establish the imagery of some expressions, they have looked at the epic literature of adjacent areas, notably that unearthed from 1929 on at Ras Shamra in Syria. Where the text is still puzzling, they have offered emendations, mostly in cautious footnotes but sometimes in the translation itself.

With the meaning thus determined by scholarship, they have felt free to tailor the English itself into an idiom which, in their view, aids understanding by using words "in their contemporary sense." Superficially, this is the biggest change from the 1917 version, which followed almost entirely the archaic, long-winded style of the King James Version (KJV). It seems likely, though they are not explicit on this, that the editors also tried to convey, in poetic passages, the rhythm or stresses of the original Hebrew. In all these respects, the result is often like the Old Testament section of the New English Bible (NEB), published in 1970.

If one goes on now to ask whether the new JPSV succeeds in its own declared terms, one is obliged to approach the question in two different ways. As a version reflecting the scholarship of our times, it scores highly; but does the use of a modern idiom help it to succeed in its deeper aim of taking us back into the minds of the ancient Hebrews, so that we might be able to sense, at close hand, the

---

CHAIM RAPHAEL *is the author of* The Walls of Jerusalem, Memoirs of a Special Case, *and* A Feast of History. *A collection of Mr. Raphael's essays, many of which have been published in* COMMENTARY, *will be brought out in April by Behrman House, under the title,* Encounters With the Jewish People.

* *Nevi'im: The Prophets. Second Section of a New Translation of the Holy Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text,* Jewish Publication Society of America, 898 pp., $9.00. The preface informs us that Dr. H. L. Ginsberg of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America served as editor of this section, in association with Dr. Harry M. Orlinsky of the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion in New York, and with the cooperation of "three learned rabbis representing the three organized bodies in the United States." This broad base should assure the new translation of wide communal use.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uniquely generative power which is the mystery of the Old Testament? Perhaps no translation can ever do this; yet as one reads *Nevi'im* in its new version, this is where one's interest lies.

Nevi'im is a good test case since it is divided so neatly—almost half and half—into two clearly defined types of Bible writing, each of which expresses a distinct challenge if we are trying to think ourselves back into the spirit that motivated it. The historical books—Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings—might seem to pose the easier problem. Read consecutively, they apparently offer us a coherent and quite comprehensible account, covering about 600 years, of the rise and fall of a small nation—the fragmented story of early settlement in Canaan, solidity and expansion under David and Solomon, triumphs and disasters of the ensuing royal dynasties, with everything ending in destruction and exile. In sharp contrast, the second half has no coherence at all, being mainly a collection of oracles by mysterious figures called "prophets," three of major status (Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel) and twelve others who drift across the scene with little to establish their position in the story except for the brief literary statements of startling virtuosity that are attached to their names.

IF THE Bible were merely literature, this contrast in style and content might seem a watertight differentiation. In reality, however, it is quite misleading. The historical books may be full of facts, but they are never straight history. What we are offered through a collection of tales—some extremely brief and some full of social and psychological detail—is an intense theological exercise, in which the dramas being recorded are selected and exploited to illustrate the total power in the life of this people of a Being to whom they are uniquely responsible and who is Himself uniquely concerned with them. At every stage in this 600-year story, the outcome of every event is directly assessed, explicitly or implicitly, on a scale of values linked to the worship of this Being. The code of conduct and ritual that He demands lies before every Hebrew, peasant or king. Happiness, in terms of health, sustenance, and freedom, follows upon obedience to His law; disobedience brings punishment and disaster. Nor is He a Being who watches the actions of His people from a distance: in endlessly varied stories, we see Him as a God of constant intervention, appearing and speaking to individuals, issuing instructions through men and women who are particularly close to Him, susceptible to argument and plea, praising and denouncing, threatening and cajoling His creatures in a tireless effort to make this people the instrument of His will. When they finally fail Him, they are destroyed and cast into exile.

This underlying pattern of the involvement of the Hebrews with their God is also the theme, of course, of the books of the Prophets; but this is only one illustration of the unity of the two halves of *Nevi'im*. If the historical books are written to express the prophetic message, the books of prophecy are dominated at every level by history. The visionaries who speak for God in these books are not abstract poets, they are men of their time and place who project in their oracles the dramas generated by the political and social perplexities that surround them. In varied degree, we learn something of their individual lives; sometimes they are close to the Establishment, at other times they preach from a safe distance, even as outlaws. They are in this sense not so much foretellers of the future as analysts and commentators; yet nothing would have been heard of them if they had been merely observers of the current scene. The daily events they talk about are transient symbols of something deeper. Like the authors of the historical books, they are drawing on a perennial philosophy which reaches back to the ancient events which established for all time the role of the Hebrews in God's plan for mankind.

Their language, when read in Hebrew, establishes this in a way which runs counter to every effort to express it in a modern idiom. The style has nothing to do with the prosaic exchanges of the palace or the marketplace. It is flowing with words and rhythms undoubtedly archaic to their own audience and doubly so to us, as if the force within them drew its authority from a historic miracle which transcended the workaday canons of clarity and reason and had to be absorbed through a cloud of mystery.

FOR BOTH parts of *Nevi'im*, then, we are in a world that might be thought distant and inaccessible to our working experience today; yet, as we know, this is not at all how the Old Testament has taken root within us. For reasons which we do not often examine, this story of ancient times operates on us with the greatest intimacy. This is a paradox, for the characters in the story reach us, as often as not, through mere fragments of description; their adventures are shadowy and episodic. If we feel, as we do, that they are important to us, it is because we have created our own image of this world through an unbroken association of thousands of years. In their earliest form, the Old Testament stories were told as absolute truth: the awe and reverence of tribal ritual flowed over into the memory, evoked in narrative, of tribal history. The magic of the Old Testament is that it has offered, generation after generation, the same inseparable amalgam of narrative and faith.

At this level, no one should expect the power of the Old Testament to be explained in modern literary or even theological terms. It operates more mysteriously. Over the centuries, we have absorbed the Old Testament into our way of thinking and feeling. It is a datum in our lives, redolent with meaning precisely because its provenance is inexplicable. The truth it expresses takes form, admittedly, in a code of ethical humanism that has become the common property of Western life; but to isolate individual sentences—as is so often done—from Amos and Micah in support of this is to treat the Bible almost as a dictionary of quotations. The truth of the Old Testament reaches us not in quotations but as a whole—a huge, in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choate literature emerging from the distant past as a tribal legacy full of crudity and poetry, violence and love, ancient in every accent, and only in these terms penetrating our lives in the modern world.

If this is a paradox, it is one that resolves itself more easily in the original Hebrew than it does in translation. In Hebrew, one is automatically sensitive to the endless variety in the style and diction of the text, and in this way close in feeling to those first exposed to it. A sense of archaism—words evoked without full understanding from the dim stretches of the past—was characteristic of the Bible from the beginning. The narrative style, with its floating sense of time (expressed in Hebrew by the so-called *vav*-conversive) was never the style of ordinary speech but a drawing on memory, in the manner of "now it came to pass"; and even straight narrative constantly picked up echoes of ancient parables or folk songs to create a vivid picture of a narrator in perfect tune with the historical sense of his audience. In poetry—the Psalms or prophecies—the evocation of a rich mysterious past is infinitely stronger. Reading the Hebrew today, one is constantly struck—as the early audience must have been—by the passion and diversity of its rhetoric.

How does this work in English? In some ways, it should rule out all translations into a modern idiom. For one thing, the language then becomes consistent in tone, which the Hebrew is not. For another, it wrenches us out of the past into the present. In this regard, the Bible was well served, it would seem, by the King James Version, which was in an English archaic even when first published in 1611, since it was heavily influenced in style by Coverdale's Bible of 1535. The KJV had another advantage—a peculiar one—arising largely, one might say, from its mistakes. The translators had a reverence for the text before them, however obscure. When they could not understand it, they would produce an apparently literal translation that was a stab in the dark, sometimes quite meaningless, but still carrying with it the splendid orotund tone of the version as a whole. For all these reasons, the KJV conveyed much of the archaism and mystery that is tangible in the original Hebrew. Correct or not, it smacks of ancient authority, and seems to carry the reader back to the age in which the Bible first surfaced.

This is partly because the "mistakes" rapidly assumed a meaning of their own, conveying an imagery which has its own validity. It has become memorable, somehow, that Job should say, in agony: "I escaped with the skin of my teeth" (Job 19:20), even if the words really mean "I gnaw my underlip with my teeth" (NEB), or "my teeth drop from my gums" (Anchor Bible, 1965). One feels the same of "Man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward" (Job 5:7). The "sparks" phrase in the KJV is really a paraphrase from the Hebrew: *"u'vnei reshef yagbihu oph."* The Anchor Bible's version, "and Reshef's sons wing high," is actually saying the same thing more literally, with the new knowledge that *reshef* was not simply "flame" but a Semitic god, lord of danger, so that his "sons" (or actions) indicate sparks. All the same, the KJV imagery is more striking.

Perhaps the most famous case of a KJV image adding something unforgettable almost by accident arises in the verse in Psalm 23: "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil." Scholars have long pointed out that the Hebrew says nothing of "the valley of the shadow of death," but should be translated "though I walk through a valley of the deepest darkness," which is how the new JPSV gives it. The KJV translators, as we know, followed the rabbis in reading the single word *tsalmut* in the Hebrew (which they did not understand) as two words: *tsel maveth* ("shadow of death"). They were unaware that the root *ts-l-m* signifies "deep darkness" in cognate Semitic languages; but this led them to produce a phrase which is infinitely more effective than any "correct" version.*

These examples of the mysterious effectiveness of the KJV all relate to words whose meaning was unknown to the translators; but sometimes a translation can become unforgettable—though "incorrect"—even when the Hebrew words are clear enough and a change is called for by grammar or prosody. A good example arises in the famous verse from the fortieth chapter of Isaiah, quoted for its imagery in the first paragraph of this essay. Isaiah talks, in the KJV, of a voice that "crieth in the wilderness: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God." The new translations insist that we must give up the idea of a voice crying in the wilderness. They want us to attach "wilderness" to the road-making process in order to insure perfect parallelism in the two halves of the verse, which then yields, "A voice rings out: In the wilderness clear a road for the Lord! Level in the desert a highway for our God!" This is how the new JPSV constructs the verse. It is logical and effective; but there is no law in Hebrew prosody by which parallelism has to be watertight. My own ear, lulled no doubt by tradition, can never surrender the closeness of the first three words: *"Qol qoreh ba-midbar"*: and the English language will never surrender the idea of a voice crying in the wilderness.

II

CAN a new translation offer something that offsets the loss of the remembered magic of the old versions? Accuracy is the obvious answer; but though the new JPSV is always very interesting in the wholesale changes it makes on this score, the serious scholarship involved frequently lessens rather than heightens the reader's assurance, since the JPS translators—unlike those of the KJV—are hon-

* The wheel can sometimes come full circle. The Anchor Bible Psalms follows modern scholarship: "Even though I should walk in the midst of total darkness," but the editor, Father Mitchell Dahood, says in a note that the rabbinic vocalization *tsalmavet* "may prove to be correct, with *mavet* (death) serving the function of a superlative. Composite nouns in Hebrew are more frequent than grammars allow, especially since they are clearly attested in the Ras Shamra tablets."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

est enough to admit repeatedly in footnotes that they are not sure how to translate. Most commonly such footnotes say simply, "Meaning of Heb. uncertain." Alternatively, the editors offer an improved version of their own translation in a footnote beginning, "Emendation yields."

It might seem at first that the new JPSV is losing on all counts. On the one hand, we really miss many of the old familiar phrases. It is rather disappointing that Elijah, after the thunder on Carmel, does not hear "a still small voice" but "a soft murmuring sound." We feel equally let down, however illogically, when Elisha, sending a disciple off on a mission, no longer tells him, "Gird up your loins" but "Tie up your skirts." And if the accuracy being claimed in such changes is brought into question by the footnotes, the reader may become nostalgic for the essential quality of the old versions—that they conveyed, in timeless English, an age and authority that were always acceptable in their own terms.

There is something in this, but not much. To begin with, the English that emerges in the new JPSV is *in itself* (i.e., if we avoid comparisons) direct and forceful. The crudities of some scholarly translations are for the most part avoided. There is nothing to evoke the hilarity achieved by the International Critical Commentary (1907) which translated Psalm 80:5 as "Yahweh Sabaoth: how long wilt Thou smoke during the prayers of Thy people?" In the KJV this had appeared as "How long wilt thou be angry against the prayer of thy people?" The editor of the ICC volume—the distinguished American scholar, Charles A. Briggs—was anxious to point out that the Hebrew for "be angry" (*ashanta*) was derived from *ashan* ("smoke"). God was "smoking" (with anger). A splendid pun was, alas, missed: "How long wilt Thou fume?"

Perhaps "tie up your skirts" comes close to this; but on the whole the new JPSV is always anxious not to offend the reader too abruptly, offering a distinct contrast on this to the New English Bible. In the NEB, Joseph's coat of many colors becomes "a long, sleeved robe," which is gratituously unsettling since no one knows what the Hebrew *ketonet passim* really means. The JPSV translates it as "an ornamented tunic," with a straddling footnote: "Or 'a coat of many colors': meaning of Heb. uncertain."

THIS treatment of Joseph's coat offers, as it happens, a good opportunity to raise a much wider question about the new translation and its presentation. It might seem, at first, that the footnote on the coat has covered the essentials. A changed version of a familiar phrase mentions the traditional version (as given in the 1917 JPSV), with an admission that both versions are "uncertain." But some questions remain. Given the uncertainty, why were the editors not content to leave the traditional phrase in the text and offer an alternative in the footnote, as they do so often elsewhere? Going deeper still, could they not have provided some explanation to us of their rationale?

This specific and local point is raised for its more general relevance. If notes are offered at all (there were virtually none in the 1917 version), could they not have been more informative, so that the reader might get a better understanding of the scholarship which impelled the translators to make such radical changes? As *Nevi'im* now stands, it is a boldly altered text, with explanations at a minimum. A fuller commentary might have helped to bring into one conspectus the approach of the old version and the compelling reasons for change, thus reconciling the familiar with the unexpected.

It must be admitted that this is sometimes achieved even with very brief notes. A good example is Isaiah 33:7, which reads in Hebrew: *"Hen erellam tsa'aqu chutzah / mal'akhei shalom mar yivkayun."* The 1917 JPSV translates (like the KJV and the NEB): "Behold, their valiant ones cry without; the ambassadors of peace weep bitterly." The new JPSV sounds more puzzling: "Hark! The Arielites cry aloud; Shalom's messengers weep bitterly." By itself, it doesn't make sense; but a footnote explains that "the Arielites" are the people of Jerusalem, as in Isaiah 29:1: "Ah, Ariel, Ariel: city where David camped." The parallel is then clear: "Shalom's [or Shalem's] messengers" are also the men of Jerusalem, as in Psalm 76:3: "In Shalem is His tabernacle, in Zion His dwelling."

Correct or not, it is stimulating and one understands it. Many other changes are equally startling, but without adequate explanation. In Isaiah 18:2, for example, the 1917 JPSV (close to KJV) reads: "Go, ye swift messengers, to a nation tall and of glossy skin, to a people terrible from their beginning onward, a nation that is sturdy and treadeth down." In the new JPSV it becomes: "Go, swift messengers, to a nation far and remote, to a people thrust forth and away, a nation of gibber and chatter." A footnote tells us, as usual, "Heb. uncertain," but offers only a sparse justification of what sounds like a change full of interest.

One feels the same curiosity about alternatives in the footnotes that are merely preceded by "Emendation yields." A striking example is in Isaiah 51:14. Here, the new JPSV offers, in the text, something close to the old version: "Quickly the crouching one is freed: he is not cut down and slain, and he shall not want for food." The footnote suggests something totally different: "Quickly the tree buds anew, it does not die though cut down, and its sap does not fail." We are not told what kind of emendation produces this.

One would like more guidance, similarly, when a new translation is based on a derivation from cognate languages. There is an interesting example in Jeremiah 3:5 in which two apparently familiar Hebrew words take on a wholly new meaning when understood this way. The Hebrew of this verse reads: *"ha-yintor le'olam im yishmor la-netzach"*—for which the KJV offers: "Will He reserve [His anger] for ever, will He keep it to the end?"—a translation followed by the 1917 JPSV. The new JPSV does not sound too different in sense: "Does one hate for all time, does one rage forever?" But in fact a basic change has been intro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duced. The Hebrew words have been reinterpreted, as the footnote mentions, on the basis of "Akkadian parallels, *nadaru* and *shamaru*." This is a fascinating suggestion; one would like to have it spelled out.

One needs even more detail on a possible change, based on Ugaritic, of a phrase in David's lament for Jonathan (2 Samuel 1:21). The well-known lines read in KJV: "Ye mountains of Gilboa, let there be no dew, neither let there be rain upon you, nor fields of offering." The Hebrew for the last four words is, *usdei t'rumoth*, an obvious puzzle. The new JPSV is conservative in translating it, "Or bounteous fields." But a footnote says, "Emendation yields 'springs from the deep': cf. Ugaritic *shr'thmtm*, and see Gen. 7:11; 8:2." The Genesis phrase, in both cases, is *ma'yenoth t'hom*, "fountains of the deep." Presumably the emendation calls for the Hebrew to be read in a way which changes the consonants of *usdei t'rumoth* to *sh-r/th-m*, to correspond to the Ugaritic. Perhaps this is all crystal clear to a Ugaritic scholar, but the ordinary reader has been told too much or too little.*

It will be clear even from these brief examples that the new JPSV is never too sure of how much weight to put on emendations. Sometimes the editors are very chary indeed, as in the opening of this lament: "Your glory, O Israel, lies slain on your heights." The NEB interprets the Hebrew words— *al bamotekha chalal*—very differently: "laid low in death," emending the middle word to *meitekha*, "thy dead," in line with a point raised in the Gesenius lexicon. The new JPSV sticks to the traditional reading.

III

To ONE reader, at least, there is endless interest in seeing modern translators not exactly at war with each other, but impelled in different ways. In matters of taste, one mostly has to give the palm to the new JPSV, though it can lose out by excess of pedantry. The majestic line from the KJV: "How are the mighty fallen!" is changed to the past tense in the JPSV to read: "How *have* the mighty fallen!" because the verb *naflu* is in the perfect, a pointless loss of euphony. However, the NEB is worse with: "How are the men of war fallen!" —surrendering the ringing word "mighty" for no reason whatsoever.

This example leads us back to the question raised at the beginning: how far can a translation convey what the words of a very ancient poetic text sounded like originally and what they meant? On the first point, the fact that the KJV has established, over nearly 400 years, what we now regard as a biblical sonority is no evidence in itself of how it was heard by the ancient Hebrews. The KJV English sounds slow and graceful, whereas one thinks of the Hebrew—fewer words, with a minimum of conjunctions and particles—as sharp and pungent. As mentioned earlier, the greatest *stylistic* influence on the KJV was the translation of Miles Coverdale (1535); but Coverdale, as David Daiches points out in his book *The King James Version of the English Bible* (1941), "gives no evidence of knowing Hebrew." He made his translation from Dutch and Latin versions. His style "was based on an innate sense of rhythm required by the meaning, rather than on any attempt to imitate the rhythm of the original."

To imitate the original rhythm would be hard in any case. Biblical prosody cannot be reduced to a regular system in modern terms. As Benjamin Hrushovski explains in his article on this subject in *Encyclopaedia Judaica:* "The major rhythmic element is stress . . . but the number of stresses in each verset is not necessarily fixed or permanent." The Hebrew words themselves determine how the stresses are organized for effect, ruling out the idea of imitating the accents or stresses with English words.

How is it, then, that passages in the KJV seem so often in tune with the "sound" of the Hebrew, while a modern translation is liable to lose this quality? It seems as if the KJV music has shaped our own ear, so that the new words, unless very apt, strike a discord. Consider, for example, the KJV opening of Isaiah 60: "Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee." The 1917 JPSV was content to reproduce this verbatim. Its new version runs: "Arise, shine, for your light has dawned; the Presence of the Lord has shone upon you!" Apart from the loss of the music, what we now have is a paraphrase, with "dawned" for *va* ("come"), and "Presence" for *kavod* ("glory"). Once again, one can only say that it is better than the NEB: "Arise, Jerusalem, rise clothed in light; your light has come and the glory of the Lord shines over you." This is paraphrase carried beyond any hope of capturing the original "sound."

But perhaps it is an effective way of achieving the second part of the aim—the recovery, as the preface to *Nevi'im* puts it, of the thought that the person who first recorded these words really intended to express. If this is what "accuracy" means, paraphrase is a useful weapon, but one has to be aware of its limitations. A Bible *commentary* can legitimately expound the "meaning" of a verse at leisure; a *translation* has to recapture also the general mode of thought of the ancient narrator and his audience. It can do this only by reproducing the imagery of the original, however distant and disparate from our world today.

ARE the editors of the new JPSV correct, then, when they say in their preface: "If Bible readers are to understand the text, words must be used in their contemporary sense"? Fortunately, they do not always apply this principle, being aware, it seems, that the Bible's archaic mode of expression cannot be turned into the kind of modernity that one expects from a newspaper.

Their sense of caution comes out clearly in the way they handle the famous oracles in the first two chapters of the book of Amos. In these oracles, God, speaking through the prophet, denounces

* It is perhaps worth noting that the NEB, perhaps on the same basis, produces something very different: "No showers on the uplands." All it offers in explanation is a laconic footnote: "prob. reading."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seven countries, one after the other, for their monstrous persecution of their neighbor Israel. The form of each oracle is identical. In the KJV:

> For three transgressions of Damascus, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they have threshed Gilead with threshing instruments of iron. . . .
>
> For three transgressions of Gaza, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they carried away captive the whole captivity. . . .

Wickedness and punishment are set out, in grim detail, for each of the seven; and then, with dramatic irony, the same formula is used to denounce Israel itself:

> For three transgressions of Israel, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they sold the righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes.

To the New English Bible, the three-and-four exposition is too ancient to be understood by a modern reader. With complete ruthlessness, the editors replace it with: "For crime after crime of Damascus I will grant them no reprieve," and so on through the whole majestic sequence.

The new JPSV will not have this. The three-and-four approach is retained in full, as it obviously has to be. But one wonders if this is not an admission that the "modern idiom" does not really work. If one looks for the power of Hebraic idealism in the aspiration of mankind it stands out supremely in these chapters of Amos, phrased in a mode that captures the full ancient tone. It has never needed modernity of expression. The setting and the imagery have to be absorbed as a whole. The passage is archaic in the extreme, but it speaks to Everyman.

Music

Yesterday's New Music

Samuel Lipman

ALTHOUGH the situation of music at the end of World War II was undeniably chaotic, there were important if superficial reasons for optimism. The days in which public musical life had been curtailed or even halted by bombing and bombardment were safely past. Music, with other kinds of culture, seemed to belong to the new world of peaceful construction. In undamaged and prosperous America the influx of refugee musicians, composers and performers alike, had changed the domestic musical scene, and a parallel strengthening of audiences by the cultivated émigré public was providing both aesthetic approval of and material support for concert activity. And in Europe, a whole new generation of artists, denied access to the world stage for almost a decade by the dislocations of war, was ready to come forward. Perhaps most important, a new electronic technology, based upon the German-invented magnetic tape recorder and (after 1948) the American-developed long-playing phonograph record, were available to provide the possibility of a hitherto unimagined diffusion of the great works of music.

It might have been supposed that all these phenomena, which were to prove so beneficial to the performance of existing music, would benefit new creation as well. For while musical composition had indeed shown marked signs of autumnal decline in the interwar period, it could hardly be denied that some important works had been written in the 1920's and 1930's, and had been widely accepted as such by a cultivated audience.

Of the most important composers who made their mark in the preceding two decades, only Alban Berg was dead at the end of the war (Béla Bartók was to die shortly thereafter). Even the 19th-century survivor Richard Strauss, still alive at the age of eighty-one, was in 1945 in the middle of writing some of his most beautiful and affecting music. The two most widely respected modern masters, Arnold Schoenberg and Igor Stravinsky, were musically active; Schoenberg would continue composing until his death in 1951, and Stravinsky, his conversion to twelve-tone writing several years in the future, was still involved in the neoclassicism which was to culminate in his opera, *The Rake's Progress* (1951).

SAMUEL LIPMAN *is our regular music critic. His most recent contributions include "Funding the Piper" (January 1979), "Wagner's Holy Family" (November 1978), and "Stravinsky's Stature" (July 1978).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Among those newer figures whose downplaying of modernity was compensated for by greater public acceptance, Prokofiev and Shostakovich were as prolific as ever, and only their difficult political situation in the Soviet Union seemed to stand in the way of the highest achievements. In England and France, the erstwhile *enfants terribles*, William Walton and Darius Milhaud (the latter an alternate-year resident in the United States), continued to write, and the very American Aaron Copland was consolidating and extending his reputation as our most considerable musical figure.

It is possible in retrospect to see that all this activity in composition, though hardly as central to the wider culture as the works of earlier composers had been, belonged to the mainstream, a kind of writing traditional in both aesthetic and technique. One can even see this kind of middle-of-the-road art as a loyal product of bourgeois society—nowhere more so, paradoxically, than in revolutionary Russia where Stalin and Zhdanov were trying to resuscitate the corpse of Victorian aesthetics. But whatever the social system in which these moderate composers worked, and whatever their past innovations, by 1945 they seemed neither to be breaking new ground in the character of their music nor to be disturbing their essentially accommodating relation to the audience and to society.

This mainstream activity, in the work of such newly important figures as Benjamin Britten in England and William Schuman and Leonard Bernstein in America, was to continue, and remains until the present day a possible choice for contemporary composition. But the survival of a past way of writing into the present does not alter the fact that for at least the last thirty-five years the word "new" in composition has had two uses. Its ordinary use has been simply to convey that a work has just been written; its more important use has been to convey the ideological message that the work in question possesses qualities of style which place it in the avant-garde, a movement revolutionary in purpose, historically unparalleled in technique, critical in reference to the past, and audacious in regard to the present.

THE history of this advanced music since World War II is the story of the development, at first separate but later merged, of two conceptions—freedom and order. The freedom sought was the possibility for composers (and later performers) to use any resource they might find attractive at any point, from the writing of the music to its reception by the listener. The order sought involved the subjection of the musical material by the composer to the most rigorous and conscious intellectual control in the writing, and to similarly conscious physical control in performance; this control was to be based both upon the generation of the composition from musical elements as carefully delimited as possible and upon the exclusion from their treatment of structural accident or sentimentality.

The roots of both these ultimately metaphysical goals lay, as might be expected, in developments going back to the earlier years of our century. To a significant extent, both of these goals were exemplified in the life and music of the most significant composer of the past century, Arnold Schoenberg. From his beginnings as a lush hyper-romanticist extending the swollen forms of Wagner, Strauss, and Mahler, he had exhausted the possibilities of complexity and sheer size alike; after the *First Quartet* (1905), he ventured increasingly into expressionism, into the uninhibited depiction of previously repressed emotions through musical means of hitherto unimagined dissonance and seeming formlessness. Though in fact ingeniously constructed, this music —best known in *Pierrot Lunaire* (1912)—was written in a style significantly called "free atonality," and struck listeners as madness and anarchy let loose on the world.

But this kind of writing did not satisfy Schoenberg's restless craving for order. So in 1921 was born his great theoretical contribution to music—"the method of composition with twelve tones related only to each other." In this innocent-sounding phrase was contained both the destruction of tonality—the euphonious world of chords and keys which underlies what we hear as "classical" music—and a new system rigorous enough to attract and satisfy the most scholastically inclined of modern composers.

GIVEN Schoenberg's propensity toward theory and discipline, it was ironic (though perhaps fitting in the light of his basic unruliness) that his most consequential pupil during his years of American exile should have been the composer, writer, and sometime mycologist, John Cage. Under Cage's benign exterior lies a streak of aesthetic nihilism which has influenced not only the kind of music today's up-to-date composers write, but also our very idea of what it means to be an avant-garde composer.

Indeed, in the words of Schoenberg himself, Cage was perhaps not a composer at all but rather "an inventor of genius." Following upon his early interest in percussion music, in 1938 he invented the prepared piano, which, by the insertion of metal, wood, and rubber objects between the piano strings, produces exotic pitched and unpitched sounds different for each note so treated. His search for new sounds led him further along the lines explored by Edgar Varèse and by Cage's own teacher, Henry Cowell, the inventor of the tone cluster, in which the keys of the piano were smacked by palm, fist, arm, or —so that even more notes might be sounded at once—a board. Whereas Schoenberg had aimed at—and in the eyes of his supporters succeeded in—the emancipation of dissonance from the tyranny of what was accepted as consonance, Cage now, as early as 1937, sought the liberation of acoustical phenomena themselves from what he regarded as "so-called musical sounds."

For Cage the future of music lay with the vast body of sounds which had in the past been called noise. As musical instruments seemed at the time incurably specialized for the production of musical sounds—notes and harmonies—Cage early worked with electrical sound sources, writing in 1939 *Imaginary Landscape No. 1* for two variable-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speed phonograph turntables playing frequency recordings, along with muted piano and cymbal. Twelve years later he had advanced to *Imaginary Landscape No. 4*, for twelve radios, twenty-four players, and conductor. The really revolutionary aspect of this work is demonstrated by the fact that its initial failure in performance—by the time Cage's piece was gotten to on the evening's program, too few radio stations were left on the air to provide the necessary sound material—hardly bothered the composer and confirmed for him (as failure in revolution always does for its supporters) the conceptual superiority of the enterprise.

As can be seen from his use of radios to provide material, Cage had become interested in the possibility of freeing composers from the necessity to choose and write down each individual note on the basis of its relation to the preceding notes. Thus, in the same year as his piece for radios, he composed *Music of Changes*, a work for piano solo in which the notes to be played by the pianist were determined in their pitches, loudness, duration, tempos, and sequences by consultation, through the mediation of coin tosses, with the Chinese oracle book, *I Ching*.

One year later, in 1952, Cage achieved the ultimate chance composition, and perhaps not quite by accident thus reached a level of public notoriety granted to few artistic creators in our time. Deciding that the noises which inevitably surround us are at least as interesting as anything a composer might write, he conceived the notorious *4'33"*, a work in three movements of pure silence for any combination of instruments whatever, with only exact durations and absence of sound specified. This was not music but pure theater, as the "performance" by pianist David Tudor proved; Tudor simply sat at the piano, closing its fall board (the lid which covers the keys) at the beginning of each of the work's movements in accordance with the composer's directions in the otherwise empty score.

At about the same time, Cage became further involved in electronic music, composing *Williams Mix* for eight-track tape. By 1958, he had married tape music to chance in *Fontana Mix*, described as "(a) a score for the production of one or more tape track (s) or for any number of instruments, or (b) pre-recorded tape material to be performed in any way." Chance techniques were applied to purely instrumental pieces as well; in *Variations I* (1958), for "player(s) on any kind and number of instruments," the performer (s) is (are) required to choose notes and rhythms with regard only to charts containing schematic notation and written instructions. The later *Variations V* has no musical score at all; in its place the performer is given a general description of past performances, among them one (according to an article on Cage by his follower, Christian Wolff) containing "dance by Merce Cunningham, film material by Stan Vanderbeek, special electronic equipment including electric eyes so that the movements of the dance would trigger sound sequences, television material by Nam June Paik, and lighting and scenery by Robert Rauschenberg."

IN THE meantime, avant-garde music in Europe had started out after 1945 by choosing a compositional aesthetic based upon the other side of Schoenberg, his concern with order. Only in the very first years after the war was the influence of Schoenberg, through the teaching of his pupil, René Leibowitz, anything like directly felt. Soon Schoenberg was being decisively overshadowed—as was his most distinguished disciple, Alban Berg—by the music and even more the example of Anton Webern, also Schoenberg's pupil, and, with Berg and Schoenberg, a member of the Viennese atonal trinity. Webern's small body of mature work consisted of short, sparse-sounding pieces of the most complex and ingenious organization; his later works were carefully written according to Schoenberg's method of twelve-tone organization.

But whereas both Schoenberg and Berg had composed works of essentially romantic sensibility, direct in their open emotionality and unabashed self-indulgence, Webern constantly pared down his rhetoric, eschewing massive combinations of instruments in favor of individual, fragmented melodic lines. Webern's few notes, written in a style utilizing pre-classical contrapuntal devices, seemed a world small, perfect, and totally controlled. Webern thus became a heaven-sent model for the widely felt musical reaction against both classicism and romanticism. And not only was Webern validated as a hero for the new generation by the neglect he and his music had suffered; as if to set an eternal seal on his martyrdom, he had been killed in 1945—but after the war was over—by an American soldier for violating a curfew (of whose existence Webern was unaware) in the Austrian village where he lived.

THESE general considerations of Webern as an example of the artistic predicament aside, what seemed so useful to young European composers about his work was what they saw as his attempt to build his compositions out of a very few "pre-formed" elements, so that the entire composition seemed the inevitable outcome inherent in its constituents. In Webern these constituents were largely melodic, and thus based on pitch; but they also included color, dynamics, and rhythms. Now composers attempted to treat all the parameters of music—among them pitch, duration, amplitude, timbre, and articulation—as Schoenberg had required pitch alone be treated. Thus, in a quasi-mathematical way each element of music could be assembled into its own series, with each unduplicated pitch, duration, etc. assigned a numerical value based upon the order in which it was first stated; the series and its parts could be inverted, retrograded, and transposed according to a predetermined scheme which governed to as great an extent as possible what occurred and where such occurrences took place.

The first attempt (though only analogically serial) at such pre-formation was made in 1949 by the French composer, Olivier Messiaen, in his étude, *Mode de valeurs et d'intensités*. Messiaen was vastly more influenced musically by his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French Catholic religiosity and fondness for bird song than by any aesthetic sympathy for Schoenberg and Webern, and so he did not follow up his first experiment. In any case, the influence of the experiment hardly stemmed from its artistic achievement. Rather, it was the fate of this short work to be noticed by the two seminal minds of the post-World War II avant-garde, Pierre Boulez and Karlheinz Stockhausen. In their separate ways—Boulez savagely polemical and passionately intellectual and Stockhausen inclined toward technological innovation and personal mysticism—these two men personified the early search for total determinism in music.

The rationality with which they worked now seems both artificial and terrifying. For example, Boulez's most totally pre-formed composition, *Structures I* (1951-52)—based on the pitch order of Messiaen's 1949 *Mode de valeurs*—was written following the preparation of matrix tables consisting of the numerical values of the original series of notes, its retrogade and their inversions, and their transpositions. These tables were then used to determine all note durations, dynamics, and modes of attack, as well as to determine the order in which the note series themselves were used.

Though Boulez was to be influential—among many other reasons—precisely for his achievement of total control, he himself soon abandoned the rigorous application of his own former principles. Stockhausen, by contrast, remained for many years (perhaps because he was not interested, as Boulez deeply was, in the performance of the music of others) committed to the role of the composer as dictator over both his compositions and the musicians who play them. More seduced by the possibilities of magnetic tape than Boulez ever was, Stockhausen saw in tape a medium which offered total control to the composer. For on tape, though working with it in these early years was inefficient and horribly time-consuming, pitch could be controlled both by the signal the tape was electronically fed and by the speed at which the tape was run by the playback heads; rhythm and duration were matters not only of tape speed but even more conveniently of tape length, to be determined by measurement with a ruler; timbre was a matter both of signal generators and frequency filtering; and dynamics were simply determined by settings of the gain controls. In fact, the composer could now be the performer, and once his tape was made, it contained its own permanent and unvarying realization.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that what animated Stockhausen and his followers—whether they worked with tape alone or, as Stockhausen often did, with conventional instruments used in such a way as to resemble electronic sources—was the desire to create a new-sounding music from scratch. Stockhausen put it well in the first issue of *Die Reihe*, a periodical devoted to the new music which appeared from 1955 to 1962:

> A sound which results from a certain mode of structure has therefore no relevance outside the particular composition for which it has been intended. For this the same "prepared" element, the same sound, or the same "object" can never be utilized in different compositions, and all sounds which have been created according to the structural pattern of one composition are destroyed when the composition is completed.

Not only does this apply to the individual work of one composer; the destruction of which Stockhausen wrote could be applied in a wider sense to musical memory itself and the block it always presents to the acceptance of anything new. This position has been brilliantly and sympathetically put in a recent history of avant-garde music by the English composer and writer, Reginald Smith Brindle:

> In the postwar years, one of the most difficult obstacles to our "beginning again" was our own musical memories. Our minds normally create only out of what memory suggests. Thinking subjectively, we tend to reassemble familiar musical patterns. To avoid this needs deliberately objective reasoning and the use of thought processes into which memory cannot obtrude. This was precisely the main reason for the flourishing of integral serialism. It was, in theory at least, a system of composition which obliged composers to think objectively and eliminate memory, so that the musical heritage of the past was blotted out and a completely new music created.

It needed little imagination to predict the reaction of the musical public to the demand that it participate in the destruction of musical memory. But even within the avant-garde movement itself, this fantasy of total control, no matter how logically impeccable and physically satisfying, could hardly last. Upon composers it laid the obligation to be thinkers rather than instinctive musicians; from performers (when they were allowed into the picture at all) it demanded absolutely faithful execution of the minutely detailed notation of the extreme complexities required by serialization. And upon even the most favorably disposed listeners it placed the burden of hearing and discriminating among sound events whose very complexity and differentiation made them seem both opaque and isolated.

For all of Stockhausen's commitment to intellectual control, he too realized the nature of this cul-de-sac, and by the mid-1950's he was looking for a way to bring back some important role for variation and imagination in composition and performance alike. It was clear that this way out could not involve a return to the past. How impossible such a return was perceived to be is clear from a 1957 comment of Herbert Eimert, co-editor, with Stockhausen, of *Die Reihe*:

> There is little to choose between "advanced" expressionist music and the stagnant bourgeois reaction to it; today, either music exists as it is in the vanguard, or it does not exist at all. This is not a "totalitarian" alternative; it is the simple truth.

But while it was thus neither possible nor desirable to give up the characteristic sound of atonality as perceived by the listener, it was possible to substitute the new indeterminacy associated with John

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cage for the total rigor of the disciples of Webern. In 1956, Stockhausen had already developed, in *Klavierstück XI*, the idea of mobile form. Here the performer is allowed to choose the order, determined by wherever his eye has happened to light in the music, in which any of the work's 19 sections are played; when one of these sections is met with for the third time, the performance is over. More than order is left to the discretion of the performer: he is directed to begin the "first" section at a tempo, loudness, and attack of his own choice; at the end of this section, he is given performance instructions applying equally to whichever section he chooses to continue with.

THOUGH Stockhausen's use of chance as described above was hardly epochal, the effect of chance in the extreme form adopted by Cage in the 1950's, and soon to be picked up in Europe, was to complete the process begun earlier in *4'33"* of transforming music into a form of theater. This kind of theater was, of course, far removed from the traditional performance of either the classics or the ordinary, new well-made play. The theater in which composers were now involved was much closer, in its emphasis on improvisation, to the idea of action painting as a process stemming from the painter's unconscious and performed by the body upon the canvas. Indeed, an attractive model for music was the "happening," first performed at Black Mountain College in 1952 by a Cage-organized group which included Charles Olsen, M.C. Richards, David Tudor, Robert Rauschenberg, Merce Cunningham, and Cage himself.

Stockhausen actually wrote a kind of happening, described by himself as "musical theater." *Originale* (1961) consists of a hodgepodge of elements, among them people doing what they usually do in real life: two musicians play *Kontakte*, an earlier score by Stockhausen; actors act; a technician makes recordings; a street singer sings street songs; and a newsvendor comes in to sell papers. Even in works of Stockhausen where the performers' actions do not seem in context quite so bizarre, the element of theater still came to occupy an important place. *Musik für ein Haus* (1968), for instance, a collective composition by members of his composition class at the Darmstadt Vacation Courses for New Music, was conceived to be performed by instrumentalists assigned to each of fifteen composers in

> a cluster of rooms of various sizes on two floors connected and acoustically isolated by a network of passages. Each listener comes and goes in his own time and is able to change his listening perspective within the House at will.
>
> What the instrumentalists play is picked up by microphones in each room and relayed at varying amplification over loudspeakers. Each of the four rooms is linked by a loudspeaker with the three others. The players not only react to one another, but also to the music emanating from the other room. In a fifth room (*"Klangbox"*) may be heard a continuous relay of the music from all four rooms over four separate speakers.

IT IS precisely this profusion of visual and theatrical elements which makes any evaluation of avant-garde music as music so difficult. And yet since these pieces go under the name of music, they clearly require evaluation in musical terms. So it is fortunate that this period was comprehensively documented on records. Some of the most characteristic works of the late 1950's and the culminating decade of the 1960's have been preserved by Deutsche Grammophon on a series of discs issued between 1968 and 1970. Consisting of eighteen individual records released in three groups of six each, the series was simply called the *Avant-Garde*.*

The history of these records turned out to be a short one. Though the critic of the English record magazine, *Gramophone*, referred to the release of the last group of six as an "annual event, something a reviewer can look forward to as winter closes in on him," no further records were to follow in the series, and those already issued were soon being discontinued and (at least in the United States) remaindered. By 1978 no trace of any of them remained in the American Schwann LP Catalog, and only two were still listed in Bielefelder, its German equivalent.

Handsomely produced, with each jacket save one bearing (in different colors) an attractive cover in the style of the American color-field painter Kenneth Noland, the records are centered around the music of Stockhausen; to him are devoted three complete discs and a part of another. Hardly less space —two complete discs and parts of two others—is given to the Argentine Mauricio Kagel. Single records are allocated to the German Bernd Alois Zimmermann and the French Luc Ferrari, while the Hungarian György Ligeti receives parts of three records. The rest of the series contains smaller selections from the music of twenty-two other composers (among them John Cage), and one group performing improvisations.

The series begins almost apologetically with conventionally modern-sounding music for the most bourgeois of combinations, the string quartet made up of two violins, viola, and cello. The longest of the three pieces on this disc is the *String Quartet* (1964) by Witold Lutoslawski, a Pole best known for his showy two-piano work, *Variations on a Theme of Paganini* (1941). His inclusion in the series is explained by the fact that most of the *Quartet* is written as completely independent parts, "each player [performing] his part as though he were alone." The second composition on the disc is the *String Quartet* (1960) of another Pole, Krzysztof Penderecki, whose most popular work has been *Threnody* (1956), dedicated "to the victims of Hiroshima." Though his quartet begins with a jumble of harsh sounds (obtained by treating the instruments as if they were percussion devices), nothing in the piece, except perhaps for the composer's intentions in writing it, justifies the jacket's comment that its significance lies in features "whose insistent irreconcilability crystallizes the composer's resistance . . .

* DG 137 001/012, 2543 001/006.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to forces dominating culture." Nor does the final piece on this record, the Japanese Toshiro Mayuzumi's *Prelude for String Quartet* (1964), bear up well under the jacket's Hegelian analysis of its structure and methods; what seems attractive about this piece is, rather, its obvious orientalisms and quiet effects of instrumental color.

WHEREAS the first record seems historically tentative, the second plunges directly into the vortex of the avant-garde. Here are two of Stockhausen's most influential and talked-about works, *Gruppen* (1955-57) for three orchestras, and *Carré* (1958-59) for four orchestras and four choruses. Both works are examples of Stockhausen's "spatial music." *Gruppen* is meant to be performed, for instance, with the three orchestras separately stationed on three sides of the hall, conducted by three conductors. This division of forces makes possible the simultaneous performance of several different tempos, a feat enormously difficult with one orchestra playing under one conductor on one stage.

While the explicitly notated and involved serialism of *Gruppen* must, in the words of a commentator, have required "fanaticism to write out," the composition of *Carré* was assisted by Cornelius Cardew, Stockhausen's then disciple. Cardew, though he attempted to follow the composer's general instructions, seems to have had no real idea of what he was to write; the doubt, in the words of still another commentator, was "all to the good in preventing creative conflicts." Whatever the value of Stockhausen's novel methods of working, listening to this music can only for most musicians produce amazement that sounds of such seeming shapelessness could have been conceived and performed, and, even more, compel respect for the personal will which could see such a project through.

The next record features the organ playing of the German Gerd Zacher, performing compositions by Kagel, Ligeti, and the Chilean Juan Allende-Blin. Kagel's *Phantasie* (1967) can be seen, from one standpoint, as the continuation of a historical crime upon the organ. By combining, as he does here, electronic techniques with the characteristic organ sound, Kagel is following in the footsteps of Laurens Hammond, who introduced the electric organ bearing his name in the 1930's. Kagel's bright idea here was to mix composed music played on the organ with recordings of the environmental noises of the organist's daily life. The sounds on these tapes—some of them made by the organist, some by Kagel—include the flushing of a toilet; the train carrying the organist to work; excerpts from wedding, christening, and burial services; and so on. And the notes actually written by Kagel do their part by sounding like electronically produced material. The other pieces on this record seem less like sound effects, and perhaps for that very reason appear less advanced. Allende-Blin's *Sonorités* (1962) is a collection of mainly static throbbings, and sounds like an improvisation calculated to show off the timbres of the organ. Even more static for the most part are the Ligeti works, *Volumina* (1961) and *Etude #1* (1967). The first manages at the end to get away from the tendency of so many avant-garde works to sound canned, but the second seems mainly distinguished for being performed with a vacuum cleaner instead of the normal organ blower in order to produce a pale and weak sound.

THE fourth record consists of unaccompanied choral music, and begins, in contrast to some later works in this series, by using the voice in a fairly traditional manner. The Englishman David Bedford's *Two Poems* (1966), written to words by Kenneth Patchen, are pleasant, even if some of the work's pleasantness stems from its brevity rather than its incorporation of "sections in which the singers are instructed to fill a fixed space of time with a certain number of notes, *ad libitum*." Ligeti's *Lux Aeterna* (1966) is slow beyond belief, and the Swede Arne Mellnäs's *Succsim* (1964)—the title is a combination of "succession" and "simultaneously"—uses no words; instead one hears sung vowels, whispers, hisses, and whistles. The Czech Marek Kopolent's *Matka* (c. 1967) seems more communicative than most of the pieces on these records; for the composer's pains, the work has been called by a distinguished English critic "disguised bubblegum music, simple and unprovocative."

The next record contains music for the trombone as played by the well-known virtuoso, Vinko Globokar, one of whose own pieces is included here. This disc is significant for the example it provides of an important trend in avant-garde music—the use of instruments in nontraditional ways involving hitting or rubbing them in order to produce sounds, and in the case of winds and brass, singing, humming, and speaking into them at the same time as tones are being blown. For all the skill involved in the production of sound by such means, the total effect resembles nothing so much as a tuneless one-man band. Globokar's *Discours II* (1967-68) for five trombones has all its parts performed on this recording by the composer alone, through the superimposition of five separately recorded tracks; this is a demonstration of the assignment frequently given to avant-garde performers to play with their recorded selves. The Italian Luciano Berio's *Sequenza V* (1966) has somewhat more energy, and even a certain crude humor, but still only seems to show just how ugly-sounding an instrument the trombone can be. Stockhausen's *Solo* (1966) presents a tape commentary on the trombonist's earlier performance simultaneously with that performance, and finally the Argentine Carlos Osuna's *Consequenza Op. 17* (1966) has as its goal the writing of music of such difficulty that the player is finally forced to give up out of exhaustion.

On the sixth record, the last of the first group, Kagel begins with a viable theatrical idea. *Match* (1964) for three players is written for one cellist scraping on the left, another on the right, and a percussionist who goes from side to side acting as an umpire. This sonic volleyball contest has obvious possibilities for stereophonic recording, and indeed is acoustically effective when reproduced on good equip-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. But as music it is utter thinness. Lacking even theatrical effect is Kagel's long work on the other side of the record. *Music for Renaissance Instruments* (1965-66) is played on, among many other instruments, krumhorns, recorders, bombards, curtals, theorbos, and violas da gamba. The music provides a prime example of how neoclassical music sounds when deprived of quotations from the classics.

THE second group of records begins with improvisations by the Italian *Gruppa Nuova Consonanza* done in 1969. Given the penchant for thinking in extremes so popular in the late 1950's and the 1960's, it was only natural for the retreat from compositorial control to spur the practice of improvisation in performance. And consistent with the political ideology of the late 1960's, the record jacket states that the group aimed at "a collective achievement" in which "the figure hitherto known as the composer is completely robbed of the myth which has surrounded him." But more is lost in this combination of conventionally instrumented and totally electronic works than the *amour propre* of the composer; the fashionable eclecticism of this group's procedures, drawn from jazz and Indian influence as well as chance music, sounds like an unmitigated mess, at once fragmented and boring.

The second record in this group, while perhaps ideologically regressive, sounds more interesting. Zimmermann's *Présence* (1961) is a piano trio—played, that is, by a piano, a violin, and a cello. *Intercommunicazione* (1967) employs a piano-cello duo. The instruments are used fairly normally, and the piano parts, which sometimes sound like the pieces of Messiaen based on bird song, provide a refreshing texture. But here again, as in so much of this music, discontinuity remains a problem, one which all Zimmermann's quotations from Strauss, Debussy, Prokofiev, and even Stockhausen (!) do little to ameliorate.

The third record in this group returns again to the very center of the avant-garde. The first side contains a long effort by John Cage, as confused in its title and indeterminate in its writing as it seems anarchic in sound. The flavor of the piece, title and instrumentation alike, is best conveyed by the notes accompanying the record:

> John Cage: *Atlas Eclipticalis* (1961-62) for 1-98 orchestral players (86 possible parts) and *Winter Music* (1957) for 1-20 pianists may be performed simultaneously, like so many of Cage's works.
>
> All or some of the instruments can be fitted with contact microphones whose outputs can be controlled by a special interpreter, the "assistant to the conductor," according to the graphic notation of Cage's *Cartridge Music* (1960), by means of adjustable electronic amplifiers.

Atlas Eclipticalis is the use of maps of stellar constellations as if the star markings were notes printed on music. *Winter Music* is made up of twenty pages performed in this version by groups of five pianists playing four pages simultaneously; the musical notation is ambiguous, and what is notated is unplayable.

As music this makes no impression at all. But as a sonic environment it conjures up a world without plan, purpose, meaning, or value. The sounds suggest a Rorschach test devised and administered by a Dada psychologist; its meaning is in the eye (ear) of the beholder (listener), and its wit can only be fully appreciated by those who are hostile to the idea of organized social life. All this might well make Cage content, for his "music" is a joke as seriously intended as it must be mockingly hostile. And the butt of the joke is that audience which in the bourgeois past has taken music seriously.

The reverse side of this record presents a vocal and instrumental piece by the German Dieter Schnebel called *Glossolalie* (1959-60, version 1961). Once again, any description other than that on the record jacket could only seem unfair. According to the jacket, the title is the

> "definition of music for speakers and instrumentalists" on 26 unbound pages: a simple material definition of remarkable elasticity. Any composition conforming to this would be a version of the work, and everybody has the right to produce one. The recording on this disc is of Schnebel's own compositional realization. . . .

Just how a nonexistent composition can have a version is a conundrum perhaps never to be solved by traditionalists. In any case, for such traditionalists the piece, with its quasi-nonsense text spoken and sung in hysterical voices, sounds like the ravings of madmen, just as did the speaking in tongues so popular among the religiously inclined young at the end of the last decade. The jacket comments that the "incomparable significance" of this work "is in the fact that composers setting themselves the task which is necessary today to politicizing music can learn from this work's technique the elementary manipulations of this absolutely new *métier*." If this be so, it is clear that underneath whatever politics such art espouses lies the cult of insanity.

THE same subverted ground is covered in the next record, which contains choral pieces by Kagel and, again, Schnebel. Kagel's *Hallelujah* (1967) for sixteen unaccompanied solo voices is meant to be "understood as a masterpiece of rabbinical expounding"; but *Hallelujah* as a song of praise "is in view of the state of the world today an expression of utter scorn." While *Hallelujah* perhaps contains more real music than is usual with Kagel and the rest, this content can only seem an inadequate reward for the philosophical barbarism a listener must endure at the same time. Schnebel's *Für Stimmen* (1956-58, 1964-68), carrying similar ideological baggage, is a collection of the fashionable whimpers, groans, and sobs which make up so much of avant-garde vocal writing.

The next disc is devoted entirely to tape music. The German Gottfried Michael König's *Terminus II* (1966-67) derives all of its sounds from one original electronic noise, the *Urklang*; the sounds succeed each other in the composition in the order in which they were originally produced, or backward.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Though the piece often has a rhythmic beat, it remains lifeless. König's *Funktion Grün* (1967) sounds like a stormy night broadcast over short-wave radio with, it is true, some Oriental noises toward the end. The Hungarian Zoltan Pongrácz's *Phonothese* (1965-66) sounds more refined, but also contains bird beeps, growls of thunder, siren glissandos, and wind murmurs. Finally, the German Rainer Riehn's *Chants de Maldoror* (1965-66, revised 1968-69) is a thin collage, unrelated to Lautréamont's poem, which scatters many long silences among its usual fragments of storms and radio interference.

The last record of the second group is again devoted to Stockhausen. His *Telemusik* (1966) was composed in Tokyo on a six-channel tape recorder in the studios of Japan Radio; its realization on this disc is a two-channel reduction, as are the recorded versions of the other Stockhausen multi-track works in this series. In *Telemusik* the composer writes that he wanted to compose "not 'my' music, but a music of the whole world, of all countries and all races." Toward this end, he included music from Japan, Bali, the Sahara, Hungary, the Amazon, China, Vietnam ("what a wonderful people!"), and "who knows where else." This material is transformed, with the addition of studio-produced material, by electronic manipulation. The result seems varied and perhaps less dependent on tape music's usual reliance on weather effects and the sounds of nature, but again in this case the work's relative brevity is a considerable virtue. *Mixtur* (1964), based upon orchestral sounds as modified by electronic signal generators, is sufficiently imaginative and polished to be judged by aesthetic criteria; what is missing here, as in *Telemusik*, is the possibility of gaining from listening any warm musical satisfaction.

THE third, and last, group of the *Avant-Garde* series begins with a long piece by Kagel, *Der Schall* —"The Sound" (1968). It is scored for such instruments as foghorn, spaghetti tube with trumpet mouthpiece, plastic tubing, garden hose, rubber bands, telephone, nose-flute, and a few conventional winds as well. The result is 37 minutes of mildly interesting drones and rattles, with some very peculiar gasping sounds adding a sinister touch. Because Kagel is here raising basic questions as to "proper" composition and performance, one can readily forgive the absence of the wit which has marked the use of such "instruments" by Hoffnung and Schickele. Unfortunately, Kagel's questions are not raised to be answered, but rather themselves constitute the answers—answers as unproductive as they are unacceptable.

The second record in this last group presents the American Earle Brown's *String Quartet* (1965), in which the players follow a prescribed series of events, whose details are determined by the performers' choices. The piece is only 11 minutes long, and makes a wispy, tenuous impression. Here as in the other pieces on this disc—Ligeti's *Quartet No. 2* (1967-68) in five mostly delicate movements, and the *Quartet No. 3* (1960-61) of the German Wolf Rosenberg—the reliance upon conventional instruments, even if they are not always conventionally used, is itself welcome. Immediately following is a record containing another of Stockhausen's better-known and important works, *Stimmung* (1968). The title is a word with many many meanings in German, among them "tuning," "voicing," and "mood." The work's six unaccompanied singers sing one chord—a dominant seventh on B-flat—for 73 minutes, in ways calculated to stress certain overtones as directed by the composer. In a combination of the efficient new and the comfortable old, the singers are assisted in finding the exactly correct pitches by softly sounding electronic reminders on tape, but as they sing they sit cross-legged in a circle around a low light, much like a campfire. In addition to the vowel sounds, one hears lines of amorous poetry written by Stockhausen, and the repetition of "magic names" of gods and goddesses from many religions, as well as erotic terms. The repetitive, droning effect creates an atmosphere of contemplation, self-absorption, and even passivity; the music serves as background for that ideal trip which seemed in the late 1960's paradise itself.

The next record conceives paradise in rather different terms. The Italian Luc Ferrari's *Presque Rien No. 1* (1970) is a taped sonic environment describing daybreak at the beach. Sounds of birds, dogs, and faintly lapping waters, and muted, indistinct voices can be heard; through the magic of stereophony the "composer" presents a truck driving off from the right speaker to somewhere past the left speaker. It all resembles a soundtrack for a Jacques Tati film. And yet this vaguely nostalgic boredom is more satisfactory than what has gone before on these records, for it makes no pretense to being music. Unfortunately, that pretense makes its return on the other side of this record, which is devoted to Ferrari's *Société II* (1967), subtitled "and if the piano were a female body." Here the tedium is occasionally relieved by the interpolation of real music, including welcome snatches of Liszt's famous *Liebestraum*.

THE fifth record of this last group begins with the American Lukas Foss's *Paradigm* (1968). This combination of notation, improvisation, and chance is divided into "Session — Reading — Recital — Lecture," and is performed with "notes to play and words to speak, whisper, or shout" by a sextet including percussion, electric guitar, violin, clarinet, cello, and tape recorder with other electronics. The result combines loud frenetic passages marked by a heavy, jazz-like beat with quiet, almost inaudible withdrawals. The composition as a whole is sometimes entertaining but mostly dull. Not even this much can be said for the works of another American: Lejaren Hiller's *Algorithms I* (Version I and Version IV—both 1968). These collections of beeps, buzzes, and bangs were composed by means of programs fed into computers and transcribed, on their reemergence, into notation to be played by conventional instruments assisted by the ubiquitous tape recorder. However this music was assembled, it lacks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all vitality, and remains heavy, turgid, and meaningless. Filling out this all-American record is Elliott Schwartz's *Signals* (1968), a duet with shouts for trombone and double-bass. Here the only achievement might be the provision of suitable background music for Hobbes's pessimistic view of the life of man.

The final record begins with still another piece of electronic music bearing a pretentious title, *Cybernetics III* (1969), by the German Roland Kayn. Here the acoustical material is fashioned entirely out of vocal material subjected to almost complete transformation. The result, as is typical of so much tape music, is the replication of the sound of weather, jet planes, and water running down the drain. The series as a whole ends with the Italian Luigi Nono's *Contrappunto dialettico alla mente*—"Dialectical Counterpoint for the Mind" (1968). Nono has made no secret of his Communist sympathies, and this work has an explicit political program based upon such crimes as the murder of Malcolm X and imperial aggression in Vietnam. To dramatize the presentation of his concerns, the composer uses electronically transformed voices along with material produced by square and triangular wave oscillators. Though the piece does have a vague tonality, as a whole it resembles old-fashioned radio drama sound effects, this time yoked to agit-prop purposes. Perhaps the significance of Nono's compositions—this work as well as his other similar political efforts—is the realization of just how much the effectiveness of program music depends on the appeal of the program.

THE Deutsche Grammophon *Avant-Garde* series has passed into history, and it is hardly too much to say that the entire musical movement which it documented is in the process of suffering a similar fate. Audiences the world over continue their chestnut-worshipping ways, closely followed by their leaders, the best performers. The dream of the avant-garde that it might entice a complete generation of alienated and affluent youth to tune in the new has proved chimerical, as has the idea that music can be revolution by another name. And although related music—sometimes called by new names and often written by new figures—continues to be produced, the intellectual excitement seems gone, and the classical avant-gardists themselves appear dispirited and disunited. Their own corrosive dissatisfaction with what they have done in the past generation is convincingly demonstrated by their restless search—always so marked in the cases of Cage and Stockhausen—for ever newer, ever more *outré* ways to reach any kind of audience at all.

What went wrong to dash the high hopes of so many young, bright, and talented minds? Why has so much effort left so little of permanent value in its wake? One cannot but be aware of the danger of making sweeping judgments on the basis of even as generous a sample as that contained on these eighteen records. Of course, hundreds and hundreds of composers wrote advanced music in the postwar period without having their works represented on the Deutsche Grammophon series. And as has already been mentioned, mainstream music—a category probably wide enough to include someone as involved in the past with the avant-garde as Pierre Boulez—continues to be written and performed and even to some extent appreciated. But the Deutsche Grammophon series nevertheless does cover the main postwar modernist trends of control, chance, improvisation, theater music, and non-music; it is, furthermore, fairly eclectic in its choice of composers and brilliantly recorded.

The most striking evidence these records provide is, it seems to me, the failure of electronic means of musical composition and performance. After 1945—and for Cage even earlier—it seemed as if electricity was an Aladdin's Lamp, capable of providing composers with total control over the production of music and its realization. But in place of this grandiose dream of unimaginable power eternally wielded, the reality of electricity's coldness and lifelessness, and the horrid invariability of sounds fossilized on tape became clear—at least to all those not professionally involved. Not only did the tape composer's ability to make any sound he might desire—so convenient with the new keyboard synthesizers—prove destructive of the hierarchy of sounds which had previously divided music from noise; performers now found that easy amplification of their efforts, divorced from physical labor, devalued performance. So electronic music has become a vehicle for Walter Carlos's gutting of the classics, for rock bands and movie soundtracks, for sonic environments, TV commercials, and white noise to sleep by.

No more successful has been the attempt to force normal instruments beyond their conventional use. Though the range of possible sounds has in general been greatly increased, the new techniques on wind and string instruments have mostly proved either hard to hear or no more than mere eccentricities. Furthermore, the use of the inside of the piano as a playing field —so attractive to children and to people who don't play the piano conventionally very well—has produced effects of limited variability, weak audibility (unless amplified), and musical sterility. And the whole panoply of performance techniques based upon aggression —hitting and banging instruments under the guise of using them as percussion—reflects only the widespread dissatisfaction and anger with traditional music among the avant-garde.

IT IS significant that there has been some attempt made to conceal the extent to which this movement has been a real, albeit failed, revolution. Like most revolutions—especially those in trouble—this one has increasingly looked for roots in the past, finding forebears in Bach and Mozart, Liszt and Wagner, Debussy and Bartók. And the revolution's fellow-travelers, consistent with their nature, manage to approve the most shocking provocations on the grounds of the necessity of the new, while always being quick to defend the provocateurs' backsliding on grounds of their reconciliation with tradition. And, as has so often happened with revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions in the past, the results of the avant-garde movement turned out to be the opposite of what had been intended. The desire for logical organization of musical material turned into a total serialism which left no room for creative contingency. The desire for freedom from serialism produced random sounds; the writing of continuously varied notes produced monotony. The return to some sort of recognizable harmonic structure produced the boredom of *Stimmung*'s one chord. New musical sounds turned out to be noise. Freedom from the vagaries of performers produced improvisation, in which nothing remained except performance. And most unhappily, the reaction against the extra-musical associations of romantic program music left composition almost wholly dependent upon conceptual schemes and written explanations.

SOMETHING of the extent of the avant-garde's failure can be seen from a sad and ironic little record, now also out of print, containing Mauricio Kagel's contribution to the Beethoven bicentennial celebration of 1970.* Though Kagel seems to have felt that the best tribute would be not to play this music at all, he nonetheless had the idea of making an avant-garde collage from passages in some of Beethoven's most beautiful and familiar pieces. Treating Beethoven's music as he might treat his own, he subjects the passages on this record to every structural indignity, combining them, mixing them, and tearing them almost apart. Yet these samples of Beethoven, momentarily intact in melody, rhythm, and harmony, continue to resonate, casting their spell across the centuries. Kagel has thus taught us, regardless of his own ambivalence, something about the nature of musical immortality. No friend of new music can be happy with the implications of such a lesson.

* *Ludwig van.* DG 2530 014.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books in Review

At the United Nations

A DANGEROUS PLACE. By DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN with SUZANNE WEAVER. *Atlantic-Little, Brown. 297 pp. $12.50.*

Reviewed by BERNARD LEWIS

FOR a few months in 1975 and 1976, Daniel Patrick Moynihan was United States Ambassador to the United Nations. His brief tenure, which forms the theme of this book, attracted to the proceedings of the United Nations a degree of attention which they have not often received before or since. At that time, I had as temporary neighbor a distinguished social scientist from the West Indies, and, as a chorus of condemnation began to gather strength and volume, denouncing Ambassador Moyhnihan for what was described as his offensive and insulting demeanor toward Third World countries, my neighbor took a diametrically opposite point of view. Far from being offended by Ambassador Moynihan's remarks, he was delighted with them. "For the first time," he said, "an American politician is treating us as responsible adults." This, he said, made a welcome change from the normal tendency to treat Third World nations and their representatives as neurotic children or, at best, retarded adolescents to be humored and cared for but not taken seriously.

The prevailing attitude was well-illustrated in the affair of the Spanish terrorists to which Moynihan devotes a few pages in this account of his mission. In mid-September 1975, the Spanish government announced that five terrorists convicted of murdering policemen would be executed. This was routinely denounced by the Soviets and their clients, and received with genuine outrage by liberal opinion in Europe and America, which tried to influence the Spanish government with pleas and protests and appeals. An attempt to use this as a means to maneuver the United States into defending Franco was adroitly foiled by Moynihan, who by joining Franco's accusers was able to score some telling points against them. This was a normal example of the double standard which had been institutionalized at the United Nations—the denunciation and condemnation of offenses against human rights by a right-wing government while offenses by left-wing dictatorships pass unnoticed.

But there is another aspect of the matter besides the double standard between Right and Left. There is also the double standard between black and white. While General Franco was being condemned for his executions, President Amin in Uganda was killing black Ugandans in numbers and by methods which made Francoist Spain look like a family Christmas party. Liberal opinion, however, though outraged by events in Spain, remained unmoved by what was happening in Uganda. There are two possible explanations of this silence. One is that white victims are so much more important than black victims that five Spaniards count for more than thousands of Ugandans. The other is that higher standards of behavior are expected from a European, even a Spanish fascist government, than from an African ruler. Either of these explanations would indicate a profoundly racist attitude.

But in the surrealist politics of the United Nations, none of this mattered. True or false, right or wrong, just or unjust—all such questions were irrelevant to the battle of the blocs. When the organization was founded there were two main groups—the West and the Soviet Union. Given the predominance of the West at that time, special arrangements were made to redress the balance in favor of the Soviet Union, which was allowed two additional votes for two of its component republics, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. These possessed far less independence than the states of, say, Delaware or Rhode Island, but probably not much less than Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. Since the foundation of the organization, the balance of forces has changed greatly to the advantage of the Soviets. This is due not so much to the increase in the number of Communist states, though here too there has been some erosion, as to the emergence of two new blocs. One of these is the Arab bloc, which has increased its voting strength from the original five to the present twenty-one and, in addition, gained enormous financial resources. Another is the so-called nonaligned bloc consisting predominantly of Third World nations.

Of these four blocs, Western, Soviet, Arab, and nonaligned, only two, the Soviets and the Arabs, have enjoyed any unity of purpose and policy. The West has been deeply divided by rivalries among the states composing it and by irresolution and uncertainty within the leadership of its most important nation, the United States. The Soviet bloc, being centrally directed and commanded, operates like a well-drilled phalanx in all agencies of the United Nations. The Arab bloc, though split by serious conflicts within itself, was until recently completely unanimous in its policy on the struggle against Israel, which for most of the Arab states has constituted the be-all and end-all of their international relations. The nonaligned states have negative rather than positive features in common, and tend to gravitate toward one or

BERNARD LEWIS *is Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and a long-term member of the Institute for Advanced Study. Among his many works are* The Arabs in History, The Middle East and the West, *and* History—Remembered, Recovered, and Invented.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another of the most important blocs. The Arab carrot and the Russian stick have proved a powerful combination.

THERE is in the Euphrates area where Syria and Iraq meet, near the Turkish frontier, a little-known Kurdish sect called the Yazidis, an aberrant offshoot separated from Islam at an early date. They are described by their neighbors as devil worshippers. This is a slander. The Yazidis are in fact dualists, surviving holders of a religious belief, once widespread in the Middle East, that there is not one but two eternal spirits, one of good, the other of evil, contending for the domination of the universe. Since the good spirit is by definition good and will remain so, the Yazidis devote most of their worship to propitiating the spirit of evil. Given their assumptions, this makes good sense. It is, thus, unfair to call their beliefs devil worship; they might more appropriately be described as theological nonalignment.

Similar considerations affect the policies of many countries at the United Nations. To attract or offend the Soviet Union can be dangerous; to differ from the Arabs, costly and perhaps also hazardous. To attack the United States and its policies, on the other hand, brings no penalties. On the contrary, in addition to gratifying the Soviet bloc and its allies, attacking the United States wins acclaim and respect from large segments of American opinion, including many policy-makers and, above all, the media. In these circumstances, the choice is not difficult, and it is not surprising that before very long the United States found itself in a permanent minority, where the best it could hope for was abstentions by its more devoted and loyal friends.

Many observers, and even participants, have come to take this as a normal state of affairs and, when challenged, dismiss what happens at the United Nations as being in any case unimportant and without effect. Many, but not all. In February 1974, Moynihan, at that time American Ambassador in India, delivered an address on the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Woodrow Wilson, an expanded version of which appeared in COMMENTARY in May of the same year ("Was Woodrow Wilson Right?"). In this article, Moyhihan set forth a strategy "for the United States deliberately and consistently to bring its influence to bear on behalf of those regimes which promise the largest degree of personal and national liberty." In the following year, these ideas were modified and developed in a further article, "The United States in Opposition," also published in COMMENTARY, arguing that the United States must recognize that it was now a minority and an opposition, and conduct itself accordingly. The move from apology to opposition, he said, "would be painful to American spokesmen but it could be liberating also. It is past time we cease to apologize for an imperfect democracy. Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our initial—not a little condescending—supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled."

The article attracted considerable attention at the time, not least from Secretary of State Kissinger, who called Moynihan "to say that he had read it through at one sitting and had to tell me straight off that he found it 'staggeringly good.'" Not long after, Moynihan was offered the post of Ambassador to the United Nations and given an opportunity to put his ideas into practice. This book is an account of his mission, written with the wit and fire for which he has been both praised and blamed, and with a devastating frankness in exposing errors and failures, his own not excluded.

ALMOST from the start he was impeded by strong opposition, more effectively from his own side than from his opponents. Powerful arguments were adduced against the case which he presented—that he was flamboyant, discourteous, self-seeking, needlessly offensive. Even if these accusations were well founded, they would in no sense constitute a reply to the well-reasoned case which Moynihan made

GOD AND THE ASTRONOMERS

BY ROBERT JASTROW

Dr. Jastrow tells the story of the reactions of scientists when their own findings force them to confront the mystery that religions have immemorially called God.

"A marvel of clarity on an apocalyptic theme."
—John Barkham Reviews

"GOD AND THE ASTRONOMERS explores the theological implications of the Big Bang theory of creation... Dr. Jastrow traces the history of the dispute imaginatively."
—People Magazine

At your local bookstore, or use coupon to order direct



W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC. C3
500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036

Please send me_____copy(ies) of GOD AND THE ASTRONOMERS by Robert Jastrow at $7.95 each (publisher pays postage). If not completely satisfied I may return the book(s) within 10 days for full refund. I enclose $_____check or money order.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State & Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in his articles, his speeches, and now in this book. His real offense was that he did not share the fashionable feeling of guilt, with its arrogant assumption of ultimate responsibility for all that goes wrong as well as right, and its patronizing tendency to treat smaller and weaker nations as smaller and weaker beings. A second and almost equally important offense was that he refused to wrap his meaning in layers of verbiage, but insisted on making speeches which were frank, direct, and, greatest crime of all, easily understandable.

It could not last, and after a tenure of only eight months he was placed in a situation where there was nothing for him to do but offer his resignation. This, it would appear, was gratefully accepted.

Nevertheless, those eight months were rich in accomplishment. It is true that in the battlefield of the General Assembly there was a sequence of defeats, notable among them the passage of the famous anti-Zionist resolution and the ignominious withdrawal of the American proposal for a universal amnesty for political prisoners. It is significant, however, that the majorities cast against American proposals, or in favor of anti-American proposals, were during this period, on the whole, smaller, not greater, than had become and has since remained the norm. This would seem to dispose of the accusation that Moynihan by needless aggressiveness antagonized Third World nations which might otherwise have supported the American line. Their anti-colonial fervor against the American presence in Puerto Rico and Saint Thomas as contrasted with their extremely cautious responses to Russo-Cuban activities in Africa or Vietnamese expansion in Indochina would seem to suggest otherwise.

Moynihan's policy, carried through logically, might have injected some reality into the debates of the United Nations and given it a positive role in international politics. But this did not happen. Instead, the corruption of the United Nations has continued and has been greatly worsened by the normalization of falsehood and intimidation, now essential features of the procedures of the United Nations as of the majority of the regimes which constitute its membership.

THERE was a time when high hopes were placed in the United Nations, which was to succeed where its predecessor, the League of Nations, had failed, and truly become the parliament of mankind. This particular aspiration was impossible from the start and arose from a confusion between diplomatic and parliamentary relationships and processes. The United Nations may be a Reichstag or a Soviet; it can never be a parliament. It might well, however, have served some other useful functions, notably in the cause of peace and human decency. Instead, it has become, in the words of the late Tibor Szamuely, an organization for the conservation of conflict, so that when, after thirty years, a first attempt was made to negotiate an Arab-Israel peace, all parties agreed on one thing if nothing else—that to give their negotiation any chance of success, it must be kept away from the explosive and contaminating influence of the United Nations. It is indeed "a dangerous place," and Senator Moynihan's lively, detailed, and remarkably outspoken account of his own term of service may help to warn us against some of its dangers.

Pillow Talk

THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY. VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION. By MICHEL FOUCAULT. Translated by ROBERT HURLEY. *Pantheon. 333 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by
MICHAEL VANNOY ADAMS

MICHEL FOUCAULT is a French intellectual who has become an international celebrity. A historian of ideas and institutions, Foucault has written in a clever and ironic way on madness and reason in the Enlightenment, and on the asylum, the clinic, and the prison—three institutions of confinement and correction among which he has established a virtual equivalence by means of juxtaposition and innuendo. Rather than an intellectual historian, however, Foucault prefers to call himself an "archeologist of knowledge." By this he means to distance himself from the way historians usually write history, tracing origins, influences, and traditions, and detailing the impact of personalities on the past. By contrast, Foucault the archeologist pretends to be a "pre-historian," excavating an open site, carefully unearthing and sifting one layer of knowledge, or "*episteme*," at a time and examining the anonymous artifacts on that one level alone.

According to Foucault, what we choose to call knowledge at a particular period depends on how we use words to order things. (Foucault's best book is *Les Mots et les choses*, translated into English as *The Order of Things*.) Strictly speaking, Foucault is thus neither an idealist nor a materialist but a verbalist, who believes that our universe of "discourse" (*the* trend-word of today) determines our organization of "reality," and therefore what and how we know.

Foucault's current project is a six-volume history of sexuality. This is not, one should emphasize, a history of sex. It is not sex itself that matters, Foucault says, but how, and how much, we talk about it. Rather than a chronicle of sexual activity, his work-in-progress is a study of sexual "discourse"; that is, of sex as a topic of conversation in Western civilization over roughly the last four centuries.

In this introductory volume, Foucault challenges the conventional psychohistorical view of the modern period as an Age of Repression from which we are only now liberating ourselves. Historians who psychoanalyze Western civilization detect a great increase in repression from the 17th through the 19th century and draw a causal connection between this and the simultaneous growth of capitalism. The work ethic, they argue, is our reality principle. In the name of morality (a euphemism for the economic rationality that is the very spirit of

MICHAEL VANNOY ADAMS *teaches English at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capitalism) we severely restrict the scope of play and pleasure: sex is not for recreation but for procreation. In the Victorian age, after the Industrial Revolution, repression reached truly neurotic heights. Now, however, we are on the verge of a new era, the Age of Sexual Liberation.

THIS is the gist of the argument made by Herbert Marcuse and other Freudian leftists in the 60's. Although Foucault is a leftist by sentiment and a psychologist by education, he begs to differ with those Marxists for whom sexual repression is proof of the economic oppression of one class by another (and therefore an article of revolutionary faith), and he rejects in no uncertain terms their interpretation of history. The facts, he says, force us to "abandon the hypothesis that modern industrial societies [i.e., capitalist ones] ushered in an age of increased sexual repression." On the contrary, we have been and are still living in an Age of Confession, a time of talk, talk, and more talk about sex. The curious and crucial fact of our recent past is not that we have been censored but that we have been incited to such loquacity. Far from there being a conspiracy of silence, sexuality is "the noisiest of our preoccupations."

Foucault says that for at least three centuries our collective conscience has been not a censor but a confessor, urging us to reveal the most intimate facts of our lives, as if a full disclosure guaranteed the discovery of an ultimate truth, the secret of our sexuality. From the Inquisition to the questionnaire, from the penitent to the patient, Foucault traces the development of our discursive universe. Our past religious discourse gives rise to our present secular discourse and, in this case, to a conversation that makes an issue of sexuality and couches that issue in scientific terms.

According to Foucault, our pervasive concern with phrasing problems in a scientific way (as if they had solutions) is a psychohistorical quirk and compulsion. That we have a science of sexuality instead of an art of love, as other civilizations have had, is significant. The relentless pursuit of truth, the "will to knowledge," is simply the form the will to power assumes in our time. (The French title of Foucault's introductory volume is *La Volonté de savoir*.) Thus Foucault grounds his sexual history in a Nietzschean volition that is also a coercion. The practical function of this volition is not to repress but to order our sexuality, to administer, manage, and regulate it. Foucault promises to discuss in future volumes the establishment of order in the sexual lives of four symbolic figures: the hysterical woman; the masturbatory child; the Malthusian couple; and the perverse adult. These psychological types are points of departure, intentionally provocative and necessarily provisional, for a program of research into the sources of sexual

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS

Raul Hilberg

"(An) important book—a massive, documented, sociological study of the greatest planned crime in history." —HUGH TREVOR-ROPER, *New Statesman*

"*The Destruction of the European Jews*, Raul Hilberg notes in the early pages of this monumental volume, is not about the Jews but about the savagery of their destroyers. It is about the bureaucracy of mass murder; about the historical antecedents, precedents, and cultural preparation for that mass murder; about the thousands of bureaucrats and ordinary citizens and workers who were in daily complicity with that mass murder.... no citizen of any organized society, including that of free America, can escape the implications of Hilberg's study." —CYNTHIA OZICK

CN 660 $8.95

"Few books possess the power to leave the reader with the feeling of awareness that we call a sense of revelation. *The Cunning of History* seems to me to be one of these.... Rubenstein is forcing us to reinterpret the meaning of Auschwitz—especially, though not exclusively, from the standpoint of its existence as part of a continuum of slavery that has been engrafted for centuries onto the very body of Western civilization." —WILLIAM STYRON, from the Introduction

CN 597 $2.95

The Cunning of History
The Holocaust and the American Future
Richard L. Rubenstein

NEW PAPERBACKS FROM HARPER & ROW
10 East 53d Street
New York, NY 10022

839

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knowledge and power in the "will" of Western civilization, and into the effectiveness of "confession" as a technique of social control.

THIS is a large undertaking and a suspect one. If this introductory volume, itself hardly more than an abstract and an advertisement, is a fair indication of what is in the offing from Foucault, he is guilty of more than enough questionable practices to raise real doubts about the entire enterprise.

First, the definition of key terms like "repression." Foucault's claim to originality rests on his repudiation of the idea that there has been a visible increase in repression since the coming of capitalism. One of the great disappointments of this book is the sudden realization that Foucault uses "repression" in a whimsical way. For Freud, repression is the strictly internal process by which *thought* is excluded from the conscious and confined in the unconscious. It is an involuntary forgetting and a hopeless attempt at remembering. The repressed is what we *cannot*, try as we may, even think about.

The concept of repression is so closely associated with Freud's name that anyone, certainly a psychologist like Foucault, who decides to change the meaning to suit himself, ought to have at least enough intellectual courtesy (honesty?) to inform the reader. Marcuse does this in *Eros and Civilization* when he says: " 'Repression' and 'repressive' are used [by me] in the non-technical sense to designate both conscious and unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint, constraint, and suppression." As a Marxist, Marcuse broadens the Freudian definition in an attempt to link sexual repression with economic oppression. For Marcuse, repression is the process by which *action* is prohibited or inhibited; the repressed in his view is what we must not act out.

For Foucault, repression is yet something else: an external process by which *speech* is censored; the repressed is merely what we must not speak about. Thus Foucault, without alerting the reader, applies the term neither to consciousness (as Freud does) nor to behavior (as Marcuse does) but selectively to discourse, and uses "repression" as a synonym for "censorship" in a simplistic and capricious way. By a disingenuous bit of prevarication he is thus able to call our recent past the Age of Confession instead of the Age of Repression. It is all, finally, a quibble.

Second, Foucault needs to explain his power principle and the logic, if there is any, to its operation in history. Is it a human instinct, and is the will to knowledge one of its historical vicissitudes? If so, why does knowledge, instead of some other manifestation or permutation of power, suddenly assume such importance? Is it an accident of history? Or is there a good reason, a perfectly sensible one, for our ambition to know? Why do we value scientific discourse so highly at the moment? Is it simply our peculiar psychohistorical obsession, a queer fixation? Is our present "*episteme*" a more accurate way of construing reality than past ones? Or is one universe of discourse just as arbitrary as another? Is science a conceit? In short, do we show historical improvement in the way we use words to order things? If Foucault is as much a relativist as he seems to be, he owes his readers an explanation of his own project concerning the will to knowledge. Is he trying to discover some new and true fact about our sexuality, or is his "history" merely an exercise in virtuosity and futility—an entertainment for dilettantes at Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and Yale? Does "charlatan," a French word, order a French thing like the Foucault phenomenon?

Finally, Foucault needs to repress his own discourse. What he lacks in terminological exactitude he more than makes up for in rhetorical extravagance; this is not fine style but sheer sensationalism. The effect (if not the intent) is to

"A disturbing, provocative journal, beautifully written, sharp and strong in viewpoint." —*Publishers Weekly*

From Boston to Berkeley, London to Paris to Cairo, novelist and social critic Joan Colebrook surveyed the revolutionary currents during the late 1960s. Here she offers, through entries in a personal journal, "a vivid picture at firsthand and close up of the destructiveness of a a whole generation. As a living historical document, a chunk of raw history, this book is priceless."—*William Barrett.*
"Recommended."—*Library Journal.*

Innocents of the West
Travels Through the Sixties
Joan Colebrook

$15.00 at bookstores,
or direct from the publisher.
BASIC BOOKS, INC.
10 East 53rd St., New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

startle the unsuspecting reader into mistaking novelty of expression for originality in ideas, and to compromise the chance for a critical exchange on the real issue, our sexual history.

The Presidency

WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION. By PHILIP B. KURLAND. *University of Chicago Press. 256 pp. $12.50.*

Reviewed by PETER H. SCHUCK

CHARLES DE GAULLE once quipped that generals are always fighting the last war. Now comes Philip Kurland, inadvertently demonstrating that civilians are also prey to such myopia. In this book, he seeks to erect his own Maginot Line to contain the tyranny of what he and others call the "imperial Presidency." Unfortunately, that fortification has about as much relevance to contemporary American political forces as static defenses had to the strategic imperatives of World War II.

In truth, Kurland has written two books combined into a single volume. The first, an analysis of a number of constitutional issues raised by the various political confrontations of the Watergate years, is a detailed, often insightful, exegesis by a scholar steeped in constitutional learning. The second, an account of the "imperial Presidency," is conventional and superficial in its diagnosis, and tendentious in its prescriptions.

Six chapters, the most valuable in the book, are devoted to areas of activity in which the Constitution allocates power among the President, Congress, and the courts: the congressional power of investigation; executive privilege; judicial review; the power to appoint and remove federal officials; the power to impeach and convict; and the power to prosecute and pardon. For each issue, Kurland carefully reviews the raw materials—the text of the Constitution, debates in the Constitutional Convention, judicial decisions, the *Federalist Papers*—from which lawyers and judges have attempted to distill contemporary meaning from a document written during the reign of Louis XVI.

What we see in these pages is the grand spectacle of men and institutions embroiled in conflicts among fundamental values and driven by political necessity. The struggles between Congress's need for information to discharge its legislative functions and the rights of those accused of criminal conduct; between the President's need to control his subordinates and Congress's right to specify the terms of their appointment and removal; or between the independence of each branch and the overall system of

PETER H. SCHUCK *was until recently Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy.*

THE THINKING MAN'S DIET...



JEWS AND THE LEFT
Arthur Liebman, *The State University of New York, Binghamton*
Arthur Liebman has written a bold and daring assessment of the relationship between American Jews and the left—from the 1880s to the present. Unlike any book on the subject, he has meticulously analyzed the rise *and* fall of socialism among Jews in this country and proposes startling and explosive predictions for the future! Liebman brings together, as never before, an incredibly rich body of resources—revealing interviews, enriching archival materials, and an extensive body of secondary sources—providing a lively first-hand account of this important subject. 0 471 53433-1 April 1979 approx. 704 pp. $18.95 (tent.)

ON SYNTHESIZING MARXISM AND CHRISTIANITY
Dale Vree, *Stanford University*
"I have learned more from [this] book than from any book I have read in recent years."—**Eric Hoffer**
For the last fifteen years there's been an international dialogue between Marxists and Christians in an attempt to blend these diverse conceptions into a coherent whole. This eye-opening book dispassionately analyzes these attempts and clearly delineates the stakes involved. It deals directly with the synthesizing process and uses a methodology inspired by the tradition of analytic philosophy.
0 471 01603-9 1976 206 pp. $16.95

CHILDREN OF FANTASY
The First Rebels of Greenwich Village
Robert E. Humphrey, *Mt. Mercy College*
"A good deal of serious analysis...reaffirms the picture of Greenwich Village in the teens as an important community where people tried to show that life had a purpose greater than the accumulation of money."—New Republic
0 471 42100-6 1978 267 pp. $14.95

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE, a division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario

Please send the books indicated for 15-DAY FREE EXAMINATION. (Restricted to the continental U.S. and Canada.)
☐ Liebman, *JEWS* AND THE LEFT 0 471 53433-1 ☐ Vree, ON SYNTHESIZING *MARXISM* AND CHRISTIANITY 0 471 01603-9 ☐ Humphrey, CHILDREN OF *FANTASY* 0 471 42100-6
Mail to: WILEY-INTERSCIENCE, P.O. Box 092, Somerset, N.J. 08873
☐ Payment enclosed, plus sales tax. Wiley pays postage/handling. We normally ship within 10 days. If shipment cannot be made within 90 days, payment will be refunded.
☐ Bill me. ☐ Bill firm or institution.
NAME_____
AFFILIATION_____
ADDRESS_____
CITY_____ STATE/ZIP_____
Prices subject to change without notice. 092 A 3628-55

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

So we won't forget.

At least once every two years, Lyle Stuart publishes a book to remind people of what happened in Germany under Hitler.



A GALLERY OF NAZIS

edited by Morris Cargill* attempts to catalog the principals responsible for the holocaust.

Fanning out from the top of the Nazi pyramid to its broad base, this book offers photographs and succinct biographies of the men and women responsible for the ten years of terror that devastated Europe and left millions dead in its wake.

A GALLERY OF NAZIS

is a book that shows what the leading Nazis (and some of those who supported them in America) looked like.

At least a third of the book is composed of photographs of the concentration camps and the horrors done there in the name of "a greater Germany."

A GALLERY OF NAZIS

was a year in the making as Morris Cargill searched through thousands of photographs to select the hundreds reproduced here.

*Cargill has been Jamaica's leading newspaper columnist for twenty-five years.

$12. (If ordering by mail, add $3 for United Parcel Service delivery.)

Published by Lyle Stuart Inc.
120 Enterprise Avenue
Secaucus, N.J. 07094.

checks and balances—these and other battles are not simply power grabs by one political institution or another. More fundamentally, they are spasmodic bursts of energy corresponding to certain basic shifts in the underlying distribution of power. The law ordinarily does not generate those shifts but is rather a symptom of them.

Kurland, however, fails to examine these shifts, and the consequence is that his political analysis—his "second book"—cannot withstand close scrutiny. Consider these assertions, each of which is demonstrably false: "Political parties . . . have come to dominate American political affairs"; federalism "has all but disappeared"; the "system of separation of powers and checks and balances . . . is now so debilitated as hardly to be recognizable"; presidential power over foreign relations "explains both Korea and Vietnam"; Congress lacks the will "to act as a strong counterforce to the executive authority." These examples could easily be multiplied.

To Kurland, the critical challenge to American democracy is the "imperial Presidency"—a phrase borrowed from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (as is its close cousin, the "plebiscitary Presidency"). Kurland correctly notes that liberal scholars have long rationalized such presidential power, although he declines to observe that Schlesinger himself was perhaps the leading apologist for what Schlesinger now denounces. He emphasizes that modern Presidents seek to acquire power through a combination of manipulation, leadership, ideology, and public relations.

This observation is correct, but essentially irrelevant. The important question is not whether Presidents pursue power—they all do, to a greater or lesser extent—but whether they are able to amass enough of it to resolve the political and policy issues which governing requires them to address. Without really focusing on this question, Kurland nevertheless implies an affirmative response.

In fact, our problem as a political society today lies in precisely the opposite direction—in the risks of a depleted Presidency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To be sure, the formal legal *authority* of the Presidency has steadily increased, due primarily to large delegations of power by Congress to the bureaucracy. But the *power* of the President—his ability to work his will on the body politic—has not increased in the last decade; indeed, it has probably declined relative to the challenges facing him, quite apart from the talents of any particular incumbent.

THE main sources of a President's power are his influence with Congress, his control of the executive branch, and his ability to mold public opinion. Each of these levers has been seriously weakened in recent years.

The current President's influence with Congress, for example, is relatively limited despite substantial Democratic majorities. The decline of the party machinery and party discipline is an important factor, but there are others as well. Fragmentation of power *within* Congress makes presidential negotiation an endless—and often fruitless—process, for the congressional leadership cannot "deliver" what it cannot control. The advantages of incumbency in Congress, always great, have been further enhanced, making members less dependent upon the President or the party for support. Congress, by massively increasing its staff, its own analytic capability, and its leverage over the budgetary process, has achieved an institutional independence from the executive branch which would have seemed impossible even a decade ago. And younger, issue-oriented members have entered Congress eager to make their reputations by doing battle with the White House, even one occupied by a President from their own party.

If Presidents have difficulty working their will on the Congress, they have not fared much better with the executive establishment, whose dramatic growth in recent decades has created a formidable barrier to White House management and control. More and more of the work of government is done by regulatory agencies which are, by design or in fact, remarkably independent of the White House. Congress has created many new ones during the last decade, while expanding both the jurisdictions and the budgets of the older ones.

Congress has interposed itself between the President and the agencies in other ways as well. The congressional budget process; Congress's readiness to undermine budget discipline imposed on agencies by the White House; and a torrent of hearings, investigations, inquiries, and other demands from a swollen congressional establishment—such pressures require a bureaucratic responsiveness to Congress which rivals the officials' loyalty to their agency superiors. Bureaucratic allegiance to the President's program is further attenuated by agency alliances with outside constituencies, an erosion of discipline that steadily deepens as the President's

STUDIES IN ECONOMIC THEORY

INTRODUCING A DISTINGUISHED NEW BOOK SERIES

CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE
by Ludwig M. Lachmann
156 Pages, Index
$15.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE An Essay on Method
by Ludwig von Mises,
Introduction by Israel M. Kirzner
168 Pages, Index
$15.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

ECONOMICS AS A COORDINATION PROBLEM
The Contributions of Friedrich A. Hayek
by Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr.
Foreword by F.A. Hayek
240 Pages, Index
$15.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
Edited with an Introduction by Louis M. Spadaro
256 Pages, Index
$15.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MARKET PROCESS Essays on the Theory of the Market Economy
by Ludwig M. Lachmann, Edited with an Introduction by Walter E. Grinder
360 Pages, Index
$15.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE
A Treatise on Economic Principles
by Murray N. Rothbard
1005 Pages, Index
$30.00 Cloth (2 Volumes), $10.00 Paper

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
Edited with an Introduction by Edwin G. Dolan
248 Pages, Index
$12.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

CAPITAL, INTEREST, AND RENT
Essays in the Theory of Distribution
by Frank A. Fetter
Edited with an Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard
408 Pages, Index
$12.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW
An Essay in the History of Economic Thought
by Israel M. Kirzner
Introduction by Laurence S. Moss
248 Pages, Index
$12.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION
by Murray N. Rothbard
381 Pages, Index
$12.00 Cloth, $4.95 Paper ($5.50 in Canada)

THE ECONOMICS OF LUDWIG VON MISES Toward a Critical Reappraisal
Edited with an Introduction by Laurence S. Moss
140 Pages, Index
$12.00 Cloth, $3.95 Paper ($4.50 in Canada)

Forthcoming titles in the Studies in Economic Theory series will feature major new works by contemporary Austrian economists plus republication of such seminal classics as:

Principles of Economics, by Carl Menger
Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society, by T.J.B. Hoff
Epistemological Problems of Economics, by Ludwig von Mises

The series will also include translations of previously inaccessible writings by Carl Menger, Richard Strigl, Ewald Schams. Leo Schönfeld-Illy, Ludwig von Mises, and others.

For free catalog please write:

Cato Institute
Department C
1700 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94111

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grip on his agencies loosens. These constituencies, whether they be maritime unions, agribusiness firms, or child-welfare groups, can supply agencies with resources that the President often lacks—influence with key Congressmen, information which the agency needs, and assistance and support in the operation of programs.

Finally, a President's power to mold public opinion—a key ingredient of the "imperial Presidency"—has certainly declined during the last decade, although it remains considerable. He now confronts a big-city press which emits a steady stream of criticism and thrives on an atmosphere of crisis. Like a predator which has wounded its more powerful prey (in at least one case, mortally) and has come to enjoy the stalking and to savor the taste, the press is fat, sassy, and poised for new conquests. As for the public, its contempt for politicians, always profound, is growing, and, at least since the incumbency of Richard Nixon, has come to include the occupant of the White House as well.

IF THE Presidency remains, in Teddy Roosevelt's phrase, a "bully pulpit," its preachments are increasingly lost in the cacophony of competing theologies. The proliferation during recent years of business organizations, environmental and consumer groups, women's groups, "public-interest" law firms, and other special constituencies is certainly unprecedented. Even more important than the number of such interests (which, as Madison argued almost two centuries ago, are a safeguard against tyranny), is their degree of organization and their ideological, crusading approach to political issues. The proliferation of single-issue organizations, such as "right-to-life" or ERA groups, coupled with the decline of political parties and other broader-based institutions, has greatly restricted the negotiating, mediating, and moralizing space of politicians, including Presidents. As articulator of a political vision or a moral direction, Presidents have lost their distinctive claim to our attention; their voice is like that of a merchant in a crowded bazaar, audible but overwhelmed by the general din.

To conclude that the depleted Presidency reflects some fundamental shifts in our society is certainly not to say that it will necessarily be a permanent feature of our political life, for there are also countervailing forces tending toward enlargement of presidential power. In the meantime, however, American politics will continue to drift in a vacuum of leadership inimical to coherent policy direction. There are virtues in such a system, to be sure. But whether it can sustain and resolve the genuine crises which lie ahead is a serious question which, in today's anti-politics mood, is receiving little attention. It is indeed disappointing that this book offers us no clues to answering such questions. Fixated on Watergate, Philip Kurland has unwittingly turned Santayana's famous dictum on its head: by mistaking a historical event for historical truth, he has been condemned to learn the wrong lessons from it.

The definitive biography of the man.
An extraordinary history of the nation.

Drawing on his own close personal relationship and on previously unavailable firsthand sources—including David Ben-Gurion's secret files—Michael Bar-Zohar has written the ultimate biography of Israel's principal founding father. Inevitably his book is also a complete, behind-the-scenes history of Israel itself—shedding new light on Ben-Gurion's feud with Chaim Weizmann, on his astounding undercover diplomacy, on the Suez War and Sinai Campaign, and on Ben-Gurion's own human vulnerability in personal relationships. $12.95 at bookstores.



delacorte press
DELL PUBLISHING CO. INC.

Modernism and Beyond

A REVOLUTION IN TASTE: STUDIES OF DYLAN THOMAS, ALLEN GINSBERG, SYLVIA PLATH, AND ROBERT LOWELL. By LOUIS SIMPSON. *Macmillan. 198 pp. $12.95.*

Reviewed by JAMES ATLAS

"IF YOU want to be a writer, write!" declares an obscure English novelist in one of Louis Simpson's poems. "Write reviews. Write articles. Write anything." This seems sound advice in a time when literature has succumbed to a sort of division of labor: the poets compose poetry, the novelists turn out novels, the reviewers review.

JAMES ATLAS *is the author of* Delmore Schwartz: The Life of an American Poet *and an editor of the* New York Times Book Review.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Simpson has apparently followed it himself. An accomplished poet whose autobiographical narratives are as absorbing as a good story, he has published two books of criticism in the last three years: *Three on the Tower: The Lives and Works of Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, and William Carlos Williams* and now *A Revolution in Taste*, which more or less takes up where the earlier work left off.

Simpson's own poems belong to the democratic mode now in vogue; composed in a willfully prosaic idiom designed to avoid the stigma that attaches to the "literary," they confine themselves to a homely, modest voice utterly without pretension. His last collection, *Searching for the Ox*, made use of dialogue, specific reference, and the circumstances of his own life in the manner of Robert Lowell's *Notebook* sonnets, but with none of their rhetorical urgency. Even so, Simpson managed to achieve the compressed language and cadence that poetry demands.

Criticism, however, requires a rather more vigorous prosecution of argument if it hopes to persuade or instruct; in his critical works, Simpson's pose of humility comes across as truculence, a defiant simplicity. Deliberately naive, he adopts the style of one writing a primer and offers up versions of literary history that resemble the composite portraits of fugitives—in other words, recognizable to no one.

"In the 19th century," he writes in *A Revolution in Taste*,

> Romantic authors praised nature and celebrated the individual. The artist with his unusual powers of feeling was regarded as a hero. But by the middle of the century disillusionment had set in: that is, artists were disillusioned. Science and industry were making great advances, and people seemed to think little of art, only of making money.

Such a gloss is not wrong, precisely; but to whom is it addressed? It could hardly be intelligible to those unfamiliar with the period; and to those who are, Simpson's potted summations of history and literary influence seem hopelessly oversimplified.

WHAT is the argument of *A Revolution in Taste*? Apparently, that the modernist movement represented by Eliot and Pound—in particular their demand for impersonality and their plundering of the literary past—has succumbed before the turmoil and self-obsession of our time. As exhibits of the mode that has succeeded them, Simpson selects, more or less at random, four poets of a later generation—Thomas, Ginsberg, Plath, and Lowell—who "created art out of the confusion of their lives." Mingling biography, textual commentary, and opinion about their temperaments and work, he has produced what are essentially summaries of others' scholarship. Indeed, so heavily does Simpson draw on standard sources that pages at a time consist of virtual paraphrase.

When it comes to his own literary opinions, Simpson's laconic irreverence does provide a few moments of wit. Berryman's *Dream Songs*, he writes, "were like singing in the shower." Deflating Pound's fatuous Social Credit theories, he notes wryly: "If Pound wanted to change the system of banking, it was in order that artists might be free to do as they liked." And Dylan Thomas's letters are said to evoke "the atmosphere of a pub shortly before closing time when talk is loud and the foaming tankards pass swiftly across the counter." But the only real literary doctrine to be found in *A Revolution in Taste* is that formal conventions of verse will no longer serve to represent the diffuse, fragmented culture that has arisen over the last two decades. Resolutely anti-literary, Simpson derides what he calls "accomplished" or "academic" verse, by which he means simply verse composed in traditional forms. But surely accomplishment is one of the qualities that determines art. Since when has it become a pejorative term? And to say

The Shadow of KEYNES

Elizabeth S. Johnson
Harry G. Johnson

Here is Keynes as a man—forceful, brilliant, quirky—and as an economist of enduring influence on both academic research and popular economic ideas. Here, too, is a vivid picture of the Cambridge society in which he was such a dominating figure. The authors of these collected essays are particularly qualified to write on Keynes and his intellectual and social milieu; Elizabeth S. Johnson as editor of four volumes of *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes* and Harry G. Johnson as a notable economic theorist who was both student and lecturer at Cambridge. $15.00



The University of Chicago Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Le Moal

942 Third Avenue
(Between 56 & 57 St.)
New York, N.Y. 10022 / MU 8-8860

The Execution
a novel by
Robert Mayer
"An absorbing novel, ostensibly about the human horror of capital punishment, but more generally about human beings trapped innocently by social injustice."
—Doris Grumbach, *Chicago Tribune*
THE VIKING PRESS $8.95
625 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022

SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE
Please include a COMMENTARY address label to insure prompt service whenever you write us about your subscription.
MAIL TO: COMMENTARY
165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

CHANGE OF ADDRESS
If you're moving, please let us know five weeks before changing your address. Place magazine address label here, print your new address below. If you have a question about your subscription, place your magazine address label here and clip this form to your letter.

ATTACH LABEL HERE

name
address
city
state zip code

that Lowell and Auden "stood for poetry written in traditional forms and in a language removed from actual speech" is just wrong. Their whole effort was to fuse colloquialism with the literary tradition to which they had apprenticed themselves.

Simpson is quick to condemn the ideas, political and other kinds, of his subjects. Of the arch, snobbish pose Eliot cultivated in his essays, he observes (in *Three on the Tower*): "Outside in the dark were multitudes who did not understand, wailing and gnashing their teeth." And in *A Revolution in Taste* he discloses his antagonism toward Lowell in the very first sentence: "Robert Lowell was born into the class of people in Boston who used to hand down standards of ethics and culture to the rest of the country." Exploiting Lowell's revelations about his mental illness, he intimates that the poet was "not well," and thus remote from life. For "these neurotics to find the way there"—that is, to discover what is significant in life—was no more probable than for "a member of the Yale Club to enter Aladdin's cave." In Simpson's mind, poetry seems to be a political, even a class issue.

This is not to say that the dangerous ideas promoted by so many of the greatest writers in this century should be condoned. Pound, Eliot, Yeats, Williams, D.H. Lawrence, and even Lowell were guilty of anti-Semitism in some form or other (though Lowell was far from vociferous about it, and Simpson can find only a single derogatory reference to Jews in his work); the matter has often been discussed, notably in John R. Harrison's *The Reactionaries: A Study of the Anti-Democratic Intelligentsia.* But the very condition Simpson deplores—the sense of being denied the consolations of a distinct literary tradition—is in part what prompted these writers to embrace reactionary ideologies; they were determined to acquire for themselves the social and cultural authority necessary to advance their work. And while they may be faulted for having succumbed to what Philip Rahv once called "the megalomaniacal disposition of modern art," theirs was an aristocracy of literary talent, not of birth.

Moreover, Simpson himself is no populist. Allen Ginsberg's unkempt personality displeases him, and he is obviously troubled by the anarchy of contemporary American poetry, which has become "almost exclusively a means of self-expression." Why? Because "the impersonality of the modern bureaucratic state" has destroyed the poet's audience (Simpson never specifies quite how). He seems resigned to the proposition that poets can only "create a feeling of community among a few thousand readers" while awaiting "the birth of a larger community." But what a curious, fatalistic, passive, and self-limiting notion this is. The pervasive sense of impersonality is precisely what inspired some of the classics of modern poetry, from Eliot's "Prufrock" to Auden's "September 1, 1939."

Simpson persists in addressing himself to "a few thousand souls in sympathy with one another," "bound together by something closer to their heart's desire than the noise of the world." No wonder poetry has lost its audience! Those of us with blunter sensibilities, who have to listen to the world's noise, are grateful whenever an artist can interpret it for us.

Silent Americans

The Guns of Lattimer. By Michael Novak. *Basic Books. 276 pp. $10.95.*

Reviewed by Arch Puddington

Unlike its counterparts in other Western democracies, the American labor movement has never embraced revolutionary ideologies calling for the ultimate transformation of the economic order. And yet, ironically enough, trade unions in this country encountered far more intense opposition to their struggle for social legitimacy than did the organized

Arch Puddington *is executive director of the League for Industrial Democracy and editor of* New America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

labor movements of practically every other democratic nation. For the early capitalist entrepreneurs, the challenge posed by the unions transcended the obvious issues of economic self-interest; as historian Lewis Lorwin observed, the employees of the late 19th and early 20th centuries fought the unions "with [the] conviction of serving a cause." They were encouraged to maintain the hard line by a dominant political and social structure that was permeated with an anti-union animus. Newspapers, particularly the largest and most influential, routinely characterized unions as violence-prone, subversive of democratic values, and motivated by foreign ideas and individuals. More crucial than the bias of the press were the policies of government officials. Every branch of government—but especially and most significantly the law-enforcement agencies—was hostile to the emerging trade-union movement. In fact, the principal reason for the existence of many state militias was the maintenance of industrial peace, which in practice often meant intervening in strikes on the side of business.

Given the lethal combination of worker outrage over the degrading conditions of early industrialism and the self-righteous unwillingness to compromise of the capitalist class, it is hardly surprising that the history of the American labor movement is filled with incidents of violence and bloodshed. One of the most tragic—and senseless—occurred on September 10, 1897, when a sheriff's posse opened fire on a group of striking coal miners at Lattimer, a mining hamlet near Hazleton, Pennsylvania. The details of the Lattimer massacre are the stuff legends are made of: seldom has there been such a clear-cut case of powerful economic interests combining with cooperative civil authorities in an effort to crush a workers' movement.

The miners were, of course, among the most wretched of the industrial workforce. They lived in ramshackle houses near the pits, suffered the exploitation of the company-store system, and were subject to a wage system—they were paid by the amount of coal extracted rather than by the hours spent on the job—that exacted an economic penalty for any minutes devoted to the construction of safety equipment.

Until the shooting broke out, the strike had been almost completely free of violence; nor had mine property been destroyed. Radicalism was not an issue: John Fahy, the United Mineworkers official who organized the anthracite district, was politically moderate and tactically conservative; he was more concerned with building a strong union than with precipitating futile and unnecessary confrontations with the owners. At Fahy's insistence, the miners refrained from carrying weapons; the eyewitness accounts of the massacre agreed that the deputies' barrage was unprovoked. Indeed, subsequent evidence showed that most of the dead

Now Available:



Hilaire Belloc: Edwardian Radical
By John P. McCarthy

A perceptive, lucid, and carefully-researched look at Belloc and British political history during the Edwardian period, the first years of the twentieth century. Dr. McCarthy is Assistant Professor of History at Fordham University. Hardcover $8.00, Paperback $3.00.

The Servile State
By Hilaire Belloc

A perceptive warning, first published in 1913, of the consequences of statism and the effect of socialist doctrine on capitalist society. With an introduction by Robert Nisbet. "A landmark of political thought in this century"—Walter Lippmann. Hardcover $8.00, Softcover $2.00.

LibertyPress LibertyClassics

We pay postage on prepaid orders.
To order these books, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
LibertyPress/LibertyClassics
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 264
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Explore
the reality of
American
Judaism

ARTHUR
HERTZBERG
Being Jewish
in America
THE MODERN EXPERIENCE

"[Hertzberg's] is a razor-sharp mind, flashing both incisive perceptions and sharp glints of humor. . . . In clarifying wide-ranging issues, he illuminates such problems as Jewish identity in a pluralistic society, Jews and race relations, the position of the American rabbinate, and American Jewry's attitudes toward Zionism and Israel. Candid, balanced and timely, these essays explore the bedrock reality of American Judaism."
—*Publishers Weekly*

$16.95 Just Published

SCHOCKEN
200 Madison Avenue, New York 10016

Save more
on quality
books from
Marboro.

Every year Marboro offers thousands of new, mostly hardcover books at 40% - 90% off publisher's prices! History books, biography, art, literature, reference, psychology, fiction, sci-fi, how-to, mystery, and hundreds of other subjects. Send us this coupon today and we will put you on our mailing list.

Marboro Books, Dept. CO1
205 Moonachie Rd.
Moonachie, N.J. 07074

Name

Address

City State Zip

men were shot in the back as they fled from the initial volley. As for the deputies, almost all were connected by relation or occupation with the coal companies; their attitudes—or at least the attitudes of a crucial minority—were reflected by one of their number, Alonzo Dodson, who declared before the confrontation that deputies "ought to get so much a head for shooting down these strikers." When the gunfire ended, some deputies roamed around the massacre site, kicking and cursing the dying and wounded; others bragged as they rode back to town about how many miners they had brought down.

Nineteen miners were killed and another sixty wounded. Measured by the standard of sheer loss of life, Lattimer ranks among the half-dozen or so greatest tragedies in American labor history. More men were killed in five minutes at Lattimer than died in the Homestead or Pullman strikes, or in the 1937 Chicago Memorial Day massacre, or the auto-industry organizing drive during the 1930's.

Yet Lattimer has until now been ignored by historians, including labor specialists and those who have written studies of American violence. Even in its own time, the shooting failed to capture wide popular interest; a campaign to raise a charity fund for the victims' widows brought in a pitiful $4,000.

IT IS Michael Novak's thesis that Lattimer has been forgotten because of the ethnicity of the victims. All of the dead were Slavs, "the most silent, the most invisible, Americans," according to Novak. For Novak, race and ethnicity have exerted far greater influence on the shaping of the American character than class differences; he believes, further, that this was the case even in the days when workers fought the representatives of capital with fists, clubs, and guns. He asserts:

> The tragic destiny of America is hidden in its virtue. Its founders, so noble and enlightened in countless ways, suffered from racial blindness in the largest sense: those of Northern European culture have imagined themselves to be superior to other races of any color, including white. Moral in so many ways, they have found reason even in their moral virtue for feeling superior. Every other race feels this whip.

So sweeping a conclusion is at best debatable, particularly when one examines the level of racial tolerance in other societies. But it is not difficult to understand how Novak could reach such a judgment; unquestionably the Slavs were feared and despised by the English-speaking natives of Pennsylvania's coal region. *The Guns of Lattimer* is in fact a powerful indictment of a dominant group's prejudice against a minority of foreigners who were industrious, law-abiding, and prepared to adhere to democratic norms. (Many Slavic miners endured their harsh existence with one goal in mind: to save enough money to bring the rest of their family to America.) Contempt for the Slavs, Poles, and Italian immigrants was not limited to the mine owners; it touched every segment of the English-speaking population, including workingmen. So strong were nativist feelings in Pennsylvania that the state legislature passed a resolution labeling the new wave of immigrants as "an ignorant and vicious class" and enacted laws relegating foreigners to the most dangerous, unpleasant, and poorly paid jobs in the mines.

The attitudes of the state's economic and civic elite were no better than those of the state legislators. Unlike the working classes, the distinguished representatives of what Novak calls "the ruling race of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" felt no economic threat from the new immigrants, and in the case of the industrialists, actually profited from the Slavs' willingness to hire cheap. But if the workingmen and farmers were simple bigots in their attitude to the Slavs, the elite could be characterized as enlightened nativists. General John Gobin, who commanded the National Guard brigade dispatched to Hazleton in the shooting's aftermath, described the Slavs as "dull to fear and indifferent to death" and suggested that they were quite capable of scheming to overthrow the American government. (Gobin was later to serve as lieu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

14 factors that could affect the performance of your next prescription.

Before you ask your pharmacist for a cheaper version of the medication prescribed by your doctor, consider.

In making the "same" drug, different companies may exercise different levels of skill and care. They formulate and manufacture the "same" product differently.

Change the inactive ingredients, compress the tablets too much, make any of a dozen other misjudgments, and the resulting product may cause problems. Yet it could look just like a well-made drug.

That's why it's vital to control factors like the few we've listed. To assure quality in every prescription drug, at every stage from research lab to pharmacy shelf.

PMA believes every company should be required to document the biological performance of its products and identify the actual manufacturer on the package label. Because the manufacturer's competence is the key to quality.

To know you're getting a drug of assured quality at an acceptable price, ask your doctor and your pharmacist. These professionals know drugs. And they know drug companies from long experience.

They know that established firms—those with proven quality assurance programs—produce consistently reliable medicines. Such products sometimes cost a little more. But in drug therapy as in drug manufacturing, a saving at the expense of quality could be the worst kind of economy.



The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.

If a new medicine can help, we're working on it.

With your health at stake, you may want to know more. Please write for our "Key Facts" booklet. It's free.
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Dept. CM-903, 1155 Fifteenth St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The signposts of success are clearly lettered.

Seagram's V.O.

Bottled in Canada. Preferred throughout the world.

Enjoy our quality in moderation.

Canadian whisky. A blend of Canada's finest whiskies. 6 years old. 86.8 Proof. Seagram Distillers Co., N.Y.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED